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Introduction
In several countries major health care reforms have been implemented in the last de-
cades. Most of these reforms focused on a shift from supply-side regulation to a more 
demand-side oriented system. Managed competition can be seen as a blue print for 
the reforms in several European countries including the Netherlands, Germany and 
Switzerland (Enthoven and van de Ven 2007, van de Ven 1996). With the introduction of 
managed competition, the structure of the health care market shifted to a more market 
oriented system in which third-party payers are responsible for the purchase of care. In 
most countries, health insurers function as third-party payers. Health insurers are given 
incentives and tools to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their enrollees. Enroll-
ees are given incentives to encourage insurers to act as prudent buyers of care since 
they have to buy a health insurance plan on a competitive health insurance market.
In this thesis we focus on the Dutch health care system. The introduction of the new 
Health Insurance Act (HIA) in 2006 has been a major step in the transition towards man-
aged competition. Under the HIA all persons who legally live or work in the Netherlands 
are obliged to buy a basic benefit package from a private health insurer on a competitive 
health insurance market. Health insurers are obliged to accept all applicants against a 
community rated premium. Via a risk equalization fund health insurers are compensated 
for high risk enrollees. Consumers can receive subsidies that make insurance affordable 
for everyone (Van de Ven and Schut 2009). With the introduction of the HIA price com-
petition on the health insurance market increased substantially. Moreover, insurers are 
given different tools to act as prudent buyers of care. Insurers can selectively contract 
with health care providers and offer different health plans to their enrollees including 
e.g. preferred provider plans and traditional fee-for-service plans.
Health insurers as prudent buyer of care
The introduction of managed competition implies that health insurers have to operate 
on a two-sided market (Armstrong 2002, Caillaud and Jullien 2003). In such markets an 
intermediary connects two sides of the market. The benefits an intermediary obtains 
on one side of the market depend on the benefits the intermediary can obtain on the 
other side of the market. A well known problem in two-sided markets is the ‘chicken and 
egg’ problem in which either side of the market is only willing to connect to the inter-
mediary if the other side of the market is (Armstrong 2002, Caillaud and Jullien 2003). 
In health care, insurers can be seen as the intermediary that connects the provider and 
consumer side of the market. The ‘chicken and egg’ problem also arises in health care 
where enrollees are only willing to enter into a contract with an insurer if the insurer 
offers an attractive network of providers while providers are only willing to conclude a 
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contract with an insurer if the insurer is able to offer an attractive network of enrollees. 
For providers not only the size of the network matters but also insurers’ ability to suc-
cessfully channel enrollees to providers within their network. Hence, insurers’ ability to 
act as prudent buyers of care largely depends on their ability to successfully channel 
enrollees towards preferred providers (Pauly 1987, Sorensen 2003, Wu 2009). The ability 
to successfully channel enrollees not only depends on the attractiveness of preferred 
providers (Capps, et al. 2003, Town and Vistnes 2001) but also on consumers’ willingness 
to accept restrictions on provider choice (Miller 2006).
Channeling strategies
Insurers are able to channel enrollees toward preferred providers via various channeling 
strategies. In the US, insurers typically encourage preferred provider utilization through 
negative financial incentives (higher co-payments for non-contracted providers). The 
most restrictive forms are the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) that only offer 
reimbursement for within network care (except in case of emergency). More popular, 
however, are the less restrictive Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) that offer partial 
reimbursement for non-contracted providers. Instead of negative financial incentives, 
insurers can also use positive incentives, either qualitative (e.g. better service and lower 
waiting times) or financial (e.g. discounts and bonus payments) to encourage preferred 
provider use. Positive channeling incentives may be particularly useful when insurers 
negotiate favorable contracts with preferred providers but do not want to restrict their 
provider network by selective contracting. Despite the widespread use of managed 
care plans in the US little is known about consumer sensitivity to various channeling 
incentives. Most empirical papers focused on the effects of restricted networks on the 
bargaining power of the insurer.
Goal
Insurers’ ability to influence provider choice is an important precondition for effective 
negotiations with providers. In the Netherlands, however, prior to the reform health 
insurers had limited experience with influencing provider choice. Moreover, in general 
little is known about effective channeling strategies. Therefore, it is not clear whether 
the important precondition for effective negotiations can be fulfilled. The goal of this 
thesis is to shed light on this question by investigating consumers’ responsiveness to 
channeling incentives in the Dutch health care market. Moreover, we evaluate whether 
health insurers have been able to take up their role as active purchaser of care in the 
reformed Dutch health care market.
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Relevance
Though this study focuses on the Dutch insurance context, the conclusions will be 
relevant for other countries as well. First, the conclusions are relevant for countries 
that recently introduced selective contracting in their health insurance scheme, e.g. 
Germany and Switzerland. Second, also in the US there is relatively little research on 
insurers’ ability to channel enrollees. Most research focused on health plan choice or on 
health plans’ ability to channel enrollees using exclusionary networks (Glied 2000, Wu 
2008, Zweifel and Manning 2000). Since the managed care backlash (Gawande, et al. 
1998, Miller 2006), however, insurers are turning increasingly to less restrictive provider 
networks such as preferred provider networks. There is little insight in the most effective 
strategy to channel enrollees to certain providers within a network (Wu 2009).
Central questions, structure and content
The central question, which is examined in the context of the new Dutch health care 
system, is:
Are insurers able to channel enrollees to preferred providers in order to effectively act as 
prudent buyers of care?
In order to answer the central question we formulated the following specific research 
questions:
Q1: How are insurers taking up their role as prudent buyers of care since the introduction of 
the new HIA in the Dutch health care market?
Q2: How did consumer attitudes towards channeling incentives and restrictions on provider 
choice developed since the introduction of the new HIA in the Dutch health care market?
In chapter 2, we develop a theoretical framework using insights from two-sided markets, 
option demand and principal-agent theories. The theoretical framework assesses the 
importance of consumer channeling in health care markets with managed competition. 
With a document analysis, a literature review and interviews with four major health 
insurers we analyze whether and how insurers used selective contracting and channel-
ing incentives since the introduction of the HIA. In addition, we investigate consumers’ 
attitudes towards restrictions on provider choice and channeling incentives using sur-
veys over the period 2005-2009. Finally, we discuss the likely impact of these (changing) 
attitudes on insurer behavior.
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Q3: What is the impact of insurers’ experiments with channeling incentives on provider 
choice?
In chapter 3, we focus on the outcomes of the first natural experiments in the Netherlands 
with preferred provider arrangements. Several health insurers concluded preferred pro-
vider contracts in the pharmaceutical market and tried to encourage enrollees through 
positive financial and qualitative incentives to visit the preferred pharmacy. This chapter 
analyzes the impact of these introduced channeling incentives on provider choice.
Q4: Are consumers sensitive to different channeling incentives to encourage the use of 
preferred providers?
Q4a: Does sensitivity to channeling incentives differ between different providers?
Q4b: How does status quo bias affect sensitivity to channeling incentives?
Q4c: Does status quo bias differ between different providers?
Since natural experiments in the Dutch health care market have been quite limited, 
we designed two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) to elicit consumer preferences 
for different channeling incentives in the pharmaceutical market and the market for 
general practitioner (GP) services. We have chosen for these two market segments 
since consumers already have some experience with preferred provider arrangements 
in the pharmaceutical market, which adds to the reality of our experiment, and since 
we expect that consumer preferences for these two providers strongly differ. We expect 
preferences for pharmacies to be relatively weak and relatively price elastic. Preferences 
for GPs are expected to be strong because of the often long-term and confidential rela-
tionship consumers have with their GP. We expect that the preferences for other health 
care providers, such as hospitals, medical specialists and physiotherapists, are weaker 
than for GPs and stronger than for pharmacies.1
With two discrete choice experiments we estimate consumers’ sensitivity to different 
financial and qualitative incentives (including practice characteristics) insurers can use 
to encourage the use of preferred providers. In addition, we confront consumers with 
choices between their current provider and a hypothetical preferred (better) alternative 
to estimate a possible status quo bias. Status quo bias implies that consumers are reluc-
tant to leave their current provider even when better alternatives are readily available. 
We expect the status quo bias to be higher with providers with whom consumers have a 
long-term and confidential relationship. Hence, status quo bias in GP choice is expected 
1. This expectation is corroborated by a survey among 2000 respondents (Keuzenkamp 2006) in which 
the reported switching propensities for various health care providers were the least for GPs and the 
highest for pharmacies.
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to play a larger role than in pharmacy choice. The effectiveness of channeling incentives 
is expected to decrease once consumers are more attached to a specific provider.
These research questions are dealt with in chapters 4, 5 and 6. In chapter 4 we analyze 
and discuss the results of a DCE about pharmacy choice. In chapter 5 we analyze and 
discuss the results of a DCE about GP choice. Finally, the results of both DCEs are com-
pared in chapter 6 and the implications are discussed for the effectiveness of consumer 
channeling for both types of providers.
In chapter 7, we summarize the answers to the research questions and provide an over-
view of the most important lessons that can be drawn.
Because the chapters of this thesis are written as separate articles for different interna-
tional journals2, each chapter can be read independently. The obvious advantage for the 
reader is that (s)he can skip one or more chapters without missing essential information 
necessary to understanding the other chapters. A drawback is, however, that various 
chapters have some degree of overlap, particularly with respect to the description of the 
Dutch health care reform and the literature reviews.
2. Chapter 2, 5 and 6 are submitted for publication in international journals. Chapter 3 is published 
in Health Economics and chapter 4 is published in the International journal of Health Care Finance and 
Economics.
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Abstract
We investigate the impact of the transition towards managed competition in the Dutch 
health care system. In particular, we examine whether insurers have been able to take up 
their role as prudent buyers of care and examine consumers’ attitudes towards managed 
care. We develop a theoretical framework using insights from two-sided markets, option 
demand and principal-agent theories. With a document analysis, a literature review and 
interviews with four major health insurers, we examine insurers’ contracting behavior. 
Using survey analysis over the period 2005-2009, we investigate consumers’ attitudes 
towards selective contracting and channeling by health insurers. Our results show that 
health insurers are very reluctant to engage in selective contracting but rather use ‘soft’ 
positive incentives to encourage preferred provider use. Consumer attitudes toward 
channeling vary considerably by type of provider but generally became more negative 
in the first two years after the reform. Insurers’ reluctance to use selective contracting 
can be explained by the presence of a credible-commitment problem. Consumers do 
not trust that insurers with restrictive networks are committed to provide good quality 
care. The credible-commitment problem limits insurers’ ability to effectively channel 
enrollees. Increasing the availability of adequate information about provider quality is 
required to reduce the credible-commitment problem.
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Introduction
Since the 1990s the Dutch health care system has been in transition from supply-side 
government regulation toward managed competition (Van de Ven and Schut 2009). A 
major step in this transition process has been the introduction of the Health Insurance 
Act (HIA) in 2006. The HIA is based on the principles of managed competition within the 
context of a national health insurance system under which all persons who legally live or 
work in the Netherlands are obliged to buy, on an annual basis, a basic benefit package 
from a private health insurer (Enthoven and van de Ven 2007). Health insurers had to 
become prudent buyers of care on behalf of their enrollees and were therefore given the 
possibilities to selectively contract or integrate with (all) health care providers.3
Insurers’ ability to act as prudent buyers of care (contracting high quality care at a 
reasonable price) crucially depends on their ability to channel enrollees to selected pro-
viders (Pauly 1987, Sorensen 2003, Wu 2009). In turn this depends on the attractiveness 
of the selected providers to consumers and consumers’ willingness to switch to these 
providers. Insurers have different possibilities to channel enrollees to selected providers. 
In the US, health insurers typically use negative financial incentives to channel enrollees 
to selectively contracted providers. These incentives are strongest in the case of Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). The most restrictive HMOs use purely exclusionary 
provider networks and do not provide any reimbursement of out-of-network use (ex-
cept in emergencies). More popular, however, are the less restrictive preferred provider 
organizations that partially reimburse non-contracted care. Rather than using negative 
incentives, health insurers may also employ positive incentives to encourage the use 
of preferred providers, e.g. by facilitating utilization, better service, discounts or bonus 
payments. Positive channeling incentives may be particularly useful when insurers 
negotiate favourable contracts with preferred providers but do not want to restrict their 
provider network by selective contracting. Moreover, in some markets it may not be 
possible or credible to exclude providers from a network (Wu 2009).
In this paper, we examine whether insurers in the Dutch health care market have, since 
the introduction of the Health Insurance Act (HIA) in 2006, been able to take up their role 
as prudent buyers of care and whether they have been able to channel enrollees toward 
preferred providers. In addition, we investigate consumers’ attitudes towards the new 
role of health insurers and the use of channeling incentives. Our findings are not only 
relevant in the Dutch context but also for an increasing number of other countries that 
have introduced managed competition and selective contracting (e.g. Germany and 
Switzerland) or are contemplating to do so.
3. See for detailed description of the new health insurance scheme Enthoven and van de Ven (2007).
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First, we develop a conceptual framework using insights from two-sided market, op-
tion demand, and principal-agent theories and give a brief overview of the empirical 
literature with respect to selective contracting and consumer channeling. Second, we 
shortly describe the methods used. Next, we analyze the developments with respect 
to insurers’ contracting policies and consumer channeling during the first years of the 
transition towards managed competition. We then examine the attitudes of enrollees 
to the introduction of restrictions on provider choice in the Dutch system using survey 
data from the year prior to the reform until 2009. We end with a discussion of the results 
and the most important conclusions.
Conceptual framework
With the introduction of managed competition, health care systems are reformed into 
systems in which insurers and providers bargain over the price and quality of health care 
services (Wu 2009). The outcome of the insurer-provider bargaining process is influenced 
by several factors. (Pauly 1987) formulated three necessary conditions for health insur-
ers to obtain discounts from health care providers. First, the net revenue of a hospital 
must be worse with lower volumes than with discounted charges. Second, insurers must 
be able to credibly threat to remove patients from a non-preferred provider. And third, 
providers must be unable to replace these new patients. These conditions apply to both 
the relationship between the insurer and provider and to the relationship between the 
insurer and its enrollees. Insurers will only be able to negotiate price discounts if they are 
able to influence consumer choice of providers. Once they are unable to move patients 
towards preferred providers, providers will be unwilling to offer discounted charges to 
the insurer.
Conceptually the interaction between these conditions can best be described by 
using the concept of two-sided markets (Armstrong 2002, Caillaud and Jullien 2003). 
In two-sided markets an intermediary connects two different sides of the market. The 
benefits an intermediary obtains on one side of the market depend on the benefits 
the intermediary can obtain on the other side of the market. A well known problem in 
two-sided markets is the ‘chicken and egg’ problem in which either side of the market is 
only willing to connect to the intermediary if the other side of the market is (Armstrong 
2002, Caillaud and Jullien 2003). An example is a dating service. Males are only willing 
to subscribe with the dating service if the dating service has enough females and vice 
versa.
In health care markets, insurers can be seen as intermediaries that connect the pro-
vider side of the market with the consumer side of the market. Also in the insurance 
market the ‘chicken and egg’ problem can arise; enrollees are only willing to enter into 
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a contract with an insurer if the insurer offers an attractive network of providers while 
providers are only willing to conclude a contract with an insurer if the insurer is able to 
offer an attractive network of enrollees. For the provider not only the size of the insurer 
in terms of enrollees matters but also the ability of the health insurer to steer its patients 
to the selected providers.
The ability of the health insurer to steer its patients to selected providers depends on 
the value of the network the insurer offers to enrollees but also on consumers’ willingness 
to accept restrictions on provider choice. Consumer demand for restricted networks can 
best be described by the option demand theory (Capps, et al. 2003, Town and Vistnes 
2001). Option demand theory applies to situations in which consumers buy an option to 
use a product rather than buying the product directly. When consumers choose a health 
plan they buy an option to use the contracted providers once they need care. The value 
of the option is determined by the ex-ante value of the network to the consumer. This 
value depends on consumers’ expectations of how well the network is able to meet their 
needs (Capps, et al. 2003). These expectations can be described in terms of consumers’ 
ex ante willingness to pay to retain a hospital in a network. The willingness to pay for a 
hospital depends e.g. on the out-of-pocket price, hospital quality, its appeal to consum-
ers and the geographic location of the hospital. Hospitals with a greater incremental 
value to the insurers’ network have a higher bargaining power. Hospital competition 
thus mainly focuses on being in- or excluded from an insurers’ network.
Consumers’ willingness to accept restrictions on provider choice may be limited by 
a credible commitment problem (Miller 2006). Miller (2006) argues that health insur-
ers with restricted networks are less able to credibly commit to provide better than 
least-cost care. Consumers often distrust integrated organizations in which insurers and 
providers are financially linked, such as health maintenance organizations, because of 
potential conflicts of interests. If consumers are not able to verify health insurers’ efforts 
to provide good quality care ex ante, they are less likely to believe that health plans with 
restricted networks offer the best treatment. The credible commitment problem may 
thus form a barrier to the insurer to actually use restricted provider networks since the 
ex ante value of restricted networks is rated below that of open networks.
Previous empirical findings
There is a vast amount of literature on the emergence of managed care plans and the 
effects of managed care plans on insurers’ bargaining power. Most literature focuses 
on the US since managed care organizations are widely present in the US health care 
market. During the last decades managed care plans have grown so fast that since the 
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1990s they dominate the US health insurance market (Glied 2000). In 2008 about 97% of 
insured working Americans were enrolled in a managed care plan (Claxton, et al. 2008).
According to Glied (2000), managed care plans in the US use different mechanisms to 
contain costs including selective and preferred provider contracting, different payment 
methods, cost-sharing instruments and methods to monitor utilization. Selective and 
preferred provider contracting is commonly used to contain costs (Dranove, et al. 2008, 
Wu 2009). In the early years of managed care, plans with exclusive provider networks 
such as HMOs dominated the market place. Over the years there has been a shift from 
these HMOs to plans that use partial consumer channeling such as preferred provider 
organizations (PPOs). PPO enrolment under insured working Americans increased from 
16% in 1988 to 58% in 2008 (Claxton, et al. 2008).
Several empirical studies focused on the impact of size and the use of exclusionary 
networks on the insurer’s bargaining power vis-à-vis health care providers (Melnick, et 
al. 1992, Smith 1997, Sorensen 2003, Staten, et al. 1987, Zwanziger and Mooney 2005). 
Results showed that prices paid by managed care plans are strongly influenced by the 
structure of the market, managed care plan’s ability to credibly threat to move market 
share, and the degree to which insurers selectively contract with health care provid-
ers. In competitive markets, providers give higher discounts than in less competitive 
markets. In general, managed care organizations are able to extract higher discounts 
than traditional fee for service organizations. The studies by (Capps, et al. 2001, Capps, 
et al. 2003, Town and Vistnes 2001) showed that insurers’ bargaining power is positively 
affected by their ability to exclude hospitals from their network. Even though the ef-
fectiveness of selective contracting decreased over the period 1990-2003, managed 
care organizations are still able to play competitive hospitals off against each other to 
obtain discounts (Dranove, et al. 2008). A recent study by (Wu 2009) showed that also 
partial consumer channeling can have a positive effect on the negotiated discounts by 
managed care organizations.
Methods
To investigate the purchasing behavior of insurers over the period 2006-2009 we per-
formed an extensive review of publicly available information sources including websites 
of insurers, reports from the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa), the federation of patient 
and consumer organizations, the Ministry of Health and consumer websites. In addition, 
we held interviews with representatives from the four largest health insurers (with a 
total market share of almost 90%) about their purchasing strategies.
Second, we used surveys to examine consumer attitudes towards managed competi-
tion. We use survey data over the period 2005-2009. In 2005 and 2006 we used two 
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surveys that were issued by a major Dutch health insurer. One survey was issued under 
a representative panel of the adult Dutch population in 2005 (n = 2006) and 2006 (n = 
2003). The second survey, using partly the same questions, was issued among about 
803 randomly selected adult enrollees of the insurer (Keuzenkamp 2006) 4. In 2007 
4. Both surveys were performed by a well-known market research company (Intomart GFK). The 
research company claims that their research panel is representative of the Dutch population, but no 
individual background characteristics were provided. Since the respondents in both samples (Intomarkt 
GFK sample and insurer sample) provided similar answers to the same questions, the research company 
states that the randomly selected sample of enrollees is likely to be fairly representative too.
Table 2.1 Consumer characteristics
mean standard
deviation
min max
Age 2007 (n = 2234) 49.1 15.6 18 92
2009 (n = 1552) 52.5 15.9 16 94
2007  2009
% of total % of total
Health
Bad 1.07 1.1
Mediocre 12.44 13.34
Good 53.49 55.28
Very Good 26.63 24.61
Excellent 6.36 5.67
Gender Female 47.9 44.9
Education
Low 30.57 34.4
Intermediate 33.32 29.71
High 36.11 35.89
Work
Work 57.47 50.97
Pension 19.04 24.61
Other 23.48 24.42
Regular GP 96.58 98.58
Regular Pharmacy 96.64 95.88
Regular Physical therapists // 34.41
Regular Dentist // 89.76
Regular Hospital // 53.48
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and 2009 we set out a similar survey under an internet based household panel that is a 
representative sample of the adult Dutch population5. The panellists receive question-
naires biweekly and background characteristics of the respondents such as age, gender, 
income, and health status are known. In total about 2500 respondents participate in 
the internet based household panel (response rate was about 62% in 2009 and 89% in 
2007). The background characteristics of both samples are presented in table 2.1.
In all surveys respondents answered a question about their willingness to listen to 
advice from their health insurer. In the surveys in 2006, 2007 and 2009 respondents were 
also asked questions about their perception of quality differences between health care 
providers and their willingness to pay for free provider choice.
Insurers’ initiatives with selective and preferred provider 
contracting
Since the introduction of the HIA, the health insurance market rapidly consolidated to 
four large insurance companies and seven smaller insurers in 2009 (see table 2.2). The 
four large insurers each have several subsidiaries operating under different labels. The 
largest four insurance companies (including their subsidiaries) have 90% of the market.
5. The internet based household panel is set up by CentER data. CentER data guarantees that the panel is 
representative of the adult Dutch population. Also people who do not have internet access are included 
in the panel as CentER provides them with a so-called Net.Box that allows them to enter the data on their 
television screen. Respondents in the CentER data panel also stay over the course of time allowing for 
longitudinal research (http://www.centerdata.nl/en/centerpanel).
Table 2.2  Market shares of health insurers in 2008*
Insurance companies Market share 2008
(based on number of enrolees)
Achmea 29%
UVIT (Unive, VGZ, IZA, Trias) 26%
CZ-DLO 20%
Menzis 13%
De Friesland 3.1%
DSW-SH 2.5%
ONVZ 2.4%
Zorg en Zekerheid 2.2%
Fortis 1.1%
Salland 0.6%
PNO 0.2%
* Source: NZA, Monitor Zorgverzekeringsmarkt 2008 (NZA 2008a)
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During the first years of the new health insurance scheme, the majority of health 
insurers did not use selective contracting. Only few insurers tried to exclude providers 
from their network (selective contracting) but because of the negative publicity and 
the fear for reputation damage, most included these providers in their network later on 
(NZa 2007). Anticipating the use of selective contracting, health insurers did, however, 
introduce insurance policies with differentiated reimbursement limits for contracted 
and non-contracted providers. Typically, reimbursement limits for non-contracted care 
were set between 80% and 90% of that of contracted care. In practice, however, the 
differentiated reimbursement limits had negligible financial consequences for providers 
and enrollees as most health insurers contracted with almost all health care providers. 
Over time the number of people enrolled in a health plan with differentiated reimburse-
ment limits increased. In 2008, only about 35% of all enrollees still have a health plan 
that does not differentiate reimbursement between contracted and non-contracted 
care. The actual impact of these negative financial incentives to visit non-contracted 
providers remained very small, since health insurers still contracted more than 95% of all 
providers6. Hence, even though insurers included the possibility to selectively contract 
in their health care policies, in practice they offer fully contracted health plans. There are 
two small regional insurers (DSW and Zorg en Zekerheid, joint market share 5%) who 
actively inform their enrollees that they do not limit provider choice in any way or intend 
to do so in the future, and for that reason do not use differentiated reimbursement limits.
In 2008, one health insurer (Univé, subsidiary of UVIT) introduced a health plan with 
a selected network of providers. This plan fully reimburses contracted care including an 
internet pharmacy and 13 preferred hospitals7 (14% of all hospitals) of which 3 are aca-
demic hospitals8. If enrollees visit non-contracted hospitals or pharmacies9, they have to 
pay 20% of the care out-of-pocket up to a maximum amount of 500 euro per year. The 
6. Most insurers provide a list of all contracted providers on their website and do not specify which 
providers are not contracted or what percentage of providers they have contracted in total. In telephone 
consultations with insurers’ help desks, insurers mention that ‘you have to search very thoroughly to 
find a non-contracted provider’. Most insurers specifically mention that they contract with ‘nearly’ all 
providers. Only Achmea specified, as of 2009, on their website the percentage of contracted providers 
per category of care.
7. For emergency care and high specialty care enrollees can visit all hospitals in the Netherlands. In 
addition, if a contracted hospital refers an enrollee to a non-contracted hospital, hospital care is also fully 
reimbursed.
8. The contracted hospitals are spread over the twelve provinces in the Netherlands. In total there are 93 
hospitals in the Netherlands of which 8 are academic hospitals (www.RIVM.nl 2008).
9. In one region in the Netherlands (the Hague) the insurer also selected a preferred general practitioner 
(GP). Only enrollees who live in this region are obliged to visit this preferred GP, other enrollees are free 
to choose their own GP.
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health plan is targeted to young, healthy enrollees as advertisement is primarily through 
the internet. In 2008, this health plan had 13,000 enrollees of which 75% is between 18 
and 30 years old (NZA 2008a).
While other insurers are reluctant to use selective contracting they did start to in-
troduce ‘soft’ positive incentives (e.g. providing advice and information) to encourage 
the use of preferred suppliers that are selected on the basis of superior service or qual-
ity aspects, such as lower waiting times, higher consumer ratings or certificates about 
meeting certain quality standards. Until 2009, insurers did not use positive financial 
incentives to encourage the use of preferred providers. As of 2009, insurers are legally 
permitted to exclude costs of designated preferred providers from the mandatory and 
voluntary deductible people have to pay10. This gave insurers the possibility to introduce 
positive financial incentives to encourage preferred provider utilization. Half of the 
health insurers (with a total market share of 58%) started to use this legal option to offer 
a financial bonus in case of preferred hospital utilization in 2009 (NZA 2008b).
Insurers use different strategies to positively influence provider choice. First, two ma-
jor insurers (CZ-DLO and Menzis) have chosen not to use financial incentives to stimulate 
preferred provider utilization. Both insurers mainly focus on the communication of 
quality information to encourage preferred provider utilization. CZ-DLO explicitly states 
to refrain from using financial incentives because of the fear for reputation damage. 
Second, the largest health insurer (Achmea) uses positive financial incentives to encour-
age its enrollees to seeking the insurer’s advice about provider choice. Enrollees are 
exempted from paying the mandatory deductible once they consult Achmea concern-
ing hospital choice. According to Achmea, enrollees have to get used to insurers giving 
advice about hospital choice. Hence, not the actual decision to visit a preferred supplier 
is ‘rewarded’ but the decision to seek advice from the insurer. Third, two health insur-
ers (UVIT and DFZ) use positive financial incentives to stimulate their enrollees to visit 
preferred hospitals. Both insurers exempt enrollees from paying the mandatory and vol-
untary deductible once enrollees actually visit the selected hospitals. UVIT argues that 
the financial incentive is mainly used to influence provider behavior. The fear of loosing 
market share is expected to stimulate providers to increase their quality. Although these 
initiatives focused on hospital utilization, insurers are allowed to exempt enrollees from 
paying the mandatory and voluntary deductible for other forms of care as well.
Furthermore, occasionally health insurers vertically integrated with health care provid-
ers. These typically small scale integrations were mainly set up to decrease local provider 
shortages or to financially support health care providers. In general, most insurers are 
10. Since 2008 enrollees have a mandatory deductible of 155 euro per year. In addition, enrollees can 
choose a voluntary deductible up to 500 euro in return for a premium discount. In 2008, about 5% of all 
enrollees have chosen a voluntary deductible (NZA 2008b).
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reluctant to engage in vertical integration. Although the largest health insurer (Achmea) 
owned several health centers in the past, it does no longer perceive vertical integration 
as a future strategy. The second largest insurer (UVIT) explained in an interview that 
vertical integration is not its main strategy but can be used as an instrument to put 
pressure on incumbent health care providers to deliver high quality care. UVIT is cur-
rently negotiating with several health care institutions about a possible cooperation. 
The third major insurer (CZ-DLO) sees integration mainly as an ‘emergency’ option in 
case the insurer is unable to contract sufficient care for its enrollees. In the past, CZ-
DLO participated in an orthopaedic clinic to reduce waiting lists and after waiting lists 
were sufficiently reduced the participation was terminated. Finally, the fourth largest 
health insurer (Menzis) is most actively involved in vertical integration. Although Menzis 
participates in several primary health centers its CEO states that he does not intend to 
become a HMO type insurer. The participation in primary health centers was based on 
GP shortages and considerations to improve the efficiency of primary care. Menzis does 
not limit provider choice nor excludes enrollees from other insurers from visiting their 
health centers.
In table 2.3 we summarized the main initiatives insurers have undertaken over the 
past few years to manage care for five specific care categories including pharmaceuti-
cal care, physical therapy, GP care, maternity care and hospital care. These initiatives 
illustrate that insurers are slowly but gradually expanding managed care activities and 
so far have confined themselves to ‘soft’ strategies to influence provider choice.
Consumers’ attitudes toward preferred providers
Using survey data over the period 2005-2009, we investigated consumers’ attitudes 
to the introduction of managed competition and whether these attitudes changed 
over time. We present the results for the different questions separately11. With logistic 
regressions per provider type we tested for differences in responses related to consumer 
characteristics such as age, gender and health status.12
First, we asked respondents whether or not they perceived quality differences be-
tween providers. We confronted respondents with this question since we expect that 
perceived quality differences influence provider choice. People may be less inclined to 
11. The results presented in the figures include the year 2008. Since we do not have information on 
consumers’ perceptions in 2008, we used interpolation to obtain figures for 2008.
12. The logistic regressions are based on the survey data from 2009. We have no information on indi-
vidual background characteristics for 2005 and 2006 and since regression results for 2007 and 2009 were 
similar we have chosen to present only the most recent results.
26 Chapter 2
Table 2.3 Main initiatives of health insurers to manage care for five selected care categories
Pharmaceutical care
Before 
2006
- Several health insurers including CZ-DLO and UVIT concluded preferred provider contracts. 
Enrolees are stimulated through positive temporary financial incentives (gift certificates and 
discounts on over-the-counter medicines) to visit the preferred pharmacy.
- The temporary incentives were insufficient to permanently influence pharmacy choice and the 
preferred provider contracts were terminated in 2008.
2006 - Health insurers CZ-DLO and UVIT concluded preferred pharmacy contracts with the internet 
pharmacy ‘de nationaleapotheek.nl’. Enrolees are stimulated via a positive financial incentive 
(respectively 4 euro and 2,5 euro bonus per prescription) to order their drugs online.
2008 - Several health insurers including CZ-DLO, UVIT and Menzis introduced drug formularies. UVIT 
used competitive bidding for 33 different generics whereas the other insurers started a bidding 
process for 10 different generics (CZ-DLO and Menzis). The individual bidding strategies had a huge 
effect on the prices of generics. For the ten biggest-selling generics, list prices were reduced by 76% 
to 93%, resulting in total savings of about 347 million euro.
Physical therapy
Since 
2005
- Experiment with free prices in the market for physical therapy, initially for a period of 2 years. 
During the experiment physical therapists and insurers could freely negotiate over the price and 
quality of physical therapy. Most insurers differentiate their contracts between physical therapists. 
Insurers often set a basic fixed ‘price’ for all contracted physical therapists and offer a mark-up on 
this price for high quality providers. Health insurers Agis and CZ-DLO e.g. offer high quality contracts 
for physical therapists that fulfil certain quality criteria (such as using electronic medical patient 
files and providing information for the consumer quality index for physical therapists) and basic 
contracts for other physical therapists. The price of the high quality contract is higher than that of 
the basic contract. Health insurer UVIT also introduced differentiated contracts but preferred physical 
therapists, selected on the basis of quality and price, receive a lower price than non-preferred physical 
therapists. During the experiments price differentiation increased but overall prices did not increase 
substantially.
2008 - Prices for physical therapy are legally freely negotiable
- Non-contracted physical therapy care is reimbursed against 80% to 95% of the contracted price.
- The majority of all physical therapists (>95%) is still contracted by all insurers.
GP
2006-
2009
- Insurers are reluctant to selectively contract GPs
- Several insurers stimulate GPs to improve the efficiency of care. Insurers CZ-DLO, Menzis and UVIT 
introduced financial incentives to stimulate GPs to prescribe cost-effective drugs. Insurers Menzis 
and Agis reward GPs that offer good coordinated and high quality diabetic care. Furthermore, several 
insurers including Menzis, Achmea-Agis and DSW financially participate in primary care centres.
Maternity care
2005-
2008
- Health insurers Achmea and Menzis introduced maternity care auctions to increase competition 
between providers and increase transparency with respect to price and quality of maternity care. 
All maternity care organisations can bid for individual demand for maternity care and the bid is 
evaluated on the basis of price and quality of care. However, both insurers did not want to limit 
provider choice ex-ante. Their enrolees were thus able to state an ex-ante preference for a certain 
maternity care organisation. Ex-ante preferences were decisive in the outcome of the auction. Since 
ex-ante preferences were more important than the bid itself, maternity care organisations had no 
incentive to significantly decrease prices.
2009 - Achmea stops with the maternity care auctions and starts working with preferred suppliers.
- Menzis continues with the auctions but will stimulate enrolees to choose their maternity care 
organisation based on the outcome of the auction instead of their ex-ante preference by offering free 
diapers for a month if they choose the provider that wins the auction instead of letting their ex-ante 
preference be decisive.
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switch to a preferred provider if they expect that quality may differ but is not observ-
able. Channeling enrollees in this case may be relatively difficult because insurers may 
face a credible commitment problem in the absence of adequate quality information. 
Results show that the majority of the respondents perceive quality differences between 
dentists, GPs and hospitals, while only a minority perceives quality differences between 
pharmacies and physical therapists (see figure 2.1). In absence of reliable information 
about quality, this would imply that channeling toward preferred GPs, dentists and 
hospitals would be more difficult for insurers than motivating people to switch to a 
preferred physical therapist or pharmacy.
Since the introduction of the HIA increasing efforts have been employed to develop 
adequate quality indicators – especially about hospital care – and to disseminate con-
sumer information about quality based on these indicators. Although quality informa-
tion is still very limited, its increased availability might have raised consumers’ awareness 
of quality differences between providers. In addition, this might have also reduced the 
Hospital care
2006 - Health insurers tried to differentiate their contracted volume between high quality and low 
quality hospitals. Low quality hospitals obtained less volume than high quality hospitals. By doing so, 
health insurers created virtual waiting lists with low quality hospitals in order to stimulate enrolees to 
visit high quality hospitals that consequently had lower waiting lists.
2008 - Several insurers started to distinguish “preferred hospitals”. Preferred hospitals are selected on 
the basis of superior performance based on various quality indicators. Insurers do not selectively 
contract with providers but encourage their enrolees with various positive incentives to visit the 
preferred hospitals such as lower waiting times and quality guarantees.
2009 - Several insurers introduced positive financial incentives to encourage preferred hospital 
utilization, using the new legal opportunity to exclude the cost of designated preferred providers 
from the mandatory deductible.
Figure 2.1 Perceived quality differences between providers
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insurer-credibility problem. Contrary to our expectations, however, we find that over 
time the percentage respondents that perceive quality differences between providers 
decreased. From 2006 to 2009 the proportion of respondents perceiving quality differ-
ences between hospitals, GPs and dentists decreased from about 70% to about 50% (see 
figure 2.1). This downward trend is similar for all provider types. A possible explanation 
for this is that the general attention for health care quality decreased after the initial 
years in which this information firstly became available.
Regression results (table 2.4) show that respondents with a bad health are more likely 
to perceive quality differences between providers than respondents with a good health. 
This holds for all provider types except for dentists. Furthermore, females are more likely 
to perceive quality differences than males (except for GPs) and highly educated people 
are more likely to perceive quality differences than people with a low education (except 
for pharmacies). In absence of adequate quality information, these findings may imply 
that channeling enrollees toward preferred providers is more difficult for enrollees that 
are less healthy, female and higher educated.
Table 2.4 Regression results with background characteristics
Quality perceptions between providers 
Pharmacy GP Physical therapist Dentist Hospital
Regular provider 0.17 0.18 0.78* 0.24 -0.21*
Female 0.29** 0.15 0.22** 0.20** 0.24*
Age -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Middle Education 0.23 0.43* 0.74* 0.45* 0.32*
High Education 0.07 0.55* 0.79* 0.68* 0.358
Good Health -0.70* -0.40* -0.69* -0.19 -0.65*
Employment status = work -0.30 0.10 -0.01 0.24** 0.11
Employment status = pension -0.21 -0.39* -0.50* -0.29 -0.01
Constant -1.09 -0.34 -1.18* -0.80* -0.04
N 1535 1535 1535 1535 1535
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02
Willingness to follow advice from the health insurer 
Pharmacy GP Physical therapist Dentist Hospital
Regular provider -0.46 -1.92* -0.35** -0.84* -0.02
Quality perception -0.27 -0.02 -0.09 -0.15 0.02
Female 0.18 0.05 -0.12 -0.14 0.06
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Second, we asked respondents whether or not they were willing to listen to advice from 
their health insurer concerning provider choice. A higher willingness to listen to advice 
increases insurers’ possibilities to channel enrollees. Results show that respondents are 
most willing to follow their insurer’s advice concerning hospital and pharmacy choice 
and are least willing to follow advice concerning GP and dentist choice (see figure 2.2). 
Providers for which the loyalty and confidentiality is expected to be high, are also those 
for which enrollees are least willing to follow advice. Furthermore, results show that dur-
ing the initial two years after the introduction of the HIA respondents developed a less 
positive attitude towards advice about provider choice given by their health insurer. The 
percentage respondents who are willing to listen to advice concerning hospital choice 
decreased from about 50% in 2005 to about 25% in 2007 and 2009. The percentage 
Age -0.02* -0.02** -0.02* -0.02* -0.01
Middle Education 0.01 -0.24 -0.12 0.27 0.09
High Education -0.22 -0.56** -0.57* -0.26 -0.24
Good Health 0.34 -0.06 0.03 -0.17 -0.12
Employment status = work -0.05 0.16 0.21 -0.09 -0.04
Employment status = pension 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.25
Constant -0.57 0.11 -0.83** -0.30 -0.67
N 1535 1535 1535 1535 1535
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
Willingness to pay a copayment for free provider choice 
Pharmacy GP Physical therapist Dentist Hospital
Regular provider 0.00 0.04 0.59* 0.89* -0.07
Quality perception 0.98* 0.95* 1.08* 1.10* 1.17*
Female -0.41* -0.06 -0.15 -0.06 -0.09
Age 0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Middle Education -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.10
High Education 0.45* 0.72* 0.69* 0.77* 0.56*
Good Health -0.41** -0.16 -0.19 -0.23 -0.24
Employment status = work -0.49** -0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.04
Employment status = pension -0.69* -0.19 -0.21 -0.27 -0.04
Constant -2.77* -1.73* -2.40* -2.74* -1.87*
N 1535 1535 1535 1535 1535
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07
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respondents willing to listen to advice concerning GP choice decreased from about 20% 
in 2005 to only 6% in 2007 and than stabilized at this low level.
Regression results (Table 2.4) show that respondents’ willingness to listen to insurers’ 
advice is negative but not statistically significantly related to their perception of quality 
differences per provider type. Apparently consumers’ perceptions of quality differences 
do not play an important role in consumers’ willingness to listen to insurers’ advice 
within each of the provider categories. Regression results further show that having 
a regular provider13 decreases the likelihood that respondents are willing to listen to 
advice (except for pharmacy choice). Furthermore, older people are less likely to listen to 
advice than younger people. Moreover, respondents with a high education level are, in 
case of GPs and physical therapists, less inclined to follow advice than respondents with 
a low education level, which is in line with the above mentioned expectation. Health 
status does not have a significant effect on respondents’ willingness to listen to advice.
Third, we asked respondents whether they would be willing to pay a co-payment 
for having a free choice of provider (see figure 2.3)14. A minority of the respondents is 
willing to pay a co-payment for free pharmacy choice (10-15%) and for free choice of 
13. Survey results show that 98% of the respondents have a regular GP, 95% has a regular pharmacy, 
89% a regular dentist, 53% a regular hospital, and 34% a regular physiotherapist. The high percentage 
respondents that have a regular GP is explained by the fact that enrollees are obliged to register with a 
single GP.
14. We also asked respondents whether they would be willing to switch to a preferred provider in return 
for a financial benefit. These results are similar to those of the financial penalty. Respondents are least 
willing to switch in case of GPs and dentists and most willing to switch in case of hospitals and phar-
macies. In general respondents are less willing to switch in case of positive financial incentives than in 
case of negative financial incentives which can be explained by the theory of loss aversion (Kahneman, 
Figure 2.2 Willingness to listen to advice from insurers about provider choice
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physical therapists (20%), which corresponds with the higher willingness to listen to 
the insurer’s advice about provider choice. Willingness to pay is highest for free choice 
of GPs and dentists, which is also in line with our finding that for these provider types 
the willingness to listen to insurers’ advice is the lowest. The proportion of respondents 
that is willing to pay for free provider choice slightly increased during the initial years of 
the reform, except for hospital care. The increasing willingness to pay for free provider 
choice is consistent with the downward trend in willingness to listen to insurers’ advice 
about provider choice during the initial years of the reform.
The regression results in table 2.4 show that for each provider type respondents that 
perceive quality differences between providers are more likely to pay for free provider 
choice. Also respondents with a higher education are more likely to pay for free choice, 
which is consistent with the finding that higher educated people are less willing to listen 
to their insurers’ advice about provider choice. Although results show that respondents 
in good health are less willing to pay for free choice than respondents in bad health, 
this effect is only significant in case of pharmacies (which is consistent with the positive 
– though not statistically significant – relation between good health and willingness to 
follow insurers’ advice about pharmacy choice).
A potential limitation of our findings is that we cannot rule out that part of the differ-
ences in consumer attitudes over time can be attributed to sample differences. However, 
given the substantial changes in consumer attitudes and the fact that the samples were 
about the same size and representative for the Dutch population, we are confident 
that differences in samples can account for only a small part of the observed changes. 
Knetsch and Thaler 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Because of the similarities between the two 
questions we only present the results of the negative financial incentive.
Figure 2.3 Willingness to pay a co-payment for free provider choice
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Furthermore, using sampling weights based on the characteristics of the 2007 sample 
to re-estimate the 2009 results did not alter these results, which sustains our supposi-
tion that consumer attitudes between the two samples are not related to background 
characteristics of the sample.15
Conclusion and Discussion
With the introduction of the new health insurance act and the gradual transition 
toward managed competition, insurers are given incentives and instruments to act as 
prudent buyers of care. A major instrument is the option to selectively contract with 
preferred providers and to use differentiated reimbursement limits for contracted and 
non-contracted care. So far, insurers have been very reluctant to use this instrument. 
Only one insurer introduced a health plan in which enrollees are stimulated by negative 
financial incentives (co-payments) to visit contracted providers. Most health insurers, 
however, contract with all providers and only use soft positive (financial) incentives to 
encourage the use of designated preferred providers, even though restrictive networks 
and negative financial incentives may sort a larger effect on provider choice.
The most important reason why insurers are reluctant to use selective contracting is 
that they face a credible-commitment problem. Many consumers do not seem to trust 
that insurers with restrictive networks are committed to provide good quality care. 
The insurer-credibility problem substantially increased during the first two years of the 
reform. We find that during these years the proportion of consumers that was willing 
to follow insurers’ advice about provider choice reduced by about 50% across all pro-
vider types. The increasing credibility problem faced by health insurers may at least be 
partly due to the considerable negative publicity about health insurers at the start of the 
reform, such as a major campaign by the association of GPs against the possible interfer-
ence of insurers in free provider choice, arousing fear that insurers would increasingly 
“sit on the chair of the doctor”. Politicians also contribute to the negative publicity about 
managed care initiatives. In 2009 the announcement of a vertical integration between 
a hospital and an insurer even led to a proposal by the vast majority of Parliament to 
prohibit mergers between hospitals and insurers by law. Hence, in the Netherlands a 
managed care backlash seems to occur even before insurers actually started to manage 
care.
15. Since we have no individual background characteristics of the 2005 and 2006 samples, we could 
not perform a similar re-estimation of the 2007 or 2009 results based on the sample weights in these 
previous years. However, the fact that the use of two completely different samples in 2006 yielded similar 
results makes it unlikely that sample selection plays an important role.
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The increasing credibility gap seems the main reason why several insurers even 
abstained from using positive financial incentives to encourage the use of preferred 
providers, although this legal option was explicitly created in 2009. Furthermore, the 
insurer-credibility problem may explain why health insurers are reluctant to engage in 
vertical integration with health care providers. Finally, it may also explain why all health 
insurers adhere to a not-for-profit status (either as mutual companies or as cooperatives), 
which fact is often stressed in marketing and communication with (potential) enrollees.
As long as insurers cannot solve the credible commitment problem, they will not be 
able to effectively channel enrollees. If they are not able to channel enrollees, providers 
may, due to the two-sided character of the market, not be willing to negotiate over the 
terms of a contract. At present, the lack of adequate quality indicators makes it difficult 
for health insurers to select good quality providers and to provide reliable information 
to enrollees about the quality of the contracted provider network. Research shows that 
quality of contracted providers is likely to play an important role in health plan choice 
once reliable information on quality is readily available (van den Berg, et al. 2008). In our 
recent 2009 survey we also asked respondents whether they would switch to a preferred 
hospital once the preferred and non-preferred hospitals were equally close, their GP had 
no ex-ante preference for either hospital and the preferred hospital was selected on the 
basis of quality indicators by the health insurer. In this scenario, in which the credibility 
problem is absent, about 75% of the respondents was willing to switch to the preferred 
hospital. Therefore, providing reliable and understandable consumer information about 
the quality of the provider network seems crucial to solve the insurer-credibility problem.
34 Chapter 2
References
Armstrong, M. (2002) ‘Competition in Two-Sided markets’, ESEM meeting Venice, Venice
Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2003) ‘Chicken & Egg: competition among intermediation service provid-
ers’, RAND journal of economics, 34(2): 309-328
Capps, C., D. Dranove, S. Greenstein and M. Satterthwaite (2001) ‘The silent majority fallacy of the 
Elzinga-Hogarty criteria: a critique and new approach to analyzing hospital mergers’, National 
Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, Mass.) Working paper 8216
Capps, C., D. Dranove and M. Satterthwaite (2003) ‘Competition and market power in option de-
mand markets’, RAND journal of economics, 34(4): 737-763
Claxton, G., J. R. Gabel, B. Dijulio, J. Pickreign, H. Whitmore, B. Finder, M. Jarlenski and S. Hawkins 
(2008) ‘Health benefits in 2008: premiums moderately higher, while enrollment in consumer-
directed plans rises in small firms’, Health Affairs (Millwood), 27(6): 492-502
Dranove, D., R. Lindrooth, W. D. White and J. Zwanziger (2008) ‘Is the impact of managed care on 
hospital prices decreasing?’, Journal of Health Economics, 27(2): 362-76
Enthoven, A. C. and W. P. M. M. van de Ven (2007) ‘Going Dutch - Managed Competition Health 
Insurance in the Netherlands’, The New England Journal of Medicine, 357(24)
Glied, S. (2000) ‘Managed Care’. in Handbook of Health Economics Culyer, A. J. and J. P. Newhouse 
Amsterdam)
Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch and R. H. Thaler (1991) ‘The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and 
Status Quo Bias’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1): 193-206
Keuzenkamp, H. (2006) ‘Willen we wel kiezen?’, VGE conference “Kiezen in de Zorg”, Rotterdam
Melnick, G. A., J. Zwanziger, A. Bamezai and R. Pattison (1992) ‘The effects of market structure and 
bargaining position on hospital prices’, Journal of Health Economics, 11(3): 217-33
Miller, N. H. (2006) ‘Insurer-provider integration, credible commitment, and managed-care back-
lash’, Journal of Health Economics, 25(5): 861-76
NZa (2007) ‘Visiedocument Richting geven aan keuzes. Kunnen verzekeraars consumenten stimul-
eren naar gecontracteerde voorkeursaanbieders te gaan?’ Dutch Competition Authority Utrecht
NZA (2008a) ‘Monitor Zorgverzekeringsmarkt 2008. Ontwikkelingen beoordeeld door de NZA.’ 
Dutch Competition Authority Utrecht
NZA (2008b) ‘Monitor Eigen risico. Tweede rapportage’ Dutch Competition Authority Utrecht
Pauly, M. V. (1987) ‘Monopsony power in health insurance: thinking straight while standing on your 
head’, Journal of Health Economics, 6(1): 73-81
Smith, D. G. (1997) ‘The effects of preferred provider organizations on health care use and costs’, 
Inquiry, 34(4): 278-87
Sorensen, A. T. (2003) ‘Insurer-Hospital Bargaining: Negotiated discounts in Post-Deregulation Con-
necticut’, The Journal of industrial economics, 51(4): 469-490
Staten, M., W. Dunkelberg and J. Umbeck (1987) ‘Market share and the illusion of power. Can Blue 
Cross force hospitals to discount?’, Journal of Health Economics, 6(1):43-58
Preferred providers and the credible commitment problem 35
2
Town, R. and G. Vistnes (2001) ‘Hospital competition in HMO networks’, Journal of Health Economics, 
20(5): 733-53
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1991) ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A reference-Dependent 
Model’, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4): 1039-1061
Van de Ven, W. P. and F. T. Schut (2009) ‘Managed competition in the Netherlands: still work-in-
progress’, Health Economics, 18(3): 253-5
van den Berg, B., P. Van Dommelen, P. Stam, T. Laske-Aldershof, T. Buchmueller and F. T. Schut (2008) 
‘Preferences and choices for care and health insurance’, Social Science and Medicine, 66(12): 
2448-59
Wu, V. Y. (2009) ‘Managed care’s price bargaining with hospitals’, Journal of Health Economics, 
28(2):350-360
Zwanziger, J. and C. Z. Mooney (2005) ‘Has price competition changed hospital revenues and 
expenses in New York?’, Inquiry, 42(2): 183-192

Chapter 3
Consumer channeling by health insurers
Natural experiments with preferred providers in the 
Dutch pharmacy market
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Abstract
Consumer channeling is an important element in the insurer-provider bargaining pro-
cess. Health insurers can influence provider choice by offering insurance contracts with 
restricted provider networks. Alternatively, they can offer contracts with unrestricted 
access and use incentives to motivate consumers to visit preferred providers. Little is 
known, however, about the effectiveness of this alternative strategy of consumer chan-
neling. Using data from two natural experiments in the Dutch pharmacy market, we 
examine how consumers respond to incentives used by health insurers to influence their 
choice of provider. We find that consumers are sensitive to rather small incentives but 
that temporary incentives may not be sufficient to sort a long-term effect on provider 
choice. In addition, we find that both consumer and provider characteristics determine 
whether consumers are willing to switch to preferred pharmacies.
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Introduction
Many countries are exploring the role of incentives in medical care by experimenting 
with the introduction of competition and managed care elements into their health care 
system (Cutler 2002). With the introduction of managed care, the role of health insur-
ers (or other third-party payers) changes from passive payers to active purchasers of 
care. Health insurers are stimulated to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their 
enrollees, while health care providers have to compete to obtain a contract with health 
insurers.
The reinforcement of the agency role of health insurers makes the insurer-provider 
bargaining process increasingly important. Several empirical studies show that the bar-
gaining power of health insurers crucially depends on their ability to channel consumers 
towards preferred providers (Staten, Dunkelberg et al. 1987; Melnick, Zwanziger et al. 
1992; Fortney, Thill et al. 2001; Bamezai, Melnick et al. 2003; Sorensen 2003). A key ques-
tion, therefore, is whether or not health insurers are able to channel consumers towards 
preferred providers, and if so how?
Health insurers may try to influence consumers’ provider choice either indirectly via 
the type of insurance contract or directly through the use of incentives. By offering in-
surance contracts that provide access to a limited network of providers, health insurers 
can restrict provider choice ex ante. This is common practice in the US. Alternatively, 
rather than offer contracts with limited provider choice, health insurers may also try to 
channel enrollees to preferred providers by using positive incentives such as bonuses, 
gift certificates and extra services. Health insurers thus offer insurance contracts with 
unrestricted provider choice and influence provider choice ex post. Next to these direct 
incentives, provider choice is influenced by distance, proximity of other health care pro-
viders, loyalty and transparency, which health insurers may be able to influence as well.
While much research has focused on consumer sensitivity with respect to plan at-
tributes such as price, quality and freedom of choice (see for example Zweifel and Man-
ning 2000; Chernew, Gowrisankaran et al. 2004; Dafny and Dranove 2005), this article 
focuses on the ability health insurers have, given free choice of providers, to channel 
consumers towards preferred providers. It is exactly this ability that determines provid-
ers’ willingness to enter the contractual negotiations. We use two unique datasets from 
the Dutch pharmacy market in which preferred provider contracts are concluded given 
that enrollees have a freedom of choice health plan. This offered us the opportunity 
to estimate consumers’ sensitivity to incentive mechanisms, which is unique in Europe. 
Literature in the US focused especially on health plan choice instead of on preferred 
provider choice, which means that this paper contributes to that literature as well.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the second section, previous research relevant 
to this subject is discussed. The third section describes the setting in which both natural 
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experiments have taken place. Section four discusses the data on which we relied while 
in section five the empirical methodology is developed. Section six presents the esti-
mation results and the differences between the two natural experiments used. Section 
seven presents the main conclusions.
Previous research
While there is little empirical research on the actual ability to channel enrollees, the con-
ditions necessary to obtain a discount from a health care provider have, however, been 
the subject of several studies. Pauly (1987) distinguishes three necessary conditions for a 
health insurer to obtain discounts from hospitals. First, the net revenue situation for the 
hospital should be worse with lower volumes than with discounted charges. Next, the 
insurer should be able to credibly threat to remove patients. Third, hospitals should be 
unable to replace patients that are channeled to a preferred hospital.
Town and Vistnes (2001) developed an empirical framework in which hospitals com-
pete for inclusion in a plan’s network In their paper, they argue that the hospital’s bar-
gaining position depends on the incremental value that a hospital brings to the plan’s 
network, which is in line with the conditions described by Pauly (1987). Their empirical 
results illustrate that a hospital’s bargaining position decreases in the HMO’s ability to 
construct an alternative network of providers. In addition, they found that product and 
geographic differentiation are important determinants of price.
Several authors report empirical estimates of obtained discounts (see for example 
Staten, Dunkelberg et al. 1987; Melnick, Zwanziger et al. 1992; Town and Vistnes 2001; 
Sorensen 2003). These authors found that the threat to move patients towards preferred 
hospitals reinforced the bargaining position of the health insurer and led to higher 
discounts by hospitals. Sorensen (2003) used a simple bargaining model that illustrates 
how the discount depends on the ability of health insurers to channel consumers. How-
ever, in his model, the channeling ability is given and determinants of this channeling 
ability are excluded from the analysis.
While many studies focused on the determinants of choice of health plans (see for 
example Zweifel and Manning 2000; Chernew, Gowrisankaran et al. 2004; Dafny and 
Dranove 2005), few examined the determinants of provider choice. The studies with re-
spect to determinants of health plan choice show that consumers’ willingness to switch 
is determined by several factors such as price sensitivity, quality, distance and the dif-
ferentiability between several health care providers. In addition, Neipp and Zeckhauser 
(1985) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) found evidence for the existence of a 
certain status-quo bias in health plan choice. We expect the status-quo bias to be even 
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higher for health care provider choice since trust is expected to play a larger role in the 
enrollee-provider relationship than in the enrollee-insurer relationship.
Setting
In 2003, health insurers introduced preferred provider contracts in the Dutch pharmacy 
market. Instead of restrictions on provider choice, they have implemented positive 
incentive mechanisms to stimulate consumers to visit the preferred providers. Their 
strategy encompasses ex post incentive mechanisms such as bonuses, gift certificates 
and qualitative incentives. The preferred provider contracts are used to cream off the 
profits Dutch pharmacies obtained by negotiating discounts on drugs purchased from 
the pharmaceutical industry. Since most consumers are fully reimbursed for drug expen-
ditures by social health insurers, they are not sensitive to the price of drugs. Due to the 
fully reimbursed prices (up to a legally specified reimbursement limit) and the limited 
degree of competition, pharmacies were able to retain all discounts they received from 
pharmaceutical companies. As a result of the introduction of managed competition in 
the social health insurance market, however, health insurers became increasingly at risk 
for the medical expenses of their enrollees (Schut and Van de Ven 2005). Hence, health 
insurers became increasingly interested in reaping part of the discounts obtained by 
pharmacies, as this lowers their drug expenditures.
The preferred provider contracts are based on financial aspects. With the introduction 
of preferred providers, health insurers try to reap part of the discounts pharmacies obtain 
and try to increase the degree of competition between pharmacies. Preferred providers 
were contracted primarily on the basis of the discount they offered to the health insurer 
as quality aspects are regulated and don’t differ much between pharmacies.
Two natural experiments provided us with the opportunity to empirically estimate 
consumers’ willingness to switch providers in response to financial and/or non-financial 
incentives. In both experiments, we obtained information about consumer character-
istics, pharmacy characteristics, information on which pharmacy is visited and which 
incentive mechanisms are used. The two settings are completely different from each 
other as the type of preferred provider contract as well as the area in which the preferred 
provider is located and the types of incentives differ. We investigate whether these dif-
ferences have an effect on the outcome of the channeling process.
Health insurer A is the first health insurer that concluded a preferred provider con-
tract with a pharmacy16. The contract is concluded with a new entrant. The entrant is a 
16. The two different databases will be referred to as databases from health insurer A and health insurer 
B respectively.
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drugstore that opened pharmacies in a few of its existing drugstores. The idea behind 
this is that of ‘convenience shopping’. As the drugstore opened pharmacies at several 
locations, including supermarkets and a major railway station, consumers may face a 
decrease in travel time. In addition, consumers may value the opportunity of one-stop 
shopping. The drug store also has more extensive opening hours than traditional 
pharmacies. Traditional pharmacies have, in most cases, opening hours from Monday 
to Friday from 8.30am to 5.30pm (for emergency services consumers can collect their 
prescription drugs outside regular opening hours). The drugstore, however, is also open 
on Saturdays and sometimes even in the evening.
The preferred provider contract between health insurer A and the drugstore involves 
a discount on the price of prescription drugs. The discount offered by the pharmacy 
depends on the number of consumers from health insurer A that visit the preferred 
provider.
The incentive mechanisms used by health insurer A and the preferred pharmacy, con-
sisted of a financial incentive in the first few months of the study period and a qualitative 
incentive at the end. The financial incentive concerned a gift certificate that was dis-
tributed to consumers who collected their prescription drugs at the preferred provider. 
Consumers received a gift certificate of 10 euro the first time they visited the preferred 
provider and one of 5 euro the second time. The qualitative incentive is a free body 
check offered at the end of the study period. To inform consumers about the preferred 
pharmacy and the incentives, both the insurer as well as the pharmacy sent information 
letters, placed advertisements in (local) newspapers and distributed flyers.
Health insurer B on the other hand, contracted a traditional pharmacy as preferred 
provider in a public tender. This public tender was held in a new residential area in which 
no other pharmacies were located and in which the health insurer has are large market 
share. The primary reason for granting the contract were the discounts on the official 
list prices offered by the preferred pharmacy. For most residents of the new area the 
travel distance to the new pharmacy was considerably shorter than to the next nearest 
pharmacy.
The direct incentive mechanisms used by the preferred pharmacy of health insurer 
B included discounts on several products offered by the pharmacy. The discounts were 
introduced a few months after the opening of the preferred pharmacy. They were valid 
for enrollees of health insurer B who collected prescription drugs at the preferred phar-
macy. The discount comprised of a fixed percentage discount on the price of several 
products. The percentage differed according to product categories. The included prod-
uct categories are baby products and care products (10% discount), over-the-counter 
drugs (20% discount), homeopathic drugs (20% discount) and contraception pills (10% 
discount). Consumers received discounts on the ‘normal’ dosage of these products 
based on dosages per month. Only consumers who need these particular drugs or 
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products will actually benefit from this incentive. The incentive can, however, have a 
positive effect even for consumers who do not need these products, since they may 
perceive it as a beneficial feature of the pharmacy with respect to their future consump-
tion. The discounts were valid until the end of our study period and can thus be seen 
as a permanent incentive. Similar to the setting of health insurer A, also health insurer 
B and the preferred pharmacy sent information letters, placed advertisements in (local) 
newspapers and distributed flyers to inform consumers about the preferred pharmacy 
and the incentives.
Another aspect that can be an important explanatory variable in provider choice for 
enrollees of health insurer B, is the opening of a general practice in the same building 
as the preferred pharmacy. In the Dutch health care system general practitioners (GPs) 
function as gatekeepers, which implies that consumers can only obtain prescription 
drugs via their GP. Although consumer can collect the prescribed drugs at a pharmacy 
of their choice, GPs can influence this choice, for instance by faxing recipes directly to 
a specific pharmacy. We expect that a GP who is practicing in the same building as the 
preferred pharmacy may be inclined to refer its patients to this particular pharmacy. In 
addition, the convenience of one-stop shopping may induce consumers to choose the 
preferred pharmacy.
Data
We have obtained data from two Dutch health insurers that have contracted preferred 
pharmacies. Health insurer A provided detailed information on pharmacy visits17 over 
the period January 2003 – December 2004 (NA =159.989) and health insurer B over the 
period August 2004 – May 2005 (NB = 4697). Health insurer A contracted the preferred 
pharmacy in April 2003 and health insurer B in August 2004. Due to the differences 
between the regions in which the pharmacies are located, the total number of observa-
tions per health insurer differs.
The study area is defined as the city in which the preferred pharmacy is located. 
Consumers are assumed to prefer a pharmacy that is located in their ‘home’ city. With 
regard to health insurer A, 9,077 records (visits) have been excluded, as these are visits 
to pharmacies located outside the study region or visits of consumers who live outside 
the study region. With respect to health insurer B we constrained ourselves to a dataset 
17. With respect to pharmacy visits, the database consisted of one observation per prescription drugs 
(total number of prescription drugs = NA = 249,735 and NB = 7681). Prescription drugs that are collected 
at the same date are, however, taken as one visit as we expect a consumer to collect all these drugs at 
once.
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including only those consumers who lived in the new residential area or in the neigh-
borhoods surrounding this area. The pharmacy they visited can be located in either the 
residential area, the surrounding neighborhoods or the city center.
We excluded all consumers younger than 18 years from the sample, as it is plausible 
that their parents make the pharmacy choice decision. This implies that 11,496 records 
of health insurer A and 386 records of health insurers B are excluded. This implies that 
the dataset with which we are going to work consists of NA = 139,416 records and NB = 
4,311 records, respectively. The total number of consumers in the two datasets are nA = 
11,954 and nB = 972.
The available dataset includes information on consumer characteristics, the pharmacy 
visited, the GP visited and the incentive mechanisms used. The included consumer char-
acteristics are age, gender, the total number of visits to a pharmacy, the mean total 
pharmacy costs per individual, and the zip code of the consumer’s home address.
The zip code is used to calculate the travel time from the home address towards 
the ‘current’ and preferred provider using the Geodan Drive Time Matrix18. This matrix 
computes the fastest route19 in meters and minutes by car. In our analysis, travel time by 
car in minutes is used to calculate consumers’ sensitivity to travel time. A variable that 
calculates the difference in travel time between the preferred and ‘own’ provider is used 
in the regression analysis. The ‘own’ provider is the provider consumers visited before 
the opening of the preferred provider or, when this information is lacking, the nearest 
provider.
The incentive mechanisms are specified as dummy variables indicating whether or 
not consumers needed prescription drugs in the period in which the incentive mecha-
nisms were applied. Several consumers were not exposed to the incentive mechanisms, 
as these were not applied during the whole study period.
Table 3.1 and table 3.2 provide some general background characteristics of the two 
samples.
18. The Geodan Drive Time Matrix uses the four-digit zip code to calculate the fastest route between the 
starting point and the end point. As Dutch zip codes consist of four numbers followed by two letters the 
inaccuracy in the distance could be about 250 meters in urban areas and about 1000 in rural areas. The 
data for health insurer A concern an urban area while with health insurer B also rural areas are included.
19. Note that the fastest route differs from the shortest route.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics health insurer A
Health insurer A
Mean S.D. Min Max
Patient attributes
Age * 45.02 17.22 18 99
Female (1 = female) 0.58 .49 0 1
Number of pharmacy visits per year 5.83 6.70 1 83
Total pharmacy costs per individual
(In 2 years in euros)
360.90 891.68 0 35,875
Mean total pharmacy costs per individual in euros 24.89 37.47 0 1,125
Travel time attributes**
Travel time to the preferred pharmacy in minutes 6.54 3.95 0 14
Travel time to the ‘own’ pharmacy in minutes 4.87 4.94 0 18
Difference in travel time in minutes 1.67 5.49 -18 11
Incentive attributes
Financial incentive (1 = yes) 0.71 0.46 0 1
Qualitative incentive (1 = yes) 0.65 0.48 0 1
* The sample only includes patients with age >18
**The difference in travel time is measured by subtracting the travel time to the prefer red pharmacy from 
the travel time to the ‘own’ pharmacy. A positive number implies that the consumer has to travel further to 
the preferred pharmacy than to his own pharmacy.
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics health insurer B
Health insurer B
Mean S.D. Min Max
Patient attributesa
Age in years* 46.55 15.65 18 90
Female (1 = female) 0.65 0.48 0 1
Number of pharmacy visits (period of 8 months) 4.44 4.75 1 49
Visits to the GP (1 if yes) 0.049 0.22 0 1
Travel time attributes**
Travel time to the preferred pharmacy 9.09 8.32 0 17
Travel time to the ‘own’ pharmacy 11.16 2.98 0 32
Difference in travel time for preferred pharmacy in minutes -2.06 9.67 -32 8
Incentive attributes
Financial incentive (1 if yes) 0.87 0.33 0 1
a For health insurer B no information on drug expenditure is available. Therefore, we cannot include a 
mean costs variable.
* The sample only includes patients with age >18
**The difference in travel time is measured by subtracting the travel time to the preferred pharmacy from 
the travel time to the ‘own’ pharmacy. A positive number implies that the consumer has to travel further to 
the preferred pharmacy than to his own pharmacy.
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Economic and Empirical Framework
Consumers are assumed to have perfect discrimination capability and to choose the 
pharmacy that maximizes their utility. We observe a selection of the factors used to 
discriminate and must therefore take uncertainty into account (equation 1),
 Uij = Vij + εij (1)
where Uij denotes individual i’s utility from choice j, Vij are the observable characteristics 
of the choices and observable individual characteristics (taste variations) and εij captures 
the characteristics that are unobservable to the researchers as well as measurement er-
ror (Manski 1977).
In the literature on health plan and provider choice individuals’ preferences are a 
function of distance, quality aspects, convenience aspects, premium, co-payments and 
consumer characteristics (Roghmann and Zastowny 1979; Feldman, Finch et al. 1989; 
Burns and Wholey 1992; Chakraborty, Ettenson et al. 1994; Buchmueller and Feldstein 
1997; Chernew and Scanlon 1998; Royalty and Solomon 1999; Harris, Schultz et al. 2002; 
Chernew, Gowrisankaran et al. 2004; Tai, Porell et al. 2004; Dafny and Dranove 2005). 
Based on this literature, consultations with several health insurers and pharmacies, and 
data availability we specify the deterministic part of the indirect utility as
 Vij = δ + φDij + φIij + γXi (2)
where Dij is a vector of distance variables including extra travel distance towards the pre-
ferred provider, Iij a vector of incentive mechanism variables, and Xi a vector of consumer 
characteristics.
In the context of this paper we focus on the decision to either visit the preferred phar-
macy or any other pharmacy. The decision whether or not to visit the preferred pharmacy 
depends on whether the utility of visiting the preferred pharmacy is larger than that of 
the current pharmacy (the status quo). We assume equal utility of non-preferred phar-
macies because there are no observable quality differences among Dutch pharmacies. 
In the Netherlands, both general practitioners and medical specialists prescribe drugs 
that consumers can collect at a pharmacy of their choice. Quality differences between 
pharmacies were practically non-existent at the time of the experiment. Pharmacies 
face regulatory restrictions, which aim to guarantee quality of pharmaceutical care. In 
addition, all included pharmacies are fully sorted and therefore can deliver all prescrip-
tion drugs. Furthermore, consumers have no information on the quality of the service 
provided by pharmacies, and advertising to attract consumers is uncommon.
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As the preferred pharmacy contracted by health insurer A is a drugstore, consumers 
may perceive quality differences between the preferred and non-preferred pharmacies. 
These differences are likely to be captured by consumer characteristics such as age and 
gender as it is expected that in particular females in the age group of 20-40 years have a 
preference for the assortment of the drugstore. Furthermore, opening hours of the drug 
store are more extensive than those of other pharmacies. This may be particularly attrac-
tive for the working population. Aside from these differences, the only other difference 
is the travel distance for consumers.
Empirical specification
In the empirical models, we estimate consumers’ willingness to switch towards a pre-
ferred provider using standard discrete choice models of consumer behavior. To analyze 
consumer behavior we use two alternative specifications for the dependent variable. 
First, we specify a model in which the pharmacy choice per visit is the dependent vari-
able (model 1). This model is used to examine which factors explain the probability to 
visit a preferred pharmacy. Second, we specify a model in which the consumer choice of 
pharmacy over the study period serves as the dependent variable (model 2). This model 
is used to explain the pharmacy choices made by different consumers.
McFadden (1974) shows that if εij are assumed to be type I extreme value (or Weibull) 
and independent, then a (multinomial) logit can be derived from the random utility 
model. The parameter estimates of the (multinomial) logit model may be interpreted 
as parameter estimates of the indirect utility function. Applications of a logit model 
in this framework in health economics are Ryan and Hughes (1997); Farrar, Ryan et al. 
(2000); Lancsar, Hall et al. (2003); Ryan and Gerard (2003) and Ryan, Netten et al. (2006) 
and applications of a multinomial logit model are Propper (2000) and van Campen and 
Woittiez (2003).
For the empirical specification of the indirect utility model for the pharmacy choice 
per visit (model 1) we use a logit model. The logit model is used to estimate the prob-
ability that a consumer visited (y = 1) or did not visit (y = 0) the preferred provider
 yi = 1  if y˙i > 0 (3)
 yi = 0 otherwise
where
 y˙ij = δl + φl Dij + λl Iij + γl Xi + εlij
48 Chapter 3
and εlij are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (IID) and type I ex-
treme value.
Consumers may have visited pharmacies more than once during the research period. 
Therefore, the decision whether or not to visit the preferred pharmacy may be assumed 
independent across consumers but not within consumers. To allow for intra individual 
correlation we used a Huber-White sandwich variance estimator.
It should be noted that the specification of the incentive mechanisms with respect to 
health insurer A does not take into account that consumers who visit the preferred phar-
macy more than twice, face no financial incentive for their third visit. When we remove 
these 1504 visits, we may eliminate this specification problem but we also lose valuable 
information on consumer choice. Since we found that removing these visits does not 
lead to meaningful differences, we choose to include all observations.
Consumer pharmacy choices over the study period (model 2) are modeled using a 
multinomial logit model. We distinguish among three different decision patterns with 
regard to preferred pharmacy choice: (1) the decision not to switch to a preferred phar-
macy (not switching), (2) the decision to switch and to stick with the preferred provider 
(staying), and (3) the decision to switch but returned to the original provider at least 
once (not staying). The weight attached to each explanatory variable may vary for each 
alternative. The choice of individual i for alternative j is
 yij = 1 if yi = j  (4)
 yi = 0 otherwise
with the related probabilities
P(yi = j) = 
exp(ÿi) , (5)ΣJj=1 exp(ÿi)
where
 ÿi = δj + ϕ j Di + λj Ii + γj Xi + εij
with the normalization that the coefficients for the default category (e.g. j=1) are set to 
zero and εijj are assumed to be IID and type I extreme value.
McFadden’s multinomial logit model assumes that the ratio of the probability of 
choosing one “decision strategy” over the other is unaffected by the number of alter-
native “decision strategies” (Burns and Wholey 1992). This independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption can be evaluated using a specification test described 
by Hausman and McFadden (1984). The IIA assumption fails once the deletion of one 
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alternative causes significant changes in the coefficients and covariance estimates. Test 
results can be inconclusive once a negative test statistic results (Burns and Wholey 1992; 
Hodgkin 1996). Therefore, in addition to the Hausman-McFadden test, we also look for 
meaningful differences in the pattern of the parameter estimates.
Expected effects
As distance is measured as the extra travel time towards the preferred pharmacy from 
the home address, it is expected to have a negative effect on preferred provider choice 
due to opportunity costs of time and travel costs. Incentive mechanisms are used to 
increase the attractiveness of the preferred provider and are therefore expected to have 
a positive effect on preferred provider choice. The actual effect of the incentive mecha-
nisms, however, depends on the type of incentives used and the magnitude of the in-
centive. The incentive mechanisms used in the natural experiment, are either financial or 
qualitative. Furthermore, the incentive mechanisms are either direct (gift certificate) or 
indirect (discount on over-the-counter drugs) and either temporarily or “permanently” 
effective (i.e. after introduction effective or during the entire study period). Consumer 
characteristics include age, gender, the number of visits to the pharmacy, the mean total 
costs per individual and several interaction and higher order effects.
The mean total pharmacy costs per individual may serve as a proxy for the health of 
enrold to of health insurer A20. Literature on risk adjustment shows that pharmacy-based 
cost groups (PCGs) are a good predictor of worse health and higher future health care 
expenditures (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000; Lamers and van Vliet 2004). Therefore, we as-
sume that higher mean total costs are associated with a lower health status. Consumers 
in worse health may face higher switching costs, as was found in the case of health plan 
choice (Royalty and Solomon 1999; Strombom, Buchmueller et al. 2002). We expect that 
switching costs with respect to health care providers for consumers in worse health are 
even higher since they are likely to have established long-term doctor-patient relation-
ships.
The number of visits is included in model 2 of health insurer A to correct for the statis-
tical probability that consumers who visit the pharmacy more often are also more likely 
to visit the preferred provider at least once. With regard to health insurer B, however, we 
have no information available on total costs per individual, which implies that we can-
not include total costs as a proxy for health. The total number of visits can, however, also 
serve as a proxy for health as we expect that consumers, who visit the pharmacy more 
often are likely to use more prescription drugs and to have a lower health status (Lamers 
20. For health insurer B we have no information on costs per individual so we cannot include this as an 
explanatory variable.
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and van Vliet 2004). The total number of visits is then expected to have a negative impact 
on provider choice as we assumed that worse health leads to higher switching costs.
The effects of age and gender are expected to depend on the setting in which the 
natural experiment has taken place. For health insurer A we expect that females in the 
age group 20-40 have a higher probability to visit the preferred provider (the contracted 
drugstore), as this is the original market segment of the drugstore. Age is thus likely to 
have a positive but diminishing effect until the age of about 40. After the age of 40 the 
effect of age is likely to be negative as older consumers are expected to be more reluc-
tant to switch (see for example Royalty and Solomon 1999; Strombom, Buchmueller et 
al. 2002; Dijk, Pomp et al. 2006). In this setting, being female is likely to have a positive 
effect on preferred provider choice since the drugstore primarily focuses on the female 
market segment. Age and female possibly capture part of the perceived ‘quality’ differ-
ence between the non-preferred and preferred provider related to the larger assortment 
of products offered by the drugstore.
In case of health insurer B the pharmacy is a traditional pharmacy located in a new 
residential area. Age is then expected to have a negative effect on switching behavior, 
as older consumers are, in general, more reluctant to switch. Gender is not expected to 
have an effect on preferred provider choice as the preferred provider has no specific fea-
tures that would attract more women than men. In case of health insurer B an additional 
variable is added to the model: “whether or not the consumer visits the GP in the new 
residential area”. Consumers who visit this GP are expected to have a larger probability 
to visit the preferred pharmacy due to a decrease in travel costs and a possible higher 
degree of cooperation between the preferred pharmacy and the GP as explained in sec-
tion 3. If consumers would make a joint decision to see the GP and visit the pharmacy in 
the same building this variable would be endogenous. In the Netherlands, however, for 
several reasons the choice of a GP and a pharmacy are unlikely to be jointly made. First, 
our explanatory variable indicates whether or not one is registered with the GP that is 
located in the same building as the preferred pharmacy. This registration is unrelated to 
actual visits, as consumers are obliged to register with a GP even before they actually 
require the services of a GP. Typically, therefore, people choose a GP long before they 
need to choose a pharmacy. Second, Dutch GPs function as family doctors with whom 
people have a long-term relationship. People rarely switch GPs for other reasons than for 
moving to another place. Third, 75% of all drug utilization consists of repeated prescrip-
tions, for which consumers often do not have to visit the GP but can directly go to the 
pharmacy (Griens and Tinke 2006). Hence, the choice of a GP can be considered as an 
exogenous determinant of pharmacy choice.
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Results
For both health insurers, we first estimate a logit model for the pharmacy choice per visit 
in which the dependent variable specifies whether or not a preferred provider is visited 
per visit. To correct for the intra-cluster correlation between visits, we use a logit model 
with a robust variance estimator. Second, a model based on ‘consumer choice’ is esti-
mated in which the dependent variable specifies which “decision process” the consumer 
followed during the study period (“not switching”, “switching and staying” or “switching 
and not staying”). The multinomial logit model is only estimated for health insurer A 
as the number of observations for health insurer B is too small to detect statistically 
significant results.
For both models, we present average marginal effects. The marginal effects for model 
1 are the estimated probabilities that a consumer visits the preferred provider for a 
marginal change in the explanatory variable holding all other variables fixed. For model 
2, we present the marginal effects of variable xi on the choice of alternative j. The mar-
ginal effect is the impact of a unit change of the variable xi on the choice of alternative j 
compared to the other alternatives (van Campen and Woittiez 2003).
Usually the marginal effects for continuous variables are computed by estimating 
a small change in one variable holding all other variables fixed at their mean. The 
marginal effects for discrete variables is computed by calculating the change resulting 
from a change in the discrete variable from 0 to 1 holding all other variables fixed at 
their mean (see for example (McGuirk and Porell 1984; Madden, Nolan et al. 2005). An 
average individual does not exist, however, and in our research we are interested in the 
probability that a certain consumer does or does not visit the preferred supplier. The 
marginal effects are thus not computed over the average individual but represent the 
mean of the marginal effects over each individual. This is done by computing the effect 
of for example a one-year increase in age on the probability of visiting the preferred 
provider for each individual and then averaging these probabilities across all individuals 
in the sample (Strombom, Buchmueller et al. 2002; Greene 2003). The standard errors 
for the marginal effects are computed through bootstrapping. Bootstrapping allows us 
to determine the confidence limits through repeated sampling, using parameter point 
estimates and their estimated variance-covariance matrix (Efron and Tibshirani 1986; 
Phillips, Maddala et al. 2002; Greene 2003). The marginal effects, computed as described 
above, are bootstrapped using 10,000 replications. Statistical inference is computed 
using percentile based confidence intervals. Given that our data consists of repeated 
measurements, we developed a bootstrap procedure in which the resampling unit is 
the individual.
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We will successively present the results for health insurer A and health insurer B. Then, 
we will discuss the observed differences between the two health insurers, given the 
different settings in which the two health insurers operate.
Results health insurer A
In total 4.77% of all visits have been to the preferred pharmacy, which corresponds to 
1618 consumers who visited the preferred pharmacy at least once. Of these consumers, 
only 8% did not visit another pharmacy during the study period. After the first visit to 
the preferred provider, 34% did not change to another pharmacy during the rest of the 
study period. Of these 561 consumers, 186 visited the pharmacy only once and hence 
we do not know whether they are inclined to visit this pharmacy again. Thus of all 
consumers who have visited the preferred pharmacy more than once (n=1432), 26% 
sticks with this pharmacy. Furthermore, almost 70% of the consumers who visited the 
preferred provider did so during the period in which the financial incentive mechanisms 
were applied. Of these consumers, 25% can be classified as “stayers” while 75% switches 
back to their ‘own’ provider at least once. Although these consumers sometimes switch 
back to their ‘own’ provider, over 50% keep on visiting the preferred provider.
Table 3.3 presents the results of the logit estimates for model 1. The estimation results 
for model 1 show that, as expected, due to the extended opening hours and the other 
products sold by the preferred pharmacy, age has a positive effect on the propensity 
to visit until the age of 40, after which the effect becomes negative. Gender has a posi-
tive effect on provider choice, which implies that the probability that a visit is made to 
the preferred pharmacy increases by 5.8 percentage points if the consumer is female. 
Provided that mean total costs are a good proxy for health status, health status has a 
negligible effect on preferred provider choice.
Distance shows that each minute extra travel time towards the preferred provider 
reduces the probability to visit a preferred provider. Per visit, the probability to visit a 
preferred provider decreases by 0.4 percentage points per minute extra travel time. 
Consumers appear to be sensitive to both types of incentive mechanisms. The prob-
ability that consumers visit a preferred provider in the presence of the financial incentive 
increases with 3.4 percentage points and with 3.2 percentage points in the presence of 
the qualitative incentive.
In estimating the second model, we first examined whether consumer characteristics 
and incentives are significantly different between the specified decision strategies. We 
find that consumer characteristics do not differ significantly between the three decision 
patterns. The incentive mechanisms, however, do show relevant differences between 
the three decision strategies. Consumers displaying the decision patterns “switching 
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and staying” and “switching and returning” were more often exposed to financial incen-
tive mechanisms than those who are not switching.
The multinomial logit model provides insight into the decision to either not switch 
(“not switching”), switch and stay with the preferred pharmacy (“staying”) or switch and 
return (“not staying”) after the first visit to the preferred pharmacy. To interpret the pa-
rameters of the multinomial logit model we present the average marginal effects. Table 
3.4 presents the results of the multinomial logit for model 2.
The estimation results show that financial incentives have a greater impact on the 
decision to “switch and return” (0.07) than on the decision “to switch and stay” (0.0294). 
Table 3.3 Coefficients and average marginal effects for model 1(logit model) of health insurer A
Model 1:
Pharmacy choice per visit
Coefficient
(s.e.)
AME1
(s.e.)
Age (in years) 0.088* 0.0041
(0.015) (0.0007)
Age squared -0.00078* -0.00004
(0.00014) (0.000007)
Gender (1 = female) 1.277* 0.058
(0.277) (0.014)
Age x gender -0.0236* -0.0011
(0.0051) (0.0002)
Mean total pharmacy costs per individual -0.0014 -0.00007
(0.0009) (0.00004)
Difference in travel time to preferred provider in minutes -0.0877* -0.0041
(0.005) (0.00028)
Financial incentive (1 = incentive) 0.628* 0.0338
(0.0367) (0.0022)
Qualitative incentive (1 = incentive) 0.5803* 0.0316
(0.0351) (0.0025)
Constant -5.449*
(0.432)
Number of observations included 139,340
Number of clusters included (individuals) 11,944
Pseudo R-square 0.0507
Percent correct predicted (cut-off 0.2) 94.73%
* Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 10% level
1 AME = average marginal effect
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Respondents, who face a financial incentive, are more likely to decide to “switch and 
return”. So many people who switched to a preferred pharmacy may only exploit the 
financial incentive and than return to their old pharmacy. The propensity to choose the 
switch decision, either “switching and staying” or “switching and not staying” increases 
in the presence of (financial) incentives. Background characteristics show, for example, 
that being female increases the probability to choose the decision strategy to switch 
and that respondents who face a longer travel time towards their own pharmacy, are 
more likely to choose one of the switching strategies.
Finally, we evaluated the IIA assumption by first deleting the decision of “switching 
and not staying” from the choice set, re-estimating the model, and computing the 
Hausman-McFadden test statistic. The test statistic resulted in inconclusive results as 
Table 3.4 Average marginal effects for model 2 (Multinomial logit model) of health insurer A
Model 2:
Consumer choice
Not-Switching
(s.e.)
Switching and 
staying
(s.e.)
Switching and 
not-staying
(s.e.)
Age (in years) -0.0061* 0.0011 0.005*
(0.0011) (0.00059) (0.0009)
Age squared 0.000057* -0.00000 0.000052*
(0.00001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Gender (1 = female) -0.0996* 0.0294* 0.0702*
(0.0181) (0.0118) (0.0159)
Age x gender 0.00156* -0.00049* -0.00107*
(0.00038) (0.00021) (0.0003)
Number of pharmacy visits per individual -0.0031* -0.00046 0.0035*
(0.00086) (0.00059) (0.00069)
Number of pharmacy visits x Number of pharmacy visits 0.000046* -0.00001 -0.000035*
(0.000016) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Mean total pharmacy costs per individual 0.00016* 0.000025 -0.00018*
(0.00099) (0.00003) (0.0001)
Difference in travel time to preferred provider in minutes 0.0105* -0.00258* -0.0078*
(0.00042) (0.00019) (0.0003)
Financial incentive (1 = incentive) -0.0946* 0.0213* 0.0733*
(0.0065) (0.0037) (0.0054)
Qualitative incentive (1 = incentive) -0.0547* 0.0154* 0.0393*
(0.007) (0.0035) (0.006)
Number of observations included 11,758
Pseudo R-square 0.1078
* Significant at 5% level
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the chi-square is negative. We follow Burns and Wholey (1992) and Hodgkin (1996) by 
looking for meaningful differences in patterns of coefficients. The logit estimations 
from the different choice set specifications, however, do not show a considerable dif-
ference in the pattern of the coefficients. We conducted the same test by re-estimating 
the model and excluding the decision of not switching, using as base the “switch and 
staying” decision. In this case, the Hausman-McFadden test is conclusive and does not 
reject the IIA assumption. In addition, there is no considerable difference in the pattern 
of the coefficients implying that we conclude that the IIA assumption does not seem to 
fail here.
Results health insurer B
The setting in which the experiment takes place is quite different from that of health 
insurer A. First, the market segment focuses on residents in a new residential area in 
which there is no other pharmacy located. Second, the incentive mechanisms differ; 
qualitative incentive mechanisms are not used while the financial incentive consists 
of an indirect financial incentive. As described in section 3, the incentive consists of 
discounts on certain categories of products. The incentive was introduced a few months 
after the opening of the preferred provider and given to all enrollees who collect their 
prescription drugs at the preferred provider. In addition, the incentive is relevant for 
each visit, in contrast to health insurer A, which offers the incentive only at the first two 
visits. The incentive used by health insurer B can thus be seen as a permanent incentive.
In total 4,311 pharmacy visits have been made of which 15% have been to the pre-
ferred pharmacy. This corresponds to 225 consumers who have visited the preferred 
provider at least once, implying that 23% of all consumers have visited the preferred 
provider. Of these consumers, 80 make no other visits in our study period after they 
have visited the preferred provider. Of the 145 consumers who remain, 129 stick with 
the preferred provider while only 16 of them switch back to their ‘own’ provider. The 
consumer choice model for health insurer B therefore cannot be estimated because the 
group of non-stayers is too small.
Table 3.5 presents the results of the logit estimates for the pharmacy choice per visit 
model. The marginal effects indicate the change in probability that consumers switch to 
the preferred provider due to a marginal change in the explanatory variable (or a change 
form 0 to 1 if the explanatory variable is a dummy variable).
The effect of age on preferred provider choice is positive until the age of about 40 
and becomes negative after that. The fact that the new residential area consists of many 
young families who moved there can explain the positive effect of age on preferred pro-
vider choice. In addition, there is a negative correlation between age and ‘visits to the GP 
located in the same building as the preferred pharmacy’ which indicates that younger 
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people are more likely to visit that GP and therefore more likely to visit the preferred 
pharmacy. This is taken into account by the explanatory variable ‘visits to the GP’.
The number of visits can be an indicator of health, as we have no information available 
on the total expenditure on drugs per consumer. The coefficient indicates that consum-
ers, who make more visits to the pharmacy (bad health), have a negative probability to 
visit the preferred pharmacy. Health is thus negatively related with the probability to 
visit a preferred provider.
Results for travel time show that each minute extra travel time towards the preferred 
provider reduces the probability to visit a preferred provider. Per visit, the probability 
to visit a preferred provider decreases by 0.8 percentage points per minute extra travel 
time.
Table 3.5 Coefficients and average marginal effects for model 1 (logit model) of health insurer B
Model 1
Pharmacy choice per visit
Coefficient
(s.e.)
AME1
(s.e.)
Age (in years) 0.0826** 0.009
(0.033) (0.0038)
Age squared -0.0008** -0.00009
(0.0003) (0.00004)
Gender (1 = female) 0.227 0.0242
(0.217) (0.0229)
Number of pharmacy visits per individual -0.0695* -0.00757
(0.024) (0.00253)
Difference in travel time to preferred provider in minutes -0.0502* -0.0055
(0.0097) (0.00122)
Financial incentive (1 = incentive) 0.528* 0.05504
(0.118) (0.0122)
Visit the GP (1 = yes) 2.566* 0.4582
(0.395) (0.0798)
Constant -3.905*
(0.860)
Number of observations included 4,280
Number of clusters included (individuals) 971
Pseudo R-square 0.1533
Percent correct predicted (cut-off 0.5) 85.93%
* Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 10% level
1 Average marginal effect
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Consumers appear to be sensitive to the financial incentives. The estimation results 
show that financial incentives increase the probability of a visit to the preferred phar-
macy by 5.5 percentage points. Most remarkable is the large effect on preferred provider 
choice of visiting the GP located in the same building as the preferred pharmacy. Estima-
tion results show that once a consumer visits the GP, the probability he opts for the 
preferred pharmacy increases by 45.8 percentage points.
Differences in results between health insurer A and health insurer B
The two natural experiments differ in several aspects. First, the number of observations 
per health insurer differs as well as the number of consumers who visit the preferred 
provider. While health insurer A offers a larger dataset of potential switchers, the 
number of actual switchers is much higher in case of health insurer B. In the setting of 
health insurer A about 14% of all consumers visit the preferred provider at least once, 
compared to 25% in the other setting.
Second, the setting in which the natural experiments have taken place significantly 
differs. The major differences focus on the type and magnitude of the incentives used, 
the characteristics of the preferred pharmacy and the type of contract. These differences 
can have an influence on consumer response to the preferred pharmacy and their will-
ingness to visit the preferred pharmacy.
The differences between the two experiments can be illustrated with respect 
to the outcomes of our estimated models. The results of health insurer A, show that 
the original market segment of the drugstore, women between the ages of 20-40, is 
indicative for the consumers who switch towards the preferred pharmacy. In addition, 
the more extensive opening hours of the drug store may also explain why the preferred 
pharmacy is particularly attractive for younger people. In case of health insurer B, the 
effect of age is, however, related to the population of the new residential area. As the 
new residential area consists of a young population (families) the effect of age indicates 
that these people have less ties to their previous pharmacy or GP and switch mostly for 
convenience reasons.
Extra travel time towards the preferred provider has, in case of both health insurers, a 
negative effect on preferred provider choice. Although the marginal effect of travel time 
is the same in both settings, distance seems to be particularly decisive for residents in 
the new residential area of health insurer B, since for most of them the preferred phar-
macy is much closer to their home address than any other pharmacy.
The opening of the GP in the same building as the preferred pharmacy, with health 
insurer B, had a strong effect on preferred provider choice. The probability to visit the 
preferred pharmacy increases by about 50 percentage points if consumers visit the GP. 
From this it can be concluded that convenience, one-stop ‘shopping’ and the referral by 
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the GP to the preferred pharmacy are important factors in provider choice. The ease of 
having the GP, who prescribes drugs, and the pharmacy, who supplies the drugs, at the 
same location, induces many consumers to switch towards the preferred pharmacy.
Incentive mechanisms have a positive effect on provider choice. Because the type 
of incentive, the duration of the incentive and the magnitude of the incentive differ, 
the effects cannot be compared in absolute terms. Health insurer A used a temporary 
incentive that was only valid during the first and second visit to the preferred pharmacy. 
Health insurer B on the other hand, introduced a ‘permanent’ incentive introduced a few 
months after the opening of the preferred provider, applicable to all visitors, given that 
they need the specific drugs for which the incentive holds. Next to a positive effect on 
provider choice, the data illustrate that incentive mechanisms may have had more than 
just a one time positive effect. With health insurer A, about 25% of all consumers, who 
switch during the incentive mechanisms period, stick with their choice. Over 50% of 
the switchers visit the preferred pharmacy in other periods as well besides visiting their 
own provider. With health insurer B the incentive mechanism is a permanent incentive 
mechanism that illustrates that more than 80% of the consumers who switch stick with 
their choice.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we analyzed the effect of different types of preferred provider arrange-
ments in the Dutch pharmacy market. In this market, consumers have free choice of 
provider and are motivated by their health insurer to visit certain preferred pharmacies 
through a variety of positive incentive mechanisms. Using data from two health insurers, 
we estimate how different consumers respond to the various incentives. In contrast to 
the substantial empirical research about consumer preferences for health plans with re-
stricted provider networks, little is known about how consumers respond to incentives 
to visit certain preferred providers in case they have access to an unrestricted provider 
network. Given the growing dislike among consumers of ex ante restrictions on provider 
choice – known as the managed care backlash – positive channeling incentives may be 
an effective tool for insurers to acquire sufficient bargaining power vis-à-vis health care 
providers.
Our results show that even small incentives can have a significant impact on provider 
choice. We find that consumer responsiveness is dependent on the type and magnitude 
of the incentive used by the health insurer, the location of the preferred provider, the 
role of the GP, convenience and quality.
Financial incentives are able to persuade some consumers to switch. In case of health 
insurer A, 25% of those who switched during the “incentive mechanism period” stay with 
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the preferred provider. We find that temporary financial incentives are more likely to in-
duce a decision “to switch and return” than a decision “to switch and stay”, implying that 
such incentives are only partially effective in making consumers stick with a preferred 
provider. By contrast, over 80% of the switchers stayed with the preferred provider in 
case of health insurer B. An important difference is that the financial incentive in case 
of health insurer B was a permanent one. The different proportions of stayers cannot 
be fully attributed to the different financial incentives, however, because other charac-
teristics of the preferred pharmacies influence provider choice as well. Particularly the 
presence of a GP in the same building as the preferred pharmacy appeared to be the 
key determinant of pharmacy choice in case of health insurer B. This may be attributed 
to the convenience of one-stop shopping and the presence of a referral system that 
requires a prescription from a GP. Health insurers can thus not only influence pharmacy 
choice by introducing financial and qualitative incentives, but also and perhaps more 
effectively, by supporting the establishment of a preferred pharmacy in the same build-
ing of a contracted GP.
Are incentive mechanisms beneficial for the health insurer given the number of con-
sumers who are willing to switch? With pharmacy B, the incentive mechanism consists 
of a percentage discount on specific prescription or over-the-counter drugs. For health 
insurers, this kind of incentive is beneficial as long as the percentage discount given to 
enrollees is equal or smaller than the percentage discount the pharmacy offers. With 
health insurer A on the other hand, the incentive mechanism was a one time financial 
incentive. Here the health insurer has to take into account that the one time financial 
incentive is smaller than or equal to the financial discount on prescription drugs it re-
ceives from the pharmacy. Important is, however, that a number of consumers seem to 
return after their first visit, without receiving any financial incentive for that. The health 
insurer, on the other hand, still receives discounts on the drugs and earns a positive 
profit. For health insurer A, it can be beneficial to introduce a bonus that is higher than 
the estimated discount for a single visit because of future benefits. The empirical esti-
mates show that about 10% of all consumers switch at least once towards a preferred 
pharmacy, and that of these consumers about 25% stays with the preferred pharmacy in 
the period thereafter and more than 50% still visits the preferred provider occasionally. 
Health insurers can calculate the attractiveness of the financial incentive based on the 
average discount received from the pharmacy, the financial incentive and the number 
of consumers who stick with the preferred provider.
Quality is assumed to be equal among pharmacies because the efficacy of drugs is 
independent of which pharmacy sells it and because consumers cannot observe qual-
ity differences between pharmacies. Sensitivity to the small financial incentives in the 
pharmacy market might, therefore, be seen as an upper bound with respect to other 
market segments. In other market segments, e.g. hospital care, qualitative aspects seem 
60 Chapter 3
to play a larger role. The efficacy of a treatment may be dependent on which hospital 
or which specialist consumers visit. Financial incentives may be less effective than for 
example qualitative incentives in this market segment.
Loyalty is another aspect that can influence consumer sensitivity for channeling 
mechanisms. We expect loyalty in the doctor-patient relationship to play a larger role 
than the pharmacy-patient relationship. Consumers in the Netherlands, for example, 
have to register with a single GP while, by contrast, they can switch between pharmacies 
for each prescription. Due to this registration, GPs and patients often have long-term re-
lationships, which are likely to increase the degree of loyalty towards GPs. This increase 
in expected loyalty decreases the expected effectiveness of channeling mechanisms.
In sum, we expect that in the pharmacy market, channeling patients towards 
preferred providers is likely to be relatively easy relative to other health care provid-
ers. Providing incentives to visit preferred providers might be more attractive in other 
market segments, however, if the benefits of channeling are larger. For instance, chan-
neling patients towards GPs with an excellent performance as gatekeeper, might lead to 
substantially lower drug and hospital expenditures for health insurers. The sensitivity of 
different consumers to different incentives for different provider types, is an interesting 
subject for future research.
Health insurers can only effectively bargain with health care providers if they can 
credibly threat to remove market share (Sorensen 2003). However, the recent managed 
care backlash in the US illustrates that consumers are reluctant to give up free choice 
of provider ex ante. The perceived negative effects of managed care were stronger for 
consumers who did not have free choice of health plan than for consumers who could 
choose their own health plan (Gawande, Blendon et al. 1998). Free choice of health plan 
and unrestricted provider networks do not have to conflict, however, with the oppor-
tunities for health insurers to channel their enrollees to preferred providers. Our results 
show that even in case of insurance contracts without ex ante restrictions on provider 
choice, health insurers can use various positive incentives to channel their enrollees 
towards preferred providers.
Consumer channeling by health insurers: natural experiments 61
3
References
Bamezai, A., G. A. Melnick, et al. (2003). ‘Hospital selective contracting without consumer choice, 
what can we learn from Medi-Cal?’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 22(1), 65-84.
Buchmueller, T. C. and P. J. Feldstein (1997). ‘The effect of price on switching among health plans’, 
Journal of Health Economics 16(2), 231-47.
Burns, L. R. and D. R. Wholey (1992). ‘The impact of physician characteristics in conditional choice 
models for hospital care’, Journal of Health Economics 11(1), 43-62.
Chakraborty, G., R. Ettenson, et al. (1994). ‘How consumers choose health insurance’, Journal of 
Health Care Marketing 14(1), 21-33.
Chernew, M., G. Gowrisankaran, et al. (2004). ‘Quality and employers’ choice of health plans’, Journal 
of Health Economics 23(3), 471-92.
Chernew, M. and D. P. Scanlon (1998). ‘Health plan report cards and insurance choice’, Inquiry 35(1), 
9-22.
Cutler, D. M. (2002). ‘Equality, efficiency, and market fundamental, the dynamics of international 
medical-care reform’, Journal of economic Literature 40(3), 881-906.
Dafny, L. S. and D. Dranove (2005). ‘Do report cards tell consumer anything they don’t already 
know?’, The case of Medicare HMOs., NBER.
Dijk, M., M. Pomp, et al. (2006). ‘Consumer price sensitivity in health insurance’, CPB Netherlands 
bureau for economic policy analysis, The Hague.
Efron, B. and R. Tibshirani (1986). ‘Bootstrap Methods for Standard Errors, Confidence Intervals and 
Other Measures of Statistical Accuracy’, Statistical Science 1(1), 54-77.
Farrar, S., M. Ryan, et al. (2000). ‘Using discrete choice modelling in priority setting, an application 
to clinical service developments’, Social Science & Medicine 50(1), 63-75.
Feldman, R., M. Finch, et al. (1989). ‘The Demand for Employment-Based Health Insurance Plans’, 
The Journal of Human Resources 24(1), 115-142.
Fortney, J., J. C. Thill, et al. (2001). ‘Provider choice and utility loss due to selective contracting in 
rural and urban areas’, Medical Care Research and Review 58(1), 60-75.
Gawande, A. A., R. Blendon, et al. (1998). ‘Does dissatisfaction with health plans stem from having 
no choices?’, Health Affairs (Millwood) 17(5), 184-94.
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis, pearson education inc.
Griens, A. M. G. F. and J. L. Tinke (2006). ‘Data en Feiten 2006’, Stichting Farmaceutische Kengetallen, 
The Hague.
Harris, K., J. Schultz, et al. (2002). ‘Measuring consumer perceptions of quality differences among 
competing health benefit plans’, Journal of Health Economics 21, 1-17.
Hausman, J. A. and D. McFadden (1984). ‘Specification tests for the multinomial logit model’, Econo-
metrica 52(5), 1219-1240.
Hodgkin, D. (1996). ‘Specialized service offerings and patients’ choice of hospital, the case of car-
diac catheterization’, Journal of Health Economics 15(3), 305-32.
62 Chapter 3
Lamers, L. M. and R. C. van Vliet (2004). ‘The Pharmacy-based Cost Group model, validating and 
adjusting the classification of medications for chronic conditions to the Dutch situation’, Health 
Policy 68(1), 113-21.
Lancsar, E. J., J. P. Hall, et al. (2003). ‘Using discrete choice experiments to investigate patient prefer-
ences for preventive asthma medication.’ ESAM03 conference.
Madden, D., A. Nolan, et al. (2005). ‘GP reimbursement and visiting behavior in Ireland’, Health 
Economics 14(10), 1047-60.
Manski, C. (1977). ‘The structure of random utility models.’ Theory and Decision 8, 229-254.
McFadden, D. (1974). ‘Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior.’ Frontiers in Econo-
metrics. P. Zarembka. New York, Academic Press.
McGuirk, M. A. and F. W. Porell (1984). ‘Spatial patterns of hospital utilization, the impact of distance 
and time’, Inquiry 21(1), 84-95.
Melnick, G. A., J. Zwanziger, et al. (1992). ‘The effects of market structure and bargaining position 
on hospital prices’, Journal of Health Economics 11(3), 217-33.
Neipp, J. and R. Zeckhauser (1985). ‘Persistence in the choice of health plans’, Advances in Health 
Economics and Health Services Research 6, 47-72.
Pauly, M. V. (1987). ‘Monopsony power in health insurance, thinking straight while standing on 
your head’, Journal of Health Economics 6(1), 73-81.
Phillips, K. A., T. Maddala, et al. (2002). ‘Measuring preferences for health care interventions using 
conjoint analysis, an application to HIV testing’, Health Services Research 37(6), 1681-705.
Propper, C. (2000). ‘The demand for private health care in the UK’, Journal of Health Economics 19(6), 
855-76.
Roghmann, K. J. and T. R. Zastowny (1979). ‘Proximity as a factor in the selection of health provid-
ers; emergency roomvisits compared to obstetric admissions and abortions’, Social Science & 
Medicine 13D(1), 61-63.
Royalty, B. A. and N. Solomon (1999). ‘Health Plan Choice, Price Elasticities in a Managed Competi-
tion Setting’, The Journal of Human Resources 34 (1)(Winter), 1-41.
Ryan, M. and K. Gerard (2003). ‘Using discrete choice experiments to value health care programmes, 
current practice and future research reflections’, Applied Health Economics and Health Policy 2(1), 
55-64.
Ryan, M. and J. Hughes (1997). ‘Using conjoint analysis to assess women’s preferences for miscar-
riage management’, Health Economics 6(3), 261-73.
Ryan, M., A. Netten, et al. (2006). ‘Using discrete choice experiments to estimate a preference-based 
measure of outcome-An application to social care for older people.’ Journal of Health Economics.
Samuelson, W. and R. Zeckhauser (1988). ‘Status quo bias in decision making’, Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 1, 7-59.
Schut, F. T. and W. P. Van de Ven (2005). ‘Rationing and competition in the Dutch health-care system’, 
Health Economics 14(Suppl 1), S59-74.
Sorensen, A. T. (2003). ‘Insurer-Hospital Bargaining, Negotiated discounts in Post-Deregulation 
Connecticut’, The Journal of industrial economics 51(4), 469-490.
Consumer channeling by health insurers: natural experiments 63
3
Staten, M., W. Dunkelberg, et al. (1987). ‘Market share and the illusion of power. Can Blue Cross force 
hospitals to discount?’, Journal of Health Economics 6(1), 43-58.
Strombom, B. A., T. C. Buchmueller, et al. (2002). ‘Switching costs, price sensitivity and health plan 
choice’, Journal of Health Economics 21(1), 89-116.
Tai, W. T., F. W. Porell, et al. (2004). ‘Hospital choice of rural Medicare beneficiaries, patient, hospital 
attributes, and the patient-physician relationship’, Health Services Research 39(6 Pt 1), 1903-22.
Town, R. and G. Vistnes (2001). ‘Hospital competition in HMO networks’, Journal of Health Economics 
20(5), 733-53.
van Campen, C. and I. B. Woittiez (2003). ‘Client demands and the allocation of home care in the 
Netherlands. A multinomial logit model of client types, care needs and referrals’, Health Policy 
64(2), 229-41.
Van de Ven, W. P. M. M. and R. P. Ellis (2000). ‘Risk Adjustment in competitive health plan markets’, 
Handbook of Health Economics. A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse, Elsevier Science BV. 1.
Zweifel, P. and W. G. Manning (2000). ‘Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care’, Hand-
book of health economics. A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science B.V. 1A, 
409-459.

Chapter 4
Which preferred providers 
are really preferred?
Effectiveness of insurers’ channeling incentives 
on pharmacy choice
66 Chapter 4
Abstract
Efficient contracting of health care requires effective consumer channeling. Little is 
known about the effectiveness of channeling strategies. We study channeling incentives 
on pharmacy choice using a large scale discrete choice experiment. Financial incen-
tives prove to be effective. Positive financial incentives are less effective than negative 
financial incentives. Channeling through qualitative incentives also leads to a significant 
impact on provider choice. While incentives help to channel, a strong status quo bias 
needs to be overcome before consumers change pharmacies. Focusing on consumers 
who are forced to choose a new pharmacy seems to be the most effective strategy.
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Introduction
In managed care markets health insurers bargain with health care providers over the 
price and quality of care on behalf of their enrollees. Several empirical studies showed 
that health insurers’ bargaining power crucially depends on the insurers’ ability to 
channel enrollees toward preferred providers (Pauly 1987; Sorensen 2003; Staten et al. 
1987; Melnick et al. 1992). Insurers have different strategies to channel enrollees toward 
selected providers. First, insurers may limit provider choice to a selected network of 
providers from which enrollees have to choose. Second, health insurers can also offer 
preferred provider networks in which enrollees retain free provider choice but are moti-
vated to use preferred providers through various incentives. The managed care backlash 
in the US showed that consumers turned away from restrictive health plans because 
consumers distrust the strong financial link between health care providers and insurers 
in such plans (Chu-Weininger and Balkrishnan 2006; Feldman et al. 1989; Gawande et al. 
1998; Miller 2006). Health insurers are increasingly turning to less restrictive strategies 
such as preferred provider networks.
Since selective contracting by health insurers or other third parties has been intro-
duced in an increasing number of countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, and Swit-
zerland), an important question is how and to what extent consumers can be motivated 
to use preferred providers. Despite the widespread use of preferred provider plans in the 
US little is known about consumer sensitivity to various channeling incentives. Most em-
pirical papers focused on the effects of restricted networks on the bargaining position of 
the insurer. The aim of this paper is to increase our understanding of the effectiveness of 
channeling incentives on provider choice.
Specifically we address the following questions. First, do consumers consider switch-
ing to a preferred provider once channeling incentives are introduced? Second, how 
does consumer sensitivity to channeling incentives depend on the type of channeling 
incentive used? Third, how does the effectiveness of channeling incentives depend on 
the existence of a patient-provider relationship? Fourth, does the effectiveness of chan-
neling depend on certain consumer characteristics?
Since revealed preference data are only limited available we use a stated preference 
method to estimate consumer sensitivity to channeling incentives. With a Discrete 
Choice Experiment (DCE) we elicit consumer preferences for different channeling in-
centives in pharmacy choice. Moreover, we estimate the existence of a possible status 
quo bias by confronting consumers with choices between their current provider and a 
hypothetical alternative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will describe the setting in which the 
experiments have taken place. Section 3 discusses the methods used and the design of 
the experiment. Section 4 discusses the econometric model. Results are presented in 
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section 5 in which we first present the estimation results for the forced choices, then the 
estimation results for the choices including the current pharmacy and last the impact 
of channeling incentives on pharmacy choice. Section 6 ends with a conclusion and 
discussion.
Setting
We examine the effectiveness of various channeling incentives in the context of the 
Dutch pharmacy market. In 2006 there has been a major health care reform in the 
Netherlands, introducing a universal mandatory health insurance scheme with man-
aged competition (Enthoven and Van de Ven 2007).21 The reform substantially increased 
the possibilities for health insurers to selectively contract health care providers and to 
offer limited or preferred provider plans. So far, most insurers are reluctant to selectively 
contract with providers and to offer health plans with preferred or limited provider net-
works (NZA 2007). Some health insurers did start experimenting with various positive 
incentives to stimulate enrollees to visit preferred pharmacies in 2003, even prior to the 
reform (Boonen et al. 2008). These experiments were motivated by the high mark-ups 
pharmacies were able to earn. In contrast to the US, Dutch citizens are largely unfamiliar 
with preferred provider networks and traditionally faced free choice of pharmacy and 
full coverage of expenditures for most prescription drugs. Pharmacies were therefore 
able to set all prices (including those of cheap generic substitutes) close to the reim-
bursement limits that were legally determined for each therapeutic category (if prices 
exceed the limit, consumers have to pay the additional amount out-of-pocket) (Schut 
and Brouwer 2004; Wolf, de et al. 2005). Given that health insurers have already been 
experimenting with preferred provider contracts in the pharmacy market and consum-
ers may be somewhat familiar with channeling incentives to influence pharmacy choice, 
we focus our analysis on the pharmacy market.
Since the scale and scope of the experiments with preferred pharmacies are very 
limited, we obtained stated preference data to estimate consumer sensitivity to various 
channeling incentives to influence pharmacy choice. With stated preference data we can 
improve our understanding of consumer preferences for various hypothetical channel-
ing incentives that may be used by health insurers in the near future.
21. For each plan health insurers are obliged to accept everyone against a community rated premium. 
A risk equalization fund compensates insurers for enrollees with high predictable medical expenses.
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Method
A discrete choice experiment (DCE) is designed to elicit stated preferences for differ-
ent aspects of pharmacies. DCEs involve the creation of hypothetical choice scenarios, 
in which the alternatives (pharmacies) are described in terms of their characteristics 
(attributes). Respondents’ choices are expected to reflect their underlying preferences 
(Lancsar 2002). The attributes used in this study are based on the different channeling 
incentives health insurers can use to motivate consumers to visit the preferred pharmacy, 
including financial incentives, qualitative incentives and pharmacy characteristics.
The attributes are based on empirical studies on determinants of provider choice, 
consultations with health insurers and pharmacists, survey data on pharmacy choice 
and actual choice behavior. Research has shown that distance, quality, low waiting 
times, easy access, availability of out-of-office hours care, and good communication 
and information are important attributes in provider choice (see e.g. Boonen and Schut 
2007; Garnick et al. 1989; Hole 2008; Kim 1990; Longo et al. 2006; Rubin et al. 2006; Tai et 
al. 2004; Vick and Scott 1998). Furthermore, data on revealed preferences, obtained from 
small scale natural experiments by health insurers with preferred pharmacies, show that 
people react positively to temporary positive financial and qualitative incentives. Gift 
certificates and discounts on over-the-counter medicines motivated 15% to 25% of the 
enrollees to visit the preferred pharmacy at least once. Also the availability of a body 
check (qualitative incentive) had a positive effect on pharmacy choice. However, most 
enrollees switched back to their original pharmacy after they received the temporary 
bonus from their health insurer (Boonen et al. 2008).
Where in the natural experiment health insurers introduced temporary financial in-
centives, we used permanent financial incentives in our study. With the introduction of 
the new health insurance act in 2006, health insurers in the Netherlands obtained more 
possibilities to use financial incentives to stimulate enrollees to visit preferred providers. 
At the time of the natural experiments these possibilities were limited. We developed 
two version of the questionnaire, one with a positive and one with a negative financial 
incentive, since we expect consumers to respond differently to losses than to gains (loss 
aversion) (Kahneman et al. 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). In the first version con-
sumers are confronted with a standard out-of-pocket payment of 9 euro per prescription 
drug from each pharmacy. To stimulate consumers to visit the preferred pharmacy, the 
insurer can give a discount up to nine euro on this co-payment. In the second version, 
consumers do not face a standard out-of-pocket payment but are confronted with a 
co-payment up to nine euro once they visit a non-preferred provider.
The qualitative incentives included in this DCE study are contractible aspects of phar-
macies that can be attractive to consumers. We included extended opening hours, avail-
ability of an internet service, availability of a quality certificate, meetings on medication 
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management and favorable consumer satisfaction ratings. Extended opening hours are 
opening hours on Saturdays and during the evening from Monday to Friday. Traditional 
pharmacies have opening hours from 8:30 AM to 5:30 PM and are closed on Saturdays 
and Sundays (in emergency situations consumers can collect their prescription drugs 
outside regular opening hours). The internet service enables online ordering and home 
delivery of drugs. A quality certificate indicates whether or not pharmacies are given a 
certificate based on the standards set by the pharmacy association. Pharmacies with 
such a certificate fulfill all requirements the pharmacy association sets for pharmacies. 
Meetings on medication management include regular meetings in which consumers 
receive extra information on the medication management for specific diseases.
In addition to qualitative incentives we distinguish several practice characteristics 
that may also influence pharmacy choice. Practice characteristics include travel time 
from the home address toward the pharmacy and the type of pharmacy. We discern 
three different types of pharmacies: a traditional stand-alone pharmacy, a pharmacy 
including a general practitioner practice and a health center in which several health care 
providers work together in the same building. The qualitative and financial incentives 
are described in table 4.1. We used effects coding to estimate our attributes.
Even though health insurers contract providers with preferable characteristics, con-
sumers may still be reluctant to switch. Empirical research has shown that consumers 
are persistent in their choice; they are reluctant to switch to another provider even when 
this provider clearly outperforms their current provider. Enrollees who switch, have to 
build new relationships of trust (intangible transaction costs) and have to establish new 
medical records, which cost money, time and discomfort (tangible transaction costs) 
(Neipp and Zeckhauser 1985; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Transaction (switching) 
costs may differ substantially between individuals (Strombom et al. 2002). In addition 
to transaction costs, status quo bias may also result from cognitive misperceptions and 
psychological commitment, stemming from misperceived sunk costs, regret avoidance 
or a drive for consistency (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). The presence of a status-
quo bias may reduce the effectiveness of channeling incentives. To estimate the effect of 
a status quo bias, consumers are confronted with two additional choices between their 
current pharmacy and a hypothetical alternative.
Study design and data collection
Data were collected by a questionnaire among an internet based household panel (n = 
2500) that is representative of the adult Dutch population (age>18). Respondents who 
participate in the panel are provided with questionnaires biweekly. Socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of the respondents are available. The overall response rate 
was about 80%.
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In the first part of the questionnaire, respondents were confronted with general 
questions about their current pharmacy and their health care utilization. In addition, we 
presented respondents a number of propositions to gain insight in respondents’ willing-
ness to switch in response to financial incentives and in respondents’ perceptions about 
Table 4.1 Attributes and levels
Attribute Levels Coding (effects coding)
I Financial incentives
Co-payment No co-payment
3 euro per prescription
6 euro per prescription
9 euro per prescription
0
3
6
9
Discount No discount
3 euro per prescription
6 euro per prescription
9 euro per prescription
0
3
6
9
II Qualitative incentives
Extra opening hours No extended opening hours
Extended opening hours during the 
evenings and/or on Saturday
-1
 1
Internet service No, not available
Yes, available
-1
 1
Certificate of quality No, not present
Yes, present
-1
 1
Meetings on medication 
management
No meetings on medication management
Yes, regular meetings on medication 
management
-1
 1
Consumer satisfaction with the 
pharmacy
Bad
Reasonable
Good
Very good
-1 -1 -1
 1  0  0
 0  1  0
 0  0  1
III Practice characteristics
Distance from home address
(Walking distance in minutes)
5 minutes
15 minutes
25 minutes
35 minutes
5
15
25
35
Type of pharmacy Traditional stand-alone pharmacy
Pharmacy and GP
Primary care center
-1 -1
 1  0
 0  1
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quality differences between providers. Respondents were also asked to describe their 
current pharmacy on the basis of the attributes used in the DCE.
In the second part, respondents were presented with choice scenarios of three hypo-
thetical pharmacies and were asked to choose the most preferred pharmacy. The set of 
attributes and levels used to construct the choice scenarios (4 attributes at 2 levels, 1 
attribute at 3 levels, and 3 attributes at 4 levels), resulted in a complete factorial design 
with more than 3000 possible pharmacies. To collect preference information effectively, 
an efficient design was created using the toolbox available for these purposes in SAS.22 
To ensure that the data support a model with possible interactions, the SAS procedure 
%choiceff was instructed to find a D-optimal design for the model with all two-way 
interactions, that is, the determinant of the information matrix for the model with all 
two-way interactions is to be maximized (Huber and Zwerina 1996).23 As data collection 
was computer-based it was relatively easy to collect data from a large design that was 
split up in many blocks. We opted for a design with 108 choice sets that was divided in 
9 blocks of 12 choice sets. The resulting design scored high on relevant measures, such 
as level balance and orthogonality. Because the data collection was computer based, 
we were also able to vary the sequence of the attributes. Each respondent received a 
questionnaire in which the attributes were placed in a random order that differed across 
respondents to neutralize any ordering effects on consumer preferences (Kjaer et al. 
2006). In addition, the alternatives were given in a random order that differed across 
respondents to neutralize any left/right bias. An example of a choice scenario is given 
in appendix 4.1.
We did not include an opt-out option but added two additional questions in which 
respondents had to choose between a hypothetical alternative and their current phar-
macy. For these choices, respondents first described their current pharmacy in terms 
of the attributes used in this study. The levels for the current pharmacy are thus based 
on respondents’ own description. Because we cannot influence the description of the 
current pharmacy, we choose to randomly draw a hypothetical alternative from the 
attribute levels instead of using design techniques. Furthermore, an earlier experiment 
showed that the majority of the consumers are very reluctant to leave their current 
22. SAS marketing manual : support.sas.com/techsup/technote/ts722/pdf.
23. Beforehand we did not have strong expectations about possible significant two-way interactions 
between attributes. However, by creating a design with the possibility of testing for interaction terms, 
our main effects model estimates will be unbiased even if several interactions would exist. By using a 
main effects design only, results may be biased if interaction effects exist but cannot be estimated. We 
did test for the presence of several interaction effects for which hypotheses may exist (including distance 
and opening hours, distance and internet, distance and quality certificate, distance and consumer satis-
faction and opening hours and internet) but we have not found any significant effects. We therefore left 
this out of the analysis.
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pharmacy (Boonen and Schut 2007). Therefore, the presence of an opt-out option would 
reveal no information about consumers’ preferences for channeling incentives, since the 
opt-out option would dominate all other effects. We could have solved this problem by 
offering two choices, a forced choice and a choice with an opt-out option. Because of 
cognitive overload we have chosen to only include two additional choices to estimate 
the status quo effect.
Econometric specification
Economic Framework
In this paper, we want to analyze consumers’ willingness to make trade-offs between 
providers that differ in financial and qualitative terms. We base our analysis on Lan-
caster’s economic theory of value (Lancaster 1966; Lancaster 1971) and random utility 
theory (McFadden 1974; Hanemann 1983; Ryan, Netten et al. 2006). This implies that we 
assume that utility is derived from the properties or characteristics of a good rather than 
from the good itself. Hence, we describe the decision making process about pharmacy 
choice in terms of comparing indirect utility functions. Consumers are assumed to have 
perfect discrimination capability and to choose the pharmacy that maximizes their util-
ity. We assume that the utility that individual i derives from choosing alternative j on 
choice occasion t is then given by equation 1,
 Uijt = Vijt + εijt (1)
where Uijt denotes individual i’s utility from choice j on choice occasion t, Vijt is the de-
terministic part which captures both pharmacy characteristics which vary over ijt and 
individual characteristics (taste variations) which vary over i, and εijt is the error term 
which captures the characteristics that are unobservable to the researchers as well as 
measurement error (Manski 1977).
Empirical Framework
In the empirical models, we first estimate consumers’ sensitivity to certain pharmacy 
characteristics and their willingness to pay to visit a pharmacy with these specific char-
acteristics based on the forced choice questions. Second, a model that allows for status 
quo bias is estimated related to the choices between the current pharmacy and the 
preferred hypothetical scenario in which we use information on the characteristics of 
the current pharmacy.
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McFadden shows that if εijt are assumed to be type I extreme value (or Weibull) and 
independent, then a logit model can be derived from the random utility model (McFad-
den 1974). The parameter estimates of the logit model may be interpreted as parameter 
estimates of the indirect utility function. For the empirical estimation of the indirect 
utility model, we used a multinomial logit model.24
Each pharmacy in the choice set is composed of a bundle of pharmacy characteristics 
(X) faced by the ith individual. Since we observe the choice and not the actual difference 
in utility, the dependent variable is binary. The conditional probability Pr(yi = m) that 
individual i in choice occasion t is observed to choose alternative m is given by equa-
tion (2),
Pr(yit = m|Vijt) = P(Uimt > Uijt ∀j ≠ m) =
exp(Vimt) for m = 1 to J (2)
ΣJj exp(Vijt)
where Vijt = xjtβ and xijt is a vector with choice attributes.
As each respondent made 12 choices, the choices whether or not to choose a specific 
pharmacy might not be independent within an individual. To obtain standard errors that 
are valid in the presence of such intra-individual correlation, we used the “cluster” option 
in Stata version 9.0. The resulting variance-covariance matrix generalizes the Huber-
White sandwich estimator to allow for possible within individual correlation (Huber 
1967; White 1980,1982, Stata User Guide 1999)25.
In the forced choice decision the labels of the pharmacies have no meaning. Pharmacy 
A, pharmacy B and pharmacy C only differ in the specified attributes and their location 
on the screen. During data collection, the alternatives were randomly assigned to one 
of the three labels and corresponding locations. As a consequence, there will be no 
relationship between the attributes and the labels. Still, alternative specific constants 
can be used to test for mis-specification. The constant term can then be interpreted as 
the difference in average utility between scenario A, B and C caused by a left/middle/
right bias (Scott, et al 2003)
In the status quo bias model consumers can choose between the chosen hypothetical 
pharmacy and their current pharmacy, i.e. they can opt-out and choose to stay with their 
24. We also analyzed our data using a mixed logit model that allows for preference heterogeneity. Since 
both models lead to similar results we have opted for the multinomial logit model because this facilitates 
the computation of confidence intervals for our marginal rates of substitution and the simulated choice 
shares.
25. See also http://repec.org/usug2007/crse.pdf for a detailed explanation of the Eicker-Huber-White 
robust standard errors in Stata.
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current pharmacy. This model can be seen as a labeled experiment in which consumers 
may attach a certain value to the label ‘current pharmacy’. Respondents are assumed to 
have an ex ante preference not to switch pharmacies. To capture this effect we included 
an alternative specific dummy, which we defined as being equal to 1 for the current 
pharmacy and equal to -1 for the hypothetical alternative. To be able to capture the full 
‘status-quo bias’ we used effects coding (-1 for the base level and 1 for the other levels, 
see table 4.1) to estimate our attributes (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen 2005).
To investigate whether there is a predictable component in the preference hetero-
geneity, we included interactions between background characteristics (income, having 
a job, age, health status) and attributes. In addition, we included interactions of the 
attributes with respondents’ past experiences; the description of and the relationship 
with their current pharmacy. It might, for example, be expected that respondents who 
are used to a pharmacy with an internet service are more likely to prefer a pharmacy 
including an internet service (Scott, et al. 2003).
A model with main effects was estimated first and is used to compute marginal rates of 
substitution (based on equation (3)) between each attribute and the price attribute (the 
financial incentive). The marginal rates of substitution represent the willingness to pay 
for an attribute m, given a marginal change in that attribute (MRSP) (Hanemann 1983). 
Since we used effects coding for the attributes the formula for the MRSP is multiplied by 
2, with an exception for distance, which is a continuous variable.
MRSP = −
δv/δbm = −2
βm  (3)
δv/δbprice βprice
To study the effectiveness of the attributes in actually channeling patients to preferred 
providers, we study their importance in terms of choice shares. The computation of the 
choice shares will be described in detail in the result section.
Results
Descriptive statistics
In total 1875 respondents filled in the questionnaire, 952 the discount version and 923 
the co-payment version. The study population is representative of the Dutch adult 
population with an average age of 49 years, 48% female, 56% with a job and an average 
net monthly income of about 1700 euro. Furthermore, over 80% indicates to be in good 
or even excellent health. Characteristics of respondents’ past experiences with their cur-
rent pharmacy are presented in table 4.2. Most respondents have a regular pharmacy 
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Table 4.2 Past experiences and the description of the current pharmacy
Past experiences/ Description of current 
pharmacy
Response Frequency
Past experiences
Number of visits to the pharmacy in the last year 0 visits 23%
1 or 2 visits 30%
3 or 4 visits 21%
More than 4 visits 26%
Do you have a regular pharmacy? No 3%
Yes 97%
How long do you have this regular pharmacy? Less than one year 3%
Between one and five years 15%
More than five years 85%
Did you ever switch between pharmacies? No 56%
Yes 44%
What was the most important reason to switch? I moved to another city 80%
The pharmacy quitted with its practice 3%
A new pharmacy opened its practice 
closer to my home address
8%
Bad experiences with the former 
pharmacy
3%
Other 6%
Description of the current pharmacy
Distance to the current pharmacy 5 minutes 38%
15 minutes 37%
25 minutes 11%
35 minutes 14%
Opening hours Basic opening hours 66%
Extended opening hours 34%
Internet Service No 73%
Yes 27%
Meetings on medication management No 76%
Yes 24%
Quality certificate No 57%
Yes 43%
Consumer satisfaction Bad 1%
Mediocre 7%
Good 70%
Very Good 22%
Type of practice Only pharmacy 69%
GP and pharmacy 14%
Primary care centre 17%
Which preferred pharmacies are really preferred? 77
4
with whom they have a long-term relationship of over 5 years. Moreover, respondents’ 
past experiences show that the majority visits a pharmacy that has no extra features 
such as extended opening hours or an internet service.
The answers to the propositions in the first part of the questionnaire, concerning ob-
served quality differences and respondents’ willingness to switch in return for financial 
incentives, showed that respondents seem reluctant to listen to advice from their health 
insurer. About 75% of the respondents indicate to see no differences in quality between 
pharmacies. Qualitative aspects may thus play a minor role in pharmacy choice. The 
description of the current pharmacy further showed that the majority of the pharmacies 
do not have extra attractive qualitative features as described by the attributes. Further-
more, respondents are reluctant to pay an out-of-pocket payment to stay with their 
current pharmacy. Only 14% of the respondents is prepared to pay a co-payment. The 
introduction of a financial advantage, on the other hand, induces 40% of the respon-
dents to leave their current pharmacy. These responses indicate that consumers react 
stronger to negative than to positive financial incentives. Only about 28% indicates to 
be willing to follow the health insurer’s recommendation to visit specific pharmacies.
Estimation results
Hypothetical scenarios
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results of the main effects model for the co-payment 
version and the discount version. After deletion of observations for which data on the 
dependent variable were missing, the final sample size included 911 individuals for the 
co-payment version and 940 individuals for the discount version. The constant term is 
only significant for alternative C and shows a general preference for alternative B over 
alternative C. This could indicate that there might be a left/right bias but since we ran-
domly assigned the alternatives to position A, B or C, this will not affect our estimates.26
For the main attributes, the signs of the coefficients are as expected. Meetings on 
medication management do not have a significant impact on pharmacy choice. All other 
attributes (financial incentives, provider characteristics and qualitative incentives) do 
have a significant effect on pharmacy choice. Respondents dislike primary care centers, 
while joint practices with a GP and pharmacy are preferred over traditional pharma-
cies. The positive coefficients for the qualitative attributes show that pharmacies with 
such characteristics generate a higher utility than pharmacies that do not have these 
characteristics, holding all other attribute levels constant.
The relative importance of each attribute is estimated by using the marginal rates of 
substitution. We presented the MRSP and their confidence intervals for the main effects 
26. We also estimated a model without the constant term and found no large differences in the results.
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model in table 4.3.27 The most important attributes in both versions are consumer satis-
faction and quality certificates. The MRSP for travel time indicates the trade-off of price 
27. Confidence intervals are estimated using the bootstrap procedure. To allow for within individual 
correlation of the error term we re-sampled individuals rather than choices. To allow for bias affecting 
the interval we used bias corrected percentile based confidence intervals (Hole 2007). Other papers in 
Table 4.3 Regression results for the hypothetical scenarios
Discount Version Co-payment Version
β (SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
β(SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
Qualitative incentives and practice characteristics
Distance -.048(.002)* -.398
(-.446; -.347)
-.046(.002)* -.211
(.187;.231)
Extra opening hours .258(.017)* 4.31
(3.63;5.01)
.224(.016)* 2.07
(1.77;2.39)
Meetings on medication management .015(.013) .252
(-.178;.71)
.025(.014) .230
(-.004;.513)
Internet Service .120(.015)* 2.01
(1.51;2.56)
.090(.015)* .829
(.572;1.12)
Quality Certificate .336(.017)* 5.61
(4.90;6.49)
.261(.017)* 2.41
(2.13;2.82)
Consumer satisfaction
Reasonable -.273(.026)* -4.56
(-5.66;-3.75)
-.330(.029)* -3.05
(2.53;3.66)
Good .615(.026)* 10.25
(9.00;11.49)
.579(.026)* 5.35
(4.82;5.99)
Very Good .757(.031)* 12.62
(11.11;14.23)
.736(.031)* 6.80
(6.08;7.40)
Type of practice
Group practice with GP .122(.021)* 2.04
(1.35;2.79)
.087(.021)* .805
(.405;1.17)
Primary Care Centre -.126(.020)* -2.09
(-2.77;-1.35)
-.008(.019) -.079
(-.408;.298)
Financial incentive
Discount/ co-payment .120(.006)* -.216(.008)*
Constant
Constant A -.018(.017) .003(.018)
Constant C -.058(.016)* -.062(.017)*
LL
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Number of individuals
-9242
.253
33762
940
-8712
.271
32634
911
* p<0.001, ** p<0.05
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for one-minute extra travel time. In the design of the DCE we worked with differences 
in travel time of 10 minutes. The willingness to pay for a decrease in travel time of 10 
minutes is then 4 euro in the discount version and 2 euro in the co-payment version. 
After consumer satisfaction and a quality certificate, travel time and extra opening hours 
are the most important attributes. Respondents are more sensitive to co-payments than 
to discounts. For all attributes, the MRSP in the discount version and thus the willingness 
to give up part of your discount in return for an attribute is substantially higher than 
those in the co-payment version.
We also estimated a model including interaction effects. Because the results showed 
only few significant effects we did not include them in the paper.28
Scenario including the current pharmacy
Respondents are confronted with two choices between their current pharmacy and 
a hypothetical alternative. One of the choices is a choice between the best possible 
pharmacy, based on the objective characteristics29, and their current pharmacy. In such 
a choice situation, 40% of all respondents stick with their current pharmacy and about 
60% is willing to switch. In choice situations between a randomly chosen hypothetical 
scenario and the current pharmacy, more than 80% sticks with their current provider, 
only 20% is willing to switch.
Table 4.4 presents the estimation results of the co-payment as well as the discount 
version of the DCE for the choices between the hypothetical and the current pharmacy. 
The alternative specific constant is positive and indicates a preference for the current 
pharmacy, as expected. All attributes show a similar pattern as in the hypothetical sce-
narios, only the significance levels differ.
The marginal rates of substitution, presented in table 4.4, show that the alternative 
specific constant is the most important attribute in pharmacy choice. Respondents are 
the health economics literature that have used bootstrapping to obtain confidence intervals are e.g. 
(McIntosch and Ryan 2002, Philips et al. 2002).
28. Having a job was associated with stronger preferences for pharmacies with extended opening 
hours, a good health with stronger preferences for internet services and ‘very good’ consumer satisfac-
tion ratings (in the discount version) or with weaker preferences for group practices including GPs and 
stronger preferences for a quality certificate (in the co-payment version). Moreover, age has a negative 
effect on the preference for a quality certificate. Finally, the interactions with past experiences show 
that respondents have stronger preferences for pharmacies that have similar attribute levels as their 
current pharmacy. We do not present detailed results since they do not add to the understanding of the 
problem. The results are available upon request from the authors.
29. The best pharmacy is described as a pharmacy located close to the home address with an excel-
lent consumer satisfaction rating, extended opening hours, meetings on medication management, an 
Internet service, a quality certificate and no out-of-pocket payment.
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willing to pay the most to stick with their current pharmacy. Also in these choice sce-
narios respondents are more sensitive to co-payments than to discounts. Respondents 
are more willing to give up part of their discount than to pay a co-payment for similar 
attribute level changes. In the discount version, quality certificates and consumer satis-
faction are the most important attributes. In the co-payment version, consumer satisfac-
tion, opening hours and distance are the most important. Since distance is measured in 
Table 4.4 Regression results for the scenarios including the current pharmacy
Discount version Co-payment version
β(SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
β(SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
Constant
Alternative specific constant .446(.08)* 8.07
(3.81;18.99)
.727(.096)* 5.929
(3.58;10.66)
Quality certificate and practice characteristics
Distance -.036(.005)* -.321
(-.643;-.177)
-.035(.006) * -.141
(-.25;-.08)
Extra opening hours -.0017(.058) -.031
(-2.48;2.48)
.146(.065)** 1.19
(.045;2.64)
Meetings on medication management .143(.063)** 2.59
(.246;6.80)
.150(.073)** 1.22
(.01;2.96)
Internet Service .124(.065) 2.25
(.012;6.57)
.001(.07) .006
(-1.18;1.34)
Quality Certificate .177(.06) * 3.21
(.879;7.187)
.055(.065) .445
(-.595;1.69)
Consumer satisfaction
Reasonable -.203(.155) -3.689
(-11.16;1.838)
-.491(.178)** -4.00
(-7.83;-1.149)
Good .436(.116)* 7.896
(3.49;16.67)
.224(.131) 1.829
(-.319;4.52)
Very Good .799(.199)* 14.46
(8.27;29.26)
1.055(.133)* 8.60
(5.523;14.39)
Type of practice
Group practice with GP -.119(.098) -2.16
(-8.023;1.55)
-.078(.107) -.632
(-2.98;1.151)
Primary Care Centre .076(.088) 1.375
(-1.631;6.377)
.294(.101)** 2.39
(.78;5.196)
Financial incentive
Discount/ co-payment .111(.028)* -.245(.037) *
LL
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Number of individuals
-712.666
.251
1384
692
-640.263
.359
1440
770
* p<0.001, ** p<0.05
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minutes the willingness to pay for a 10 minute decrease in travel time is 1.41 euro in the 
co-payment version.
The model including the interaction effects resulted in only one significant effect: 
older respondents showed a stronger preference for their current pharmacy than 
younger respondents. Other background characteristics or the description of the cur-
rent pharmacy showed no significant results. Due to the few significant effects we do 
not present the results for the model including the interaction effects.
Impact of channeling incentives on choice shares
Next to the computation of the MRSP, we simulated the impact on choice shares for the 
preferred pharmacy by varying the level of one attribute at a time (King, et al 2007)30. 
To examine the impact of attribute level changes on the choice share we constructed a 
base scenario with two identical pharmacies for which all attribute levels are equal. The 
attribute levels are based on the description of the “most common” current pharmacy by 
the respondents31. To estimate the impact of attribute level changes on choice shares, 
we vary the attribute levels of one of the two alternatives one at a time. In the choice 
scenarios including the current alternative, we assumed that in the base case the cur-
rent and non-current alternative have equal attribute levels except for the alternative 
specific constant. The attribute levels for the non-current alternative are then changed 
to estimate the impact on choice shares. With this simulation we want to estimate how 
many respondents are actually willing to switch in return for attribute level changes. We 
report the results for the hypothetical scenarios and the choices between the current 
and non-current pharmacy in table 4.5.
Again, we find that respondents are more sensitive to co-payments than to discounts. 
Introducing a co-payment leads to a larger reduction in market share then a similar 
reduction of the discount. This holds for both the hypothetical scenarios as well as the 
choice scenarios including the current pharmacy. This is in line with the estimation 
results that show higher MRSP in the discount version than in the co-payment version. 
Negative financial incentives thus appear to be more effective in channeling consumers 
toward preferred providers than positive financial incentives. Moreover, we see a similar 
30. We found that the MNL results are similar to those obtained with the mixed logit models. We start 
with three identical scenarios to compute the shift in market share. Our main interest is the in- or de-
crease in market share for the ‘preferred’ pharmacy, the pharmacy for which an attribute level is changed. 
The proportional substitution pattern that arises from the MNL model will therefore not bias our results 
(King et al. 2007).
31. The “most common” pharmacy was a traditional stand-alone pharmacy located at about 15 minutes 
walking distance from the home address. Furthermore the average pharmacy had no extra services such 
as Internet or extended opening hours. The “most common” pharmacy does not offer a discount nor 
requires a co-payment.
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pattern of choice probabilities between the hypothetical scenarios and the choices be-
tween the current pharmacy and a hypothetical scenario. Qualitative incentives attract 
enrollees in both scenarios, while the choice share decreases once negative financial in-
centives are introduced. We do, however, find important differences in the effectiveness 
of channeling incentives between the scenarios including the current pharmacy and 
the hypothetical scenarios. The switching rates in the scenarios including the current 
pharmacy are, in most cases32, lower for similar attribute level changes than those in the 
hypothetical scenarios. The relationship respondents have with their current pharmacy 
decreases the effectiveness of channeling incentives.
32. Only for meetings on medication management and very good consumer satisfaction ratings the 
choice shares in the choice situations including the current pharmacy are higher. Meetings on medica-
tion management have, however, no significant effect on the choice probability.
Table 4.5 Predicted probabilities in response to variation in attributes
Hypothetical scenarios Current versus alternative
Discount version Co-payment version Discount version Co-payment version
Δ % Preferred 
Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred 
Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred 
Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred 
Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Base share Alternative .50 .50 .29 .19
Distance = −10 minutes +.11
(.106; .128)
+.11
(.101; .123)
+.08
(.015; .142)
+.06
(.007; .111)
Extended opening hours +.13
(.112; .140)
+.11
(.096; .0124)
+.00
(-.057; .056)
+.05
(-.004; .102)
Meetings on medication 
management
+.01
(-.005; .020)
+.01
(-.001; .025)
+.06
(-.003; .128)
+.05
(-.003; .104)
Internet service +.06
(.046; .073)
+.04
(.032; .058)
+.05
(-.009; .116)
+.00
(-.043; 0.43)
Quality certificate +.16
(.148; .176)
+.13
(.114; .142)
+.08
(.009; .148)
+.02
(-.035; .069)
Consumer satisfaction = bad -.35
(-.356; -.338)
-.33
(-.337; -.317)
-.20
(-.231; -.178)
-.11
(-.137; -.086)
Consumer satisfaction = 
mediocre
-.21
(-.221; -.196)
-.21
(-.227; -.199)
-.11
(-.154; -.072)
-.09
(-.114; -.060)
Consumer satisfaction = very 
good
+.04
(.020; .050)
+.04
(.023; .054)
+.08
(.013; .147)
+.16
(.390; .534)
Type of practice = GP and 
pharmacy
+.03
(.014; .045)
+.04
(.026; .056)
+.03
(-.087; .022)
+.02
(-.032; .076)
Type of practice = group 
practice
-.03
(-.047; -.018)
+.02
(.003; .032)
+.01
(-.049; .063)
+.09
(.035; .146)
Financial incentive = −3 euro -.09
(-.100; -.080)
-.16
(-.166; -.148)
-.06
(-.097; -.029)
-.09
(-.106; -.072)
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The impact of channeling incentives is shown graphically in figure 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 
4.1 shows the impact on the choice probability for the current pharmacy once the 
out-of-pocket payment for the current pharmacy increases from 0 to 9 euro. Figure 4.2 
shows the impact of the introduction of an out-of-pocket payment for a non-preferred 
pharmacy in the hypothetical choice situation. The base scenario shows that about 
80% of the respondents choose for the current pharmacy in the co-payment version 
Figure 4.1 The probability that respondents choose their current pharmacy given different levels of out-
of-pocket payments.*
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Figure 4.2 The probability that respondents choose the non-current pharmacy given different levels of 
out-of-pocket payments.*
Probability that respondents choose the non-preferred alternative
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* The x-axis of the graphs shows the net payment respondents have to make to visit the non-preferred 
pharmacy. For the discount version a co-payment of 3 euro is similar to a discount of 6 euro. We thus translated 
the discount into the corresponding co-payment to generate the results in the graph.
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and about 70% in the discount version33, even when the attribute levels of the current 
and non-current pharmacy are equal (figure 4.1). Naturally, in the hypothetical scenario 
(figure 4.2) choice shares are equally divided between the two alternatives. The starting 
points between the two scenarios are thus different. In the scenarios including the cur-
rent pharmacy, the current pharmacy starts with an advantage due to the preference 
for the status quo. Once the insurer is able to compensate consumers for giving-up their 
current provider, we expect respondents to react similar to channeling incentives as in 
the hypothetical choice scenarios.
The figures show that the impact of channeling incentives is larger in the hypotheti-
cal scenarios than in the scenarios including the current pharmacy. The introduction of 
a similar out-of-pocket payments leads to a larger relative decrease in the probability 
to pick the non-preferred alternative in the hypothetical choice scenarios than in the 
scenarios including the current alternative. The relative decrease in choice share of the 
non-preferred pharmacy in the hypothetical scenarios equals 75% in the co-payment 
version and 50% in the discount version. The relative decrease in choice share including 
the current scenario is lower: 50% in the co-payment version and 33% in the discount 
version. The impact of other channeling incentives can be shown by using the MRSP 
from table 4.3 and table 4.4. We illustrated this in both figures by looking at the MRSP 
for the quality certificate in the discount version. Figure 4.1 shows that an out-of-pocket 
payment of 3.21 euro, which is the MRSP for a quality certificate in the discount version, 
leads to a reduction in choice share for the current pharmacy of about 8 percentage 
points, which corresponds to the choice shares computed in table 4.5. Figure 4.2 
indicates that the introduction of qualitative incentives leads to a larger reduction in 
choice shares for the non-preferred pharmacy than that in figure 4.1. A quality certificate 
showed a MRSP of 5.6 euro in the discount version, resulting in a decrease in choice 
share for the non-preferred alternative of about 16 percentage points. This also holds for 
other qualitative attributes and practice characteristics.
Even though the results including the current pharmacy are more realistic, they may 
still overestimate the true effect of the incentives. The reason for this is that the descrip-
tive statistics show that 97% of the respondents has a regular pharmacy, whereas in our 
experiment only about 80% chooses the current pharmacy in the starting point (Table 
4.5). This may imply that the actual status quo bias is even larger than in the experiment. 
33. The difference in the starting points between the discount and the co-payment version is a result 
from the simulation used to compute the choice shares. In the base scenario we constructed two identi-
cal pharmacies with identical attribute levels. In the scenarios including the current pharmacy, these 
pharmacies only differed with respect to the alternative specific constant. The alternative specific con-
stant determines the preference for the current pharmacy. The estimation results (table 4) show that the 
preference for the current pharmacy is stronger in the co-payment version than in the discount version, 
resulting in different starting points.
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However, this would only be the case if all individuals having a regular pharmacy would 
be loyal to this pharmacy if an equal alternative would be available. Since this is unlikely, 
the 80/20 split may well be a good indication of the proportion of people that are loyal 
to their regular pharmacy in the presence of an equal alternative. In that case our results 
may provide a good estimation of the true effect of the channeling incentives.
Conclusion and Discussion
The aim of our paper was to investigate the sensitivity of consumers to different types of 
incentives health insurers can use to channel enrollees toward preferred pharmacies. To 
this end we addressed several issues. With a DCE methodology we examined whether 
respondents were sensitive to different types of incentives and whether this sensitivity 
depended on the type of channeling incentive used and on background characteristics 
of the respondent. Furthermore, we estimated the presence of a status quo bias and 
calculated the impact of a status quo bias on the effectiveness of channeling incentives.
Results show that respondents are sensitive to qualitative incentives and financial 
incentives. Consumer satisfaction ratings, quality certificates and extended opening 
hours are valued most by respondents. Furthermore, respondents are substantially 
more sensitive to negative financial incentives (co-payments) than to positive ones (dis-
counts). Since negative financial incentives are more effective in channeling enrollees, 
the bargaining power of the insurer vis-à-vis the health care provider is higher in case 
of negative than in case of positive financial incentives. The sensitivity to channeling 
incentives thus depends on the type of incentive used. For a quality certificate more 
consumers are willing to switch than for an internet service. Also distance and extended 
opening hours are important factors in pharmacy choice. The results also show that 
health insurers can use different instruments to channel enrollees. Both the qualitative 
and financial incentives have an impact on pharmacy choice.
Respondents show persistence in their choice for their current pharmacy. They are 
reluctant to leave their current pharmacy even when superior alternatives (in terms of 
attributes) are available. Moreover, channeling incentives are less effective in the pres-
ence of the current pharmacy than in a scenario with two hypothetical pharmacies. 
Before consumers view the current and non-current alternatives with equal attributes 
as equal substitutes, consumers must be compensated for their status quo bias. The 
results obtained from the forced choice format may therefore overstate the impact of 
channeling incentives.
Status-quo bias is not relevant, however, for new enrollees and for enrollees that have 
recently moved to another residential area. Since these enrollees do not have any ties to 
a specific pharmacy, they are expected to respond to channeling incentives in a similar 
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way as the respondents in the hypothetical choice scenario. For health insurers this 
forms an important result for their channeling strategies. Health insurers are informed 
when enrollees move to a different residential area or when a pharmacy quits practice. 
An effective strategy for the health insurer would be to actively inform those consumers 
about the preferred pharmacy in their residential area. The probability that enrollees visit 
the preferred pharmacy increases when health insurers contract preferred pharmacies 
on the basis of qualitative and financial aspects. Since about 44% of the respondents 
switched pharmacies at least once this can be a beneficial strategy. Naturally a status 
quo bias arises once consumers start visiting this preferred pharmacy, which makes it 
likely that consumers also stick with the preferred pharmacy. This would also imply that 
financial incentives do not have to be permanent in order to keep a substantial part of 
these ‘new’ consumers with the preferred pharmacy.
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Appendix 4.1
In the questionnaire we presented respondents with the following questions:
“In the next part of the questionnaire we have put together a number of different choices 
between 3 pharmacies and ask you to choose between them. The pharmacies are described 
based on the characteristics we explained before. You can assume that the pharmacies only 
differ on the basis of these characteristics; all other things can be assumed equal.
When you have to visit one of these pharmacies, which one would you visit?”
Pharmacy A Pharmacy B Pharmacy C
Distance from your home 
address to the pharmacy
5 minutes 15 minutes 25 minutes
Opening hours Extended opening hours Limited opening hours Extended opening hours
Internet Service Yes, internet service Yes, internet Service No, no internet service
Certificate of Quality No quality certificate Yes, a quality certificate No quality certificate
Meetings on medication 
management
Yes, regular meetings No meetings No meetings
Consumer satisfaction Good Excellent Reasonable
Practice type Only a pharmacy Pharmacy and GP Primary care center
Co-payment 6 euro 3 euro 0 euro
I choose A B C
Chapter 5
Channeling patients to preferred GPs
Not a question of how, but of when!
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Abstract
In managed care markets, health insurers are motivated to act as prudent buyers of 
health services. Insurers’ bargaining power depends on their ability to channel enrollees 
to preferred providers. An important question is whether and how insurers can influ-
ence provider choice. This is particularly relevant in case of GPs, since GPs often fulfill an 
important gatekeeper role. The main goal of this paper is to examine the sensitivity of 
consumer choice of GPs to channeling incentives and contractible characteristics of GP 
practices. We elicited consumer preferences for GPs with a large scale Discrete Choice 
Experiment (DCE). The DCE is performed among a representative Dutch household panel 
of about 2,000 respondents. The main results show that qualitative and financial incen-
tives have a positive impact on GP choice. At the same time, staying with ones own GP is 
valued extremely high. To conclude, we can state that strong incentives are required to 
draw patients away from their current GP. Incentive schemes aimed at achieving this are 
likely to fail or will be extremely expensive. Hence, channeling of patients can only be 
effective in cases where patients have to choose a new GP. Health insurers should focus 
on such cases if they want to channel enrollees toward preferred GPs.
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Introduction
In an increasing number of countries, health insurers are motivated to act as ‘prudent 
buyers of care’ on behalf of their enrollees. Among these countries, the recent introduc-
tion of a universal health insurance scheme with managed competition in the Nether-
lands draws a lot of attention because it may serve as a model for other countries, in 
particular for countries with a social health insurance scheme (Enthoven and Van de Ven 
2007, Van de Ven and Schut 2008). With the introduction of the new Health Insurance Act 
(HIA) in 2006 in the Netherlands, all persons who legally live or work in the Netherlands 
are obliged to buy, on an annual basis, a basic benefit package from a private health 
insurer. Health insurers are obliged to accept every applicant against a community 
rated premium. Health insurers are compensated via a risk equalization fund for high 
risk enrollees and subsidies for enrollees make insurance affordable for everyone. With 
the introduction of the HIA competition between insurers is reinforced and insurers are 
motivated to act as prudent buyers of care. Insurers can selectively contract or integrate 
with health care providers.
Whether insurers can fulfill the expected role of prudent buyers of health services 
crucially depends on their ability to channel consumers toward preferred providers 
(Pauly 1987, Sorensen 2003). Research on health plan choice in the US, however, has 
shown that consumers dislike or even distrust restrictions on provider choice (Gawande, 
Blendon et al. 1998; Chu-Weininger and Balkrishnan 2006; Miller 2006).
In contrast to the US, consumers in the Netherlands and most other counties are not 
used to selective contracting by health insurers. Health insurers in the Netherlands 
seem to be quite reluctant to engage in selective contracting. Up to 2008 only few 
experiments were implemented using financial incentives to channel enrollees towards 
preferred pharmacies (Boonen, Schut and Koolman 2008). Although these experiments 
showed that consumers are sensitive even to small temporary financial incentives, these 
findings may not hold for other types of providers since consumer loyalty to pharma-
cies is expected to be relatively low. The reason for this is that consumers may view a 
pharmacy more as a retailer of drugs rather than a personal provider of health services. 
An important question, therefore, is whether health insurers are also able to motivate 
their enrollee to visit other provider types. In this paper, our aim is to answer this ques-
tion for one specific provider type, the general practitioner (GP). We focus on the GP for 
two reasons. First, selective contracting of GPs may be particularly effective, since GPs 
often function as a gatekeeper to other health services. This is particularly true in the 
Netherlands, where people have to register with a single GP and are required to obtain a 
referral from a GP to get access to non-emergency specialist and hospital care. A second 
reason for focusing on the GP is our expectation that consumer loyalty to a GP may 
be particularly strong because people often have a long-standing personal relationship 
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with a single GP. The effectiveness of channeling incentives may be limited by a strong 
status quo bias that typically arises in case of long-term and confidential relationships 
with frequent encounters (Neipp and Zeckhauser 1985; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
1988; Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein 2002).
In this paper, we use a large scale Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to examine the 
sensitivity of consumer choice of GPs to various channeling incentives and contractible 
characteristics of GP practices. During the first years since the reform, health insurers 
did not yet selectively contract with preferred GPs. Therefore, since revealed preference 
data are absent, we have chosen to use the Discrete Choice Methodology to elicit prefer-
ences for hypothetical GP practices and potential channeling incentives. We especially 
examine the role of status quo bias, by comparing choices between GPs that include and 
exclude respondents’ current GP.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the methods used and the design 
of the Discrete Choice Experiment. Section 3 explains the econometric specification of 
the model. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 ends with a discussion and the 
main conclusions.
Method
We use a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to elicit consumers’ preferences for dif-
ferent GPs. DCEs involve the creation of hypothetical market situations adapted to a 
specific research question. With the DCE methodology different choice scenarios are 
constructed in which alternatives (GPs) are described in terms of their characteristics 
(attributes and levels). Individuals’ stated choices are assumed to reflect their underly-
ing preferences (Lancsar 2002). The description of the relevant attributes and levels of 
the DCE were based on consultations with health insurers, representatives of the Dutch 
GP Association and a literature review (see e.g. Wensing, Jung et al. 1998; Braspenning, 
Schellevis and Grol 2004; Berg van den, Bakker de et al. 2005; Lems 2006). The attributes 
include various financial and non-financial channeling incentives as well as contractible 
characteristics of GP practices which can be used by health insurers to channel enrollees 
toward preferred GPs.
We can distinguish two types of financial incentives: positive financial incentives, be-
ing bonuses or discounts for a preferred GP and negative financial incentives, such as 
(extra) co-payments for a non-preferred GP. With the introduction of the HIA insurers are 
allowed to differentiate reimbursement limits between contracted and non-contracted 
care. Since consumers are expected to react differently to losses than to gains (Kahne-
man, Knetsch and Thaler 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), we developed two versions 
of the DCE. In the first version, consumers are confronted with the full price of 9 euro per 
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visit for each GP, being the regulated price for a GP visit in the Netherlands. The positive 
financial incentive entails a discount up to 9 euro on the full price. In the second version, 
consumers face no standard out-of-pocket price and the negative financial incentive is 
a co-payment up to 9 euro.
Consumers may also be motivated to visit a preferred GP by contracting GPs with 
favorable (qualitative) characteristics. Research on GP choice has shown that patient 
preferences for GP care relate to low waiting times, easy access, availability of care during 
out-of-office hours, a good communication and information, length of the consultation 
and a good doctor-patient relationship. Most DCEs on GP choice focused on subjective 
and interpersonal attributes of GP care such as whether the doctor listens and the ability 
to talk to the doctor (Vick and Scott 1998; Longo, Cohen et al. 2006; Rubin, Bate et al. 
2006; Hole 2007). Such subjective attributes, however, are difficult to contract by health 
insurers. Furthermore, information about patient valuation of GP practices is limited 
and not used in the contractual negotiations between GPs and insurers. Therefore, in 
our study, we focus on objective characteristics of GP practices that can play a role in 
contractual negotiations and can be communicated to enrollees. Subjective features, 
including the familiarity with a current GP, are expected to be captured in consumers’ 
preferences for their current GP and will be relevant in the estimation of the status quo 
bias.
The qualitative incentives and GP characteristics included in this study are described in 
table 5.1. Two access attributes are included: extended telephone access and availability 
of care during out-of-office hours. We included extended telephone access since, in the 
Netherlands, telephone access for non-emergency care is often limited (e.g. between 10 
and 12 in the morning). Research has shown that consumers are often unsatisfied with 
their GPs telephone access. Adequate telephone access is, however, important for the 
functioning of GP care (Berg van den, et al. 2005, Braspenning, et al. 2004). Furthermore, 
there is hardly any care during out-of-office hours (except for emergency care). Research 
showed that consumers are positive about the possibility of visiting the GP for non-
emergency care during out-of-office hours; about 62% is willing to visit their GP during 
out-of-office hours (Lems 2006).
In addition, the availability of practice assistants, an Internet service and a quality 
certificate are included as qualitative attributes insurers can use to motivate consum-
ers to visit preferred GPs. Practice assistants can perform regular check ups for, e.g. 
diabetic patients, and can thus take over part of the work of GPs (Berg van den, et al. 
2005). In 2006, about 65% of all GPs used practice assistants. Most GPs and consumers 
highly value the contribution of practice assistants (Lems 2006). Furthermore, quality 
certificates play an increasing role in GP care. GPs that meet certain quality criteria as 
defined by the Dutch association of GPs (NHG) receive a quality certificate (Berg van den, 
et al. 2005). In addition, GPs are increasingly providing extra services via the Internet. 
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Consumers are e.g. able to ask an online consult or order their prescription drugs online. 
Patient opinions about the use of internet for GP services vary. About half of the patients 
values internet services positively and about the other half does not (Lems 2006).
GP characteristics that are included are distance, defined as the travel time from the 
home address to the GP, and the type of practice defined as a solo-practice, a practice 
including a pharmacy and a primary care center. In the primary care center several 
health care providers work together in the same building.
Table 5.1 Attributes and levels
Levels Coding
I Financial incentives
Co-payment No co-payment
3 euro per visit
6 euro per visit
9 euro per visit
0
3
6
9
Discount No discount
3 euro per visit
6 euro per visit
9 euro per visit
0
3
6
9
II Qualitative incentives
Telephone Access Basic access (Monday- Friday 8:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.)
Extended access (Monday – Friday 8:00 a.m.– 18:00p.m.)
-1
 1
Out-of-office hours care No out-of-office hours care
One or two evenings available for out-of-office hours care
-1
 1
Availability of practice 
assistants
No, not available
Yes, available
-1
 1
Internet service No, not available
Yes, available
-1
 1
Certificate of quality No, not present
Yes, present
-1
 1
III Practice Characteristics
Type of practice Only GP
GP and pharmacy (group practice)
GP and other primary care providers (primary care center)
-1 -1
 0  0
 1  1
Distance from home address
(Walking distance in minutes)
5 minutes
15 minutes
25 minutes
35 minutes
5
15
25
35
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Experimental Design
The set of attributes and their levels (5 attributes at 2 levels, 1 attribute at 3 levels and 2 
attributes at 4 levels) result in a complete factorial design with more than 1500 possible 
GP descriptions and over a billion possible choice sets, consisting of all possible com-
binations of three such GP descriptions. To collect preference information effectively, 
an efficient design was created using the toolbox available for these purposes in SAS.34 
To ensure that the data support a model with possible interactions, the SAS procedure 
%choiceff was instructed to find a D-optimal design for the model with all two-way 
interactions, that is, the determinant of the information matrix for the model with all 
two-way interactions is to be maximized (Huber and Zwerina 1996).35 The optimal de-
signs by, among others, Street and Burgess (2005) only consider main effects. Instead, 
we used SAS procedures, which tend to provide the most efficient designs for models 
with two-way interactions, see Street, Burgess and Louviere (2005). As data collection 
was computer-based, it was relatively easy to collect data from a large design that was 
split up in many blocks. We opted for a design with 108 choice sets that was divided in 
9 blocks of 12 choice sets. The resulting design scored high on all relevant measures, 
such as level balance and orthogonality. Because the data collection was computer 
based, we were able to vary the sequence of the attributes. Each respondent received a 
questionnaire in which the attributes were placed in a random order that differed across 
respondents to neutralize any ordering effects on consumer preferences (Kjaer et al. 
2006). In addition, the alternatives were given in a random order that differed across 
respondents to neutralize any left/right bias.
As patients in the Netherlands are required to register with a GP, we did not provide 
them with a “no-choice” option. To estimate the effect of a possible status quo bias, we 
confronted respondents with two additional choices including their current GP. We 
could also have chosen to, in addition to the forced choice options, offer choices includ-
ing their current GP as an opt-out option. It is expected, however, that the label ‘current’ 
dominates other attributes for the majority of the respondents. In addition, offering a 
similar number of non-forced choices next to the forced choice format leads to cognitive 
overload for the respondents. With the two additional choices we expect to capture the 
34. SAS marketing manual: support.sas.com/techsup/technote/ts722.pdf.
35. Beforehand we did not have strong expectations about possible significant two-way interactions 
between attributes. However, by creating a design with the possibility of testing for interaction terms, 
our main effects model estimates will be unbiased even if several interactions would exist. By using a 
main effects design only, results may be biased if interaction effects exist but cannot be estimated. We 
did test for the presence of several interaction effects for which hypotheses may exist but we have not 
found any significant effects. We therefore left this out of the analysis.
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effect of a possible status quo bias. The forced choice format may, however, lead to an 
overestimation of the effectiveness of channeling incentives.
Questionnaire and data collection
Data were collected by a questionnaire among an Internet based household panel. This 
panel consists of about 2500 households of the Netherlands and is representative of 
the adult Dutch population36 (see appendix 5.1 for a detailed description of the sample 
characteristics). The panelists receive questionnaires biweekly and background charac-
teristics of the respondents such as age, gender, income, and health status are known. 
The overall response rate was about 80%.
In the first part of the questionnaire respondents were presented questions about 
their relationship with their current GP, their health care utilization and a number of 
propositions to gain insight in respondents’ attitudes towards channeling. Respondents 
were also asked to describe their current GP in terms of the attributes and levels used 
in the DCE. In the second part, respondents were presented twelve scenarios of three 
hypothetical GPs that differed with respect to the attribute levels presented in table 5.1. 
Respondents had to choose their most preferred GP from these three hypothetical GPs. 
After being confronted with the hypothetical choice scenarios, respondents were faced 
with two additional choices, one between their current GP and the best possible GP and 
one between their current GP and a GP whose characteristics are drawn randomly from 
the levels presented in table 5.1. The current GP is described by respondents themselves 
based on the attributes used in this study (see appendix 5.1). The best possible GP is a 
GP that has all attribute levels at the most preferred levels. Hence, the best possible GP 
is expected to be more or at least equally preferred than the respondent’s current GP. 
Respondents were asked to assume that GPs only differ with respect to the attributes 
described in the study. An example of a choice scenario is given in appendix 5.2.
36. The internet based household panel is set up by CentER data. CentER data guarantees that the panel 
is representative of the Dutch population. Also people who do not have internet access are included in 
the panel as CentER provides them with a so-called Net.Box that allows them to enter the data on their 
television screen. Respondents in the CentER data panel also stay respondents over the course of time 
allowing for longitudinal research (http://www.centerdata.nl/en/centerpanel).
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Econometric specification
Economic Framework
In this paper, we want to analyze consumers’ willingness to make trade-offs between 
providers that differ in financial and qualitative terms. We base our analysis on Lan-
caster’s economic theory of value (Lancaster 1966; Lancaster 1971) and random utility 
theory (McFadden 1974; Hanemann 1983; Ryan, Netten et al. 2006). This implies that we 
assume that utility is derived from the properties or characteristics of a good rather than 
from the good itself. Hence, we describe the decision making process about GP choice 
in terms of comparing indirect utility functions. Consumers are assumed to have perfect 
discrimination capability and to choose the GP that maximizes their utility. We assume 
that the utility that individual i derives from choosing alternative j on choice occasion t 
is then given by equation 1,
 Uijt = Vijt + εijt  (1)
where Uijt denotes individual i’s utility from choice j on choice occasion t, Vijt is the deter-
ministic part which captures both GP characteristics which vary over ijt and individual 
characteristics (taste variations) which vary over i, and εijt is the error term which captures 
the characteristics that are unobservable to the researchers as well as measurement er-
ror (Manski 1977).
Empirical Framework
In the empirical models, we first estimate consumers’ sensitivity to certain GP character-
istics and their willingness to pay to visit a GP with these specific characteristics based on 
the forced choice questions. Second, a model that allows for status quo bias is estimated 
related to the choices between the current GP and the preferred hypothetical scenario 
in which we use information on the characteristics of the current GP.
McFadden shows that if εijt are assumed to be type I extreme value (or Weibull) and 
independent, then a logit model can be derived from the random utility model (McFad-
den 1974). The parameter estimates of the logit model may be interpreted as parameter 
estimates of the indirect utility function. For the empirical estimation of the indirect 
utility model, we used a multinomial logit (MNL) model.37
37. We also analyzed our data using a mixed logit (ML) model that allows for preference heterogene-
ity. Since both models lead to similar results we have chosen for the multinomial logit model because 
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Each GP in the choice set is composed of a bundle of GP characteristics (X) faced by 
the ith individual. Since we observe the choice and not the actual difference in utility, our 
dependent variable is binary. The conditional probability Pr(yi = m) that individual i in 
choice occasion t is observed to choose state m is given by
Pr(yit = m|Vijt) = P(Uimt > Uijt ∀j ≠ m) = 
exp(Vimt)
for m = 1 to J (2)
ΣJj exp(Vijt)
Vijt is specified in equation (3) in which xjt is a vector with attributes.
 Vijt = xjt β (3)
As each respondent made 12 choices, the choices whether or not to choose a specific 
GP might not be independent within an individual. To correct for such intra-individual 
correlation we used the Huber-White sandwich variance estimator.
In the forced choice decision the labels of the GPs have no meaning; the GPs only differ 
in the specified attribute levels and their location on the screen. During data collection, 
the alternatives were randomly assigned to one of the three labels and corresponding 
locations. As a consequence, there will be no relationship between the attributes and 
the labels. Still, alternative specific constants can be used to test for mis-specification. 
The constant term can then be interpreted as the difference in average utility between 
scenario A, B and C caused by a left/middle/right bias (Scott, Watson and Ross 2003).
In the status quo bias model consumers can choose between the chosen hypotheti-
cal GP and their current GP, i.e. they can opt-out and choose to stay with their current 
GP. This model can be seen as a labeled experiment in which consumers may attach 
a certain value to the label ‘current GP’. Respondents are assumed to have an ex ante 
preference not to switch GPs. To capture this effect we included an alternative specific 
dummy, which we defined as being equal to 1 for the current GP and equal to -1 for the 
hypothetical alternative. To be able to capture the full ‘status-quo bias’ we used effects 
coding (-1 for the base level and 1 for the other levels, see table 5.1) to estimate our 
attributes (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen 2005).
A model with main effects38 was estimated and used to compute marginal rates of 
substitution (based on equation (4)) between each attribute and the price attribute (the 
this facilitates the computation of confidence intervals for our marginal rates of substitution and the 
simulated choice shares.
38. To investigate whether there is a predictable component in the preference heterogeneity, we also 
estimated a model including interactions between the attributes and background characteristics and 
between the attributes and consumers’ past experiences with GP care. Only age and having a job showed 
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financial incentive). The marginal rates of substitution represent the willingness to pay 
for an attribute m, given a marginal change in that attribute (MRSP) (Hanemann 1983; 
Lancsar and Savage 2004a; Ryan 2004). Because we have used effects coding, the MRSP 
is multiplied by 2 to obtain the willingness to pay. Only for distance the MRSP is not 
multiplied by 2 as this is a continuous attribute which does not require effects coding.
MRSP = −
δvj / δbjm = −
βm *2 (4)
δvj / δbprice βprice
In addition to the MRSP, choice probabilities are reported. A choice shares indicates the 
share of respondents who opt for a specific alternative. We therefore created a base 
scenario in which all GPs have equal attributes that are based on the description of 
respondents’ current GP. By varying the attribute levels one by one for one of the GPs in 
the base scenario, we simulate the impact on choice probabilities of moving away from 
his base case (King, et al. 2007) To estimate the impact of channeling incentives, we 
simulate these choice probabilities for choices between hypothetical alternatives and 
for choices between the current alternative and a hypothetical (preferred) alternative.
Results
Descriptive statistics
In total 1906 respondents filled in the questionnaire; 967 the discount version and 939 
the co-payment version. Respondents were spread fairly even across the 9 versions. The 
respondents are representative of the adult Dutch population (see appendix 5.1). The 
average age is 49 years, 47% is female, over 85% has a good to very good health status 
and 57% has a job with an average monthly net income of 1700 euro. The majority of the 
respondents has a regular GP with whom they have a long term relationship of over 5 
years. Their past experiences show that most respondents visit a traditional GP practice 
without extra features such as evening opening hours and an Internet service.
Next to the description of their current GP and their relationship with their current 
GP, respondents also answered to some addition propositions concerning GP choice. 
significant effects. Older respondents have a lower preference for internet, a quality certificate and 
primary care centers. Having a job led to a higher preference for out-of-office hours of care. In addition, 
past experiences showed that consumers value attributes higher if their current GP possesses these at-
tributes. Because of the few significant effects we did not present the results. The results are available 
upon request from the authors.
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From the propositions it followed that: (1) a majority of the respondents (65%) perceived 
quality differences between GPs; (2) a small minority of the respondents (10%) would be 
prepared to follow the advice by their health insurer to choose a certain GP; (3) a major-
ity (63%) was willing to pay for unrestricted choice of GPs, and (4) a small percentage 
(17%) would switch to another GP in return for a financial advantage.
Estimation results
Hypothetical choice scenarios
Table 5.2 presents the estimation results for the main effects model for the co-payment 
and the discount version. The final sample size, after deletion of observations for which 
data on the dependent variable were missing, for the main effects model equals 924 for 
the co-payment version and 954 for the discount version. The included constant term 
is only significant for the difference between alternative B and C. The constant shows 
a general preference for alternative B over alternative C. This could indicate that there 
might be a left/right bias but since we randomly assigned the alternatives to position A, 
B, or C this will not affect our estimates.39
For the main effects estimation, the signs of the coefficients are as expected and thus 
confirm the theoretical validity of the technique. All attributes have a significant effect 
on general practitioner choice. Opening hours, telephone access, having practice as-
sistants, a discount and a certificate of quality all have a positive effect on GP choice 
while distance and a co-payment have a negative effect as expected. The results on the 
type of practice show that practices including a GP and pharmacy are valued positively 
compared to practices including only GPs, while primary care centers (including GPs, 
pharmacies, physiotherapists and other health care providers) are valued negatively 
with respect to practices including only GPs.
The relative importance of each attribute is computed by the marginal rates of sub-
stitution (equation 4). The MRSP and their confidence intervals are presented in table 
5.2.40 The MRSP estimate the maximum amount a consumer is willing to pay to secure 
a change in one of the attributes. This amount leaves the consumers’ utility and prefer-
ences unchanged. A negative value indicates that consumers require a compensation for 
a change in an attribute while a positive value indicates consumers are willing to pay to 
39. We also estimated a model without the constant term and found no large differences in the results.
40. Confidence intervals are estimated using the bootstrap procedure. To allow for within individual 
correlation of the error term we re-sampled individuals rather than choices. To allow for bias affecting 
the interval we used bias corrected percentile based confidence intervals (Hole 2007). Other papers in 
the health economics literature that have used bootstrapping to obtain confidence intervals are e.g. 
(McIntosch and Ryan 2002, Philips et al. 2002).
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secure the change in an attribute. Respondents are most willing to pay for better access 
(extended telephone access and out-of-office hours of care) and quality certificates. The 
willingness to pay for travel distance is measured per minute. For a 10 minute decrease 
in travel time, respondents are thus willing to pay about 5.4 euro in the discount version 
and 2.4 euro in the co-payment version. The willingness to pay values further show that 
respondents are willing to give up a much larger part of their discount than they are 
willing to pay a co-payment for the same attributes.
Table 5.2 Regression results for the hypothetical choice scenarios
Discount Version Co-payment Version
β(SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
β(SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
Qualitative incentives and practice characteristics
Distance -.039 (.002)* -.563
(-.685;-.478)
-.041 (.002)* -.244
(.22;.27)
Telephone access .437 (.018)* 12.56
(10.80;15.30)
.435 (.019)* 5.20
(4.67;5.85)
Out-of-office hours care .249 (.016)* 7.16
(6.06;8.92)
.210 (.016)* 2.50
(2.13;2.90)
Availability of practice assistants .213 (.014)* 6.14
(5.06;7.82)
.160 (.014)* 1.91
(1.56;2.31)
Internet service .120 (.013)* 3.46
(2.69;4.53)
.123 (.014)* 1.47
(1.13;1.81)
Quality certificate .391 (.018)* 11.25
(9.52;13.79)
.359 (.018)* 4.29
(3.81;4.85)
Type of practice
Group practice with pharmacy .091 (.019)* 2.61
(1.59;3.97)
.017 (.019) .206
(.286;.629)
Primary care center -.107 (.021)* -3.07
(-4.58;-1.86)
-.077 (.021)* -.925
(-1.39;-.420)
Financial incentive
Discount / Co-payment .070 (.006)* -.167 (.007)*
Constant
Constant A .023 (.015) .022 (.015)
Constant C -.114 (.015)* -.077 (.015)*
LL
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Number of individuals
-10144.808
.187
11001
924
-9650.511
.2015
11001
924
* significant at P<0.001, ** significant at P<0.10
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Scenarios including the current GP
The results from the choices between the current GP and a hypothetical GP show that 
most respondents prefer their current GP, even when the hypothetical GP has prefer-
able characteristics. The price attribute for the current GP is set equal to zero in the 
co-payment version and equal to 9 in the discount version.41 In the choice scenario 
between the current GP and the best possible GP42, still about 50% of the respondents 
opt for their current GP. In the choice between the current GP and a GP with randomly 
chosen attribute levels, even 85% opt for the current GP.
Table 5.3 presents the estimation results for the main effects model for both the co-
payment and the discount version. The alternative specific constant shows a preference 
for the current GP. This indicates the presence of a status-quo bias in GP choice. The type 
of practice has no significant effect on GP choice (except the primary care center in the 
discount version). Furthermore, we see similar effects on GP choice as in the hypotheti-
cal scenarios. Distance and the co-payment have a negative effect on GP choice while 
telephone access, out-of-office hours of care, the availability of practice assistants, an 
Internet service, a quality certificate and the discount have a positive effect.
The relative importance of the attributes is estimated by using the marginal rates of 
substitution. We presented the MRSP and their confidence intervals in table 5.343. The 
marginal rates of substitution indicate that the status quo bias is the most important 
attribute in GP choice. Respondents are most willing to pay to stick with their current 
GP. In the discount version, telephone access, out-of-office hours of care and a quality 
certificate are, next to the status quo bias, the most important attributes. The MRSP for 
distance is presented in minutes. Hence for a 10 minute decrease in travel distance, 
respondents are willing to pay 3.69 euro in the discount version and .59 euro in the 
co-payment version. In the co-payment version out-of-office hours of care and a qual-
ity certificate are the most important attributes. Similar as to the hypothetical choice 
scenarios, respondents are more willing to give up part of their discount than they are 
willing to pay for similar attribute level changes.
41. In practice, only respondents with a voluntary deductible face a co-payment equal to 9 euros for the 
current GP. Since only 5% of the Dutch population has chosen a voluntary deductible, we assumed that 
for the current GP no co-payment was required or a maximum discount was given.
42. The best possible GP is defined as a GP located close to the home address, with extended access 
(telephone as well as evening opening hours), an Internet service, practice assistants and a quality 
certificate. In addition, there is no out-of-pocket payment for this GP.
43. Confidence intervals are estimated using the bootstrap procedure. To allow for within individual 
correlation of the error term we re-sampled individuals rather than choices. To allow for bias affecting 
the interval we used bias corrected percentile based confidence intervals (Hole 2007). Other papers in 
the health economics literature that have used bootstrapping to obtain confidence intervals are e.g. 
(McIntosch and Ryan 2002, Philips et al. 2002).
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Impact of channeling incentives on provider choice
Next to the computation of the MRSP, we simulated the impact on probabilities of mov-
ing towards a preferred GP by varying the level of one attribute at a time (King, et al. 
2007)44. With this simulation we gain insight in consumers’ willingness to switch to a 
preferred GP. To estimate the impact of channeling incentives we constructed a base 
scenario in which the attribute levels for both GPs are equal. The attribute levels in the 
44. We found that the MNL results are similar to those obtained with the ML models. We start with three 
identical scenarios to compute the shift in market share. Our main interest is the in- or decrease in market 
share for the ‘preferred’ pharmacy, the pharmacy for which an attribute level is changed. The proportional 
substitution pattern that arises from the MNL model will therefore not bias our results (King et al. 2007).
Table 5.3 Regression results including the current GP
Discount Version Co-payment Version
β(SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
β(SE) MRSP
(95% CI)
Alternative specific 
Constant
1.018 (.099) * 37.03
(11.45;157.97)
.937 (.103) * 9.21
(6.08;15.87)
Qualitative incentives and practice characteristics
Distance -.020 (.004)* -.369
(-2.08;-.107)
-.012 (.005) ** -.059
(-.135;-.008)
Telephone access .221 (.058)* 8.03
(7.22;36.33)
.199 (.063)* .196
(.63;3.97)
Out-of-office hours care .324 (.081)* 11.79
(2.64;49.26)
.311 (.088)* 3.05
(1.32;5.83)
Availability of practice 
assistants
.116 (.056)*** 4.22
(3.18;19.88)
.221 (.0598)* 2.17
(.87;4.15)
Internet service .149 (.06) ** 5.44
(2.43;24.63)
.119 (.066)*** 1.16
(-2.89;.22)
Quality certificate .233 (.060)* 8.47
(1.23;40.22)
.233 (.066)* 2.28
(1.03;4.16)
Type of practice
Group practice with 
pharmacy
-.063 (.086) -2.30
(-9.98;18.32)
-.079 (.098) -.774
(-1.24;3.46)
Primary care center .186 (.079) ** -.75
(-32.40;2.27)
.131 (.056) 1.29
(-4.0;.58)
Financial incentive
Discount / Co-paymentd .055 (.026) ** -.204 (.032)*
LL
Pseudo R2
Number of choices
Number of individuals
-719.255
.263
1407
704
-773.194
.196
1388
694
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10
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base share are based on the description of the current GP45. In the choices between the 
current GP and a hypothetical GP, both GPs only differ with respect to the alternative 
specific constant. In these scenarios, the attribute levels for the hypothetical GP are 
changed one at a time to estimate the impact of channeling incentives on the choice 
shares. With this simulation we want to estimate whether respondents are actually will-
ing to switch in return for financial and qualitative incentives. We present the results of 
this simulation for both the hypothetical scenarios and the choices including the current 
pharmacy in table 5.4.
The results show, similar to the estimation results, that respondents are more sensitive 
to negative financial incentives than to positive financial incentives. The introduction 
of a co-payment of 3 euro leads to a larger decrease in market share (both in the hy-
pothetical scenarios as in the scenarios including the current GP) than a reduction in 
45. The “most common” GP is a traditional GP located at about 15 minutes walking distance from the 
home address. The “most common” GP has no extra qualitative aspects such as practice assistants or a 
quality certificate. In addition, there is no out-of-pocket payment for this GP.
Table 5.4 Predicted changes in choice shares resulting from attribute level changes
Hypothetical scenarios Current versus alternative
Discount version Co-payment
version
Discount version Co-payment 
version
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Base share .50 .50 .115 .13
Current GP .885 .887
Distance = −10 minutes +.097
(.086;.107)
+.101
(.090;.111)
+.022
(-.003;.048)
+.016
(-.015;.044)
Extended telephone access +.206
(.192;.219)
+.201
(.190;.219)
+.053
(.020;.086)
+.053
(.013;.093)
Evening opening hours +.122
(.108;.135)
+.103
(.089;.117)
+.084
(.049;.120)
+.089
(.051;.127)
Availability of Practice 
Assistants
+.105
(.092;.118)
+.079
(.066;.091)
+.025
(-.001;.056)
+.059
(.016;.103)
Internet service +.060
(.047;.072)
+.061
(.048;.074)
+.034
(.004;.064)
+.030
(-.007;.066)
Quality certificate +.186
(.172;.200)
+.172
(.157;.187)
+.057
(.023;.091)
+.063
(.0186;.108)
Type of practice = GP and 
pharmacy
+.019
(.004;.033)
-.011
(-.025;.003)
+.006
(-.019;.032)
-.003
(-.034;.028)
Type of practice = Primary 
care centre
-.031
(-.046;-.016)
-.034
(-.049;-.020)
+.036
(.003;.068)
+.022
(-.011;.056)
Financial incentive = −3 euro -.052
(-.061;-.043)
-.123
(-.132;-.114)
-.016
(-.030;-.001)
-.056
(-.068;-.044)
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the discount of 3 euro. Negative incentives may thus be more effective in channeling 
consumers toward preferred GPs. Furthermore, we see a similar pattern of choice prob-
abilities between the hypothetical scenarios and the scenarios including the current GP. 
We do, however, find differences in the impact of channeling incentives between the 
scenarios. In the hypothetical scenarios, more respondents are willing to switch in return 
for similar attribute level changes than in the scenarios including the current GP. The 
relationship respondents have with their current GP influences the impact of channeling 
incentives. Where in the base case scenario respondents are indifferent between two 
equal hypothetical scenarios, in the scenarios including the current GP, respondents 
have a preference for the current GP even if the attribute levels are equal. About 90% 
of the respondents choose the current GP over the hypothetical alternative, even when 
the attribute levels of both GPs are equal. Before consumers are indifferent they must 
first be compensated for the loss of their current GP. Once the consumer is compensated 
for this loss, we expect the consumer to react to channeling incentives similar as in the 
hypothetical scenarios.
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the impact of channeling incentives graphically. Figure 5.1 
shows the impact of the introduction of an out-of-pocket payment for the current GP, 
while figure 5.2 shows the impact of out-of-pocket payments in case of the hypothetical 
scenarios. Figure 5.1 clearly illustrates that before consumers are indifferent between 
the two GPs (choice shares equal 50%), they must be compensated for the loss of their 
current provider (see indifference line in figure 5.1). This compensation is higher in the 
discount version than in the co-payment version.
Figure 5.1 The probability that respondents choose their current GP for different levels of co-payments
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The x-axis of the graph shows the net payment respondents have to make to visit the non-preferred GP. For the 
discount version a co-payment of 3 euro is similar to a discount of 6 euro. We thus translated the discount into 
the corresponding co-payment to generate the results in the graph.
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The introduction of out-of-pocket payments decreases the attractiveness of the 
current GP. The decrease in market share is larger in the co-payment version than in 
the discount version. Where in the co-payment version the introduction of a 9 euro co-
payment leads to a decrease in market share for the current GP of about 35%, in the 
discount version the decrease in market share is only about 8%. In the hypothetical sce-
narios the decrease in market share is also larger in the co-payment version than in the 
discount version. Furthermore, the relative impact of financial incentives is larger than 
that in the scenarios including a current GP. The relative decrease in market share in the 
hypothetical scenarios equals 30% in the discount version and 64% in the co-payment 
version. The scenarios including the current GP show a relative decrease in market share 
of about 6% in the discount version and 30% in the co-payment version.
Conclusions and implications
The aim of this paper was to estimate consumer sensitivity to various channeling incen-
tives in GP choice and to investigate the role of status quo bias. In the Netherlands, where 
GPs have a gatekeeper role, successful channeling can lead to efficiency gains once 
insurers can channel enrollees to qualitatively superior GPs. Since the introduction of a 
universal health insurance scheme with managed competition in 2006, health insurers 
are allowed to selectively contract with GPs and to use incentives to influence GP choice.
Figure 5.2 The probability that respondents choose the non-preferred GP for different levels of co-
payments
Porbability respondents pick the non-preferred alternative
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The x-axis of the graph shows the net payment respondents have to make to visit the non-preferred GP. For the 
discount version a co-payment of 3 euro is similar to a discount of 6 euro. We thus translated the discount into 
the corresponding co-payment to generate the results in the graph.
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Our results show that respondents are sensitive to channeling incentives and various 
contractible GP characteristics and channeling incentives. Respondents are more sensi-
tive to negative financial incentives (co-payments) than to positive financial incentives 
(discounts). At the same time, consumers value their own GP extremely high. When 
offered a choice between their current and an alternative GP with the most favorable 
attributes, the majority of the respondents prefers to stick with their initial choice.
The implications of our findings are that strong incentives are required to motivate 
consumers to switch to another GP. Incentive schemes aimed at achieving this are there-
fore expected to fail or prove to be extremely expensive. Rather than using incentives 
for all enrollees, health insurers can better target on those enrollees who have to choose 
a new GP, e.g. in case the enrollee moves to another residential area or in case a GP quits 
with its practice. In such instances, our findings imply that channeling incentives can 
be very effective. Since health insurers typically know when a GP quits with its practice 
or when their enrollees move to another residential area, they can actively target infor-
mation and incentives on those enrollees who have to choose a new GP. In our survey 
about 65% of the respondents reported that they switched GPs at least once, so over 
time this strategy may be quite effective. Moreover, because of the strong status quo 
bias effective channeling may have a long lasting impact on GP choice, since enrollees 
that switch to a preferred GP are likely to stay with that GP for a long time. Due to the 
gatekeeper role of GPs this is likely to have an indirect long-term effect on the choice 
of other providers as well. Especially since most patients are inclined to listen to advice 
from their GP about which hospital or medical specialist to consult (RVZ 2003, Vries, de 
2006). This implies that health insurers have to be very careful in selecting preferred GPs.
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Appendix 5.1 Sample characteristics
Table A1 Background characteristics
Background characteristics (n = 1906)
Age 49 years
(s.d. = 15.5, min = 18, max = 19)
Definition %
Female 1 if female 47%
Health status
Very Bad 1.16%
Bad 12.43%
Good 53.76%
Very Good 26.54%
Excellent 6.11%
Job 1 if job 57%
Past experiences and Description of current GP
Past experiences
Number of visits to the GP in the last year 0 visits 28%
1 or 2 visits 43%
3 or 4 visits 18%
More than 4 visits 11%
Do you have a regular GP? No 3%
Yes 97%
How long do you have this regular GP? Less than one year 4%
Between one and five years 19%
More than five years 78%
Did you ever switch between GPs? No 35%
Yes 65%
What was the most important reason to switch? I moved to another city 60%
The GP quitted with its practice 23%
A new GP opened its practice closer to my 
home address
1%
Bad experiences with the former GP 9%
Other 7%
Description of the current GP
Distance to the current GP 5 minutes 28%
15 minutes 34%
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25 minutes 17%
35 minutes 21%
Opening hours Basic opening hours 94%
Extended opening hours 6%
Internet Service No 77%
Yes 23%
Quality certificate No 77%
Yes 23%
Telephone access No 75%
Yes 25%
Availability of Practice assistants No 94%
Yes 6%
Type of practice Only GP 66%
GP and pharmacy 13%
Primary care centre 20%
Appendix 5.2 Choice scenarios
In the questionnaire we presented respondents with the following choice scenarios:
‘In the next part of the questionnaire we have put together a number of different choices 
between 3 GPs and ask you to choose between them. The GPs are described based on the 
characteristics we explained before. You can assume that the GPs only differ on the basis of 
these characteristics; all other things can be assumed equal.
When you have to visit one of these GPs, which one would you visit?’
GP A GP B GP C
Distance from your home 
address to the GP
5 minutes 15 minutes 25 minutes
Opening hours Extra evening opening 
hours
No evening opening 
hours
Extra evening opening 
hours
Telephone access Limited telephone access
(between 10 AM and 12AM 
on weekdays)
Extended telephone 
access (between 8 AM 
and 17 PM on weekdays)
Limited telephone access 
(between 10 AM and 
12AM on weekdays)
Internet Service Yes, internet service Yes, internet Service No, no internet service
Certificate of Quality No quality certificate Yes, a quality certificate No quality certificate
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Practice assistants Yes, practice assistants 
available
No, no practice assistants 
available
No, no practice assistants 
available
Practice type Solo practice Pharmacy and GP Primary care center
Co-payment 6 euro 3 euro 0 euro
I choose A B C

Chapter 6
Consumer willingness to switch to 
preferred providers
Are preferences stronger for GPs than for pharmacies?
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Abstract
Health insurers can only effectively bargain with providers about the price and quality of 
health services if they can channel their enrollees to preferred providers. Little is known, 
however, about consumer sensitivity to incentives health insurers can use to influence 
provider choice. In this paper, we investigate the impact of channeling incentives on 
pharmacy and general practitioner (GP) choice with a large scale discrete choice experi-
ment (n =1900). We find that positive financial incentives are only effective in influenc-
ing pharmacy choice while negative financial incentives influence both pharmacy and 
GP choice. Qualitative incentives are more effective in influencing choice for GPs. We 
also find that the effectiveness of channeling incentives is significantly reduced by a 
status quo bias, which is particularly strong in case of GPs. This implies that stronger and 
more targeted channeling incentives are required to encourage consumers to switch 
to preferred GPs than to preferred pharmacies. Although channeling enrollees toward 
preferred GPs is more difficult and costly, it is likely to have a longer lasting and broader 
impact on provider choice than channeling toward preferred pharmacies.
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Introduction
In managed care markets health insurers bargain over the price and quality of health 
care services. Selective contracting is an important tool for health insurers in the nego-
tiations with health care providers. Empirical research in the US has shown that health 
insurers using exclusionary provider networks obtain higher discounts than insurers 
without restrictions on provider choice (Melnick, et al. 1992, Sorensen 2003, Staten, et al. 
1987). As an alternative to exclusionary networks, health insurers can also use preferred 
provider networks in which enrollees still have the option to seek out-of-network care. 
In that case the bargaining position of health insurers largely depends on their ability to 
channel enrollees toward preferred providers (Pauly 1987). In turn, this ability depends 
on the attractiveness of the network to consumers and their propensity to switch to 
another provider.
In an increasing number of countries with a social health insurance system (e.g. Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Switzerland), health insurers are provided with incentives and 
tools, such as selective contracting, to act as prudent buyers of health care on behalf 
of their enrollees. Despite the widespread use of preferred provider networks in the 
US, surprisingly little is known about the insurer’s ability to channel enrollees toward 
preferred providers. Most research focused on the impact of price on health care utiliza-
tion or on health plan choice (Glied 2000, Zweifel and Manning 2000). In a recent paper 
Wu (2008) finds that health plans that successfully channel patients can extract greater 
discounts but that it still remains unclear which strategies are effective in directing 
patients to preferred providers.
In this paper, we first elicit consumer preferences for contractible aspects of General 
Practitioner (GP) practices and pharmacies and their sensitivity to different channeling 
incentives. Second, we examine consumer willingness to switch from a current GP or 
pharmacy to a preferred GP or pharmacy.
We examine these questions in the context of the recently reformed Dutch health care 
system. With the introduction of managed competition in 2006, health insurers have 
become responsible for the purchase of care. Health insurers can use exclusionary and 
preferred provider networks to negotiate with providers over price and quality of health 
care services. A crucial determinant of the feasibility of such networks is how effectively 
insurers can channel enrollees toward the selected providers. In contrast to the US, Dutch 
citizens are largely unfamiliar with provider networks. The aim of our investigation is 
to shed light on the potential effectiveness of selective contracting by examining con-
sumer sensitivity to channeling incentives. This issue is relevant to all countries that have 
introduced selective contracting and consumer choice or are contemplating to do so.
We focus on preferences for GPs and pharmacies since consumer sensitivity to chan-
neling incentives may strongly differ for these provider types. We expect that consumers 
120 Chapter 6
have ‘strong’ preferences for GPs and are relatively price inelastic, while consumers are 
expected to have ‘weak’ preferences for pharmacies and to be relatively price elastic. 
Preferences for GPs are likely to be strong because of the often confidential and long-
term relationship consumers have with their GP. This is particularly the case in the Neth-
erlands, where people are required to register with a single GP. By contrast, consumers 
may be less loyal to pharmacies because a pharmacy is more likely to be considered as 
a retailer than as a health care provider. We expect that the preferences for other health 
care providers, such as hospitals, medical specialists and physiotherapists, are weaker 
than for GPs and stronger than for pharmacies.46
Since there is only very limited experience in the Dutch health care market with 
respect to channeling and preferred provider contracts, we use stated preference data 
to estimate consumer preferences for various channeling incentives to influence both 
GP and pharmacy choice. In this paper, the discrete choice methodology is used to 
elicit consumer preferences for channeling incentives. We include both financial and 
qualitative channeling incentives. Moreover, the existence of a possible status-quo bias 
is estimated by confronting consumers with choices between the current provider and 
a hypothetical alternative.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of relevant literature, 
section 3 describes the methods used, section 4 presents the econometric model, and 
in section 5 the results are discussed. In section 6 we provide a simulation of the impact 
of positive and negative financial channeling incentives on provider choice. Section 7 
concludes.
Literature review
Empirical research about consumer sensitivity to different channeling incentives is lim-
ited. Research on health plan choice in the US has shown that consumers are reluctant to 
choose a health plan with restrictions on provider choice (HMOs). Consumers dislike or 
even distrust some of these very restrictive forms of managed care (Chu-Weininger and 
Balkrishnan 2006, Feldman, et al. 1989, Gawande, et al. 1998, Miller 2006). Furthermore, 
consumers are sensitive to the premium, quality, available information and restrictions 
in provider choice (Chernew, et al. 2004, Dafny and Dranove 2005, Zweifel and Manning 
2000).
46. This expectation is corroborated by a survey among 2000 respondents (Keuzenkamp 2006) in which 
the reported switching propensities for various health care providers were the least for GPs and the 
highest for pharmacies.
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In our study, we focus on determinants of provider choice, conditional on the decision 
to visit a provider. Most empirical research on provider choice is related to hospitals and 
found that hospital choice is determined by distance, quality and consumer character-
istics (Garnick, et al. 1989, Kim 1990, Tai, et al. 2004). Research on GP choice is primarily 
focused on patient ratings of GP care. Patient priorities for GP care are, among others, 
waiting times, access, availability of out-of-hours care, communication and information, 
time of consultation and the doctor-patient relationship (Anderson, et al. 2007, Braspen-
ning, et al. 2004, Rubin, et al. 2006, Wensing, et al. 1998). Few studies used Discrete choice 
methodology to assess preferences for GP characteristics (Bergmo and Wangberg 2007, 
Gerard and Lattimer 2005, Rubin, et al. 2006, Ryan 2006, Scott, et al. 2003). These studies 
provide insight in the relative importance of different attributes of GP care. They do not, 
however, provide insight in the trade-offs consumers are willing to make and, even more 
important, in consumers’ willingness to switch to another GP.
With respect to pharmacy choice, Boonen et al. (2008) examined few small scale ex-
periments by health insurers to encourage the use of preferred pharmacies. They found 
that the small positive incentives insurers introduced to channel enrollees to preferred 
pharmacies were effective in influencing pharmacy choice. About 15% to 25% of the 
enrollees were willing to switch to the preferred pharmacy in return for financial incen-
tives. The long-term impact of the channeling incentives depended on the duration of 
the financial incentive and on the location of the preferred pharmacy.
Research on provider choice has also shown that consumers’ willingness to switch to 
other alternatives is limited by a status-quo bias. Status-quo bias arises once consum-
ers are reluctant to leave their current provider even if better alternatives are readily 
available (Neipp and Zeckhauser 1985, Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, Strombom, et 
al. 2002). Switching costs, uncertainty about other alternatives and the relationship con-
sumers have with their current provider determines the importance of the status-quo 
bias. Stole (2007) finds that consumers are more price inelastic with their second choice 
than with their first choice. This holds both for consumers with ‘strong’ preferences and 
for those with weak preferences. This difference in price elasticity can be explained 
by the theory of reference dependence, which states that consumers value attributes 
compared to a reference level (Hardie, et al. 1993). Choice may thus be dependent on 
the levels of the attributes of the provider patients are used to, since these levels may 
function as their reference point.
Methods
To compare consumer preferences for contractible aspects of GPs and pharmacies, two 
discrete choice experiments (DCE) are designed. A DCE is a method to elicit consumer 
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preferences and willingness to pay values. DCEs involve the creation of hypothetical 
choice scenarios, in which alternatives are described in terms of their characteristics 
(attributes). Respondents’ stated choices are expected to reflect their underlying prefer-
ences (Lancsar 2002).
The attributes used are based on a literature review about patient preferences for 
providers and on consultations with health insurers, pharmacies and the Dutch GP 
association. We find that distance, quality, low waiting times, easy access, availability 
of out-of-office hours of care, a good doctor-patient relationship and good communica-
tion and information are the most important attributes in provider choice. (Boonen and 
Schut 2006, Boonen, et al. 2008, Garnick, et al. 1989, Hole 2008, Kim 1990, Longo, et 
al. 2006, Rubin, et al. 2006, Tai, et al. 2004, Vick and Scott 1998). In addition, we also 
investigated whether pharmacies and GPs in the Netherlands are actually differentiating 
themselves with respect to several attributes. Some pharmacies offer online services, 
home delivery of drugs and meetings on medication management to distinguish them-
selves from their competitors. Furthermore, some have extended opening hours and 
offer a large variety of health related products. GPs primarily distinguish themselves by 
service aspects such as extended telephone access, better information and communica-
tion, evening opening hours and shorter waiting times. In addition, GPs and pharmacies 
differ by practice type. Most pharmacies are located in stand-alone practices and most 
GPs (over 50%) are working in solo or duo practices (www.nivel.nl). Lems (2006) found 
that consumers positively value recent developments in GP care such as the availability 
of practice assistants, the possibility of on-line consultation, extended opening hours 
and extended telephone access.
In this paper, the attributes are related to the different strategies health insurers can 
use to motivate enrollees to visit a preferred provider: financial incentives, qualitative 
incentives and practice characteristics (see table 6.1). Since individuals typically react 
differently to similar positive and negative incentives because of loss aversion (Kahne-
man, et al. 1991, Tversky and Kahneman 1991), we designed two DCEs, one including a 
negative financial incentive (co-payment) and one including a positive financial incen-
tive (discount). In the first DCE, consumers are confronted with a standard out-of-pocket 
payment of nine euro per visit to each GP or nine euro per prescription drug from each 
pharmacy. The regulated price for a GP visit in the Netherlands is nine euro (in addition 
to a fixed capitation fee per registered patient that is paid by the health insurer), which 
is why we have chosen to set the standard out-of-pocket payment in the first DCE to 
nine euro. The positive financial incentive, included in this DCE, is a discount up to nine 
euro on this out-of-pocket payment. In the second DCE, consumers face no standard 
out-of-pocket payment and the negative financial incentive used is a co-payment up to 
nine euro per visit or per prescription drug.
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Table 6.1 Attributes and levels
Attribute Levels
General practitioner and Pharmacy
I Financial incentives
Co-payment No co-payment
3 euro per prescription/ per visit
6 euro per prescription/ per visit
9 euro per prescription / per visit
Discount No discount
3 euro per prescription / per visit
6 euro per prescription/ per visit
9 euro per prescription/ per visit
II Qualitative incentives
Extra opening hours GP:
No out-of-office hours care
One or two evenings available for out-of-office hours care
Pharmacy:
No extra office hours
Extra office hours during the evenings and/or on Saturday
Internet service No, not available
Yes, available
Certificate of quality No, not present
Yes, present
III Practice characteristics
Distance from home address
(Walking distance in minutes)
5 minutes
15 minutes
25 minutes
35 minutes
Type of practice GP:
Only GP
GP and pharmacy
GP and other primary care providers (primary care center)
Pharmacy:
Only pharmacy
Pharmacy and GP
Pharmacy and other primary care providers (primary care center)
GP only
Telephone Access Basic access (8:00 AM – 11:00 PM)
Extended access (all day: 8:00 AM – 5:30 PM)
Availability of practice assistants No, not available
Yes, available
Pharmacy only
Meetings on medication management No, no meetings on medication management
Yes, regular meetings on medication management
Consumer satisfaction with the 
pharmacy
Bad
Reasonable
Good
Very good
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The incentives and practice characteristics that are comparable for both the GP and 
the pharmacy are described in the same manner using the same wording to make 
them comparable between the two providers. ‘Extra opening hours’ are defined as 
out-of-office hours during which enrollees can visit the GP or can collect their prescrip-
tion drugs at their pharmacy. In the Netherlands, most GPs and pharmacies are only 
open during office hours (from 8:00 am to 5:30 pm) on weekdays. For emergency care 
during out-of-office hours, consumers are able to visit GP-cooperatives and late night 
pharmacies. An Internet service enables online ordering, home-delivery of prescription 
drugs and on-line consultations with the GP. The quality certificate is a certificate GPs 
and pharmacies obtain once they fulfill specific quality requirements set by their profes-
sional association. Further comparable attributes are the practice characteristics travel 
time and the type of practice. Travel time we defined as the distance in walking minutes 
from the home address to the pharmacy and GP. We discern three types of practices: a 
stand-alone pharmacy and a single practice GP (including one or two GPs), a practice 
including both a pharmacy and a GP and a primary health care center in which several 
care providers work together in the same building.
We also distinguish several specific attributes for each provider type. Specific attributes 
that are only relevant to pharmacy choice are meetings on medication management 
and consumer satisfaction surveys in which consumers rate their pharmacy on different 
service aspects. Consumer satisfaction surveys are particularly relevant for pharmacy 
choice since several health insurers are introducing such surveys and are planning to use 
the outcomes of such surveys in their contracting policy. In the case of GPs, such surveys 
have not been used or considered by health insurers and may be more difficult to use in 
their contracting policy because of the personal relationship patients have with their GP. 
Specific attributes that are only relevant for the choice of a GP are extended telephone 
access and the availability of practice assistants. In most GP practices telephone access 
for non-emergency care visits is restricted to a certain time period during the day, for 
example between 8:00am and 11:00am. Extended telephone access is defined as the GP 
practice being accessible by telephone from 8:00am to 5:30 pm during working days.
Experimental study design and data collection
Questionnaire data were collected using an Internet based household panel (n = 2500) 
that is representative of the adult Dutch population (age >18). Respondents who 
participate in the Internet based household panel are provided with questionnaires 
biweekly. The same panel received the questionnaire about pharmacy choice as well as 
the questionnaire about GP choice. Background characteristics of the respondents such 
as age, gender and health status are available. The overall response rate was about 80%.
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In the first part of the questionnaire, respondents are confronted with questions about 
their current GP and pharmacy, their health care utilization and several propositions 
focusing on consumers’ preferences concerning provider choice. Respondents were also 
asked to describe their current GP and pharmacy on the basis of the attributes used in 
the DCE.
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of 12 choice scenarios between either 
three pharmacies or three GPs and respondents were asked to choose the most preferred 
one. We opted for a choice among three providers as this increases the information 
content of an individual question, raising the statistical efficiency (Burgess and Street 
2003). The set of attributes and levels for the GP (5 attributes at 2 levels, 1 attribute at 3 
levels and 2 attributes at 4 levels) results in a complete factorial design with more than 
1500 possible GP descriptions. The set of attributes and levels for the pharmacy (4 at-
tributes at 2 levels, 1 attribute at 3 levels and 3 attributes at 4 levels) results in a complete 
factorial design with more than 3000 possible pharmacies. To collect preference infor-
mation effectively, efficient designs were created using the toolbox available for these 
purposes in SAS.47 To ensure that the data support a model with possible interactions, 
the SAS procedure %choiceff was instructed to find a D-optimal design for the model 
with all two-way interactions, that is, the determinant of the information matrix for the 
model with all two-way interactions is to be maximized (Huber and Zwerina 1996).48 
The general optimal designs by, among others, Burgess and Street (2005) only consider 
main effects. Optimal designs for models with interactions are only known for a limited 
number of specific settings, excluding ours. Instead, we used SAS procedures, which 
tend to provide the most efficient designs for models with two-way interactions (Street, 
Burgess and Louviere 2005).
As data collection was computer-based, it was relatively easy to collect data from a 
large design that was split up in many blocks. We opted for two designs, one for the GP 
and one for the pharmacy version, both with 108 choice scenarios divided in 9 blocks 
of 12 choice sets. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the 9 blocks. The 
resulting design scored high on all relevant measures, such as level balance and or-
thogonality. Because the data collection was computer based, we were also able to vary 
the sequence of the attributes. Each respondent received a questionnaire in which the 
47. SAS marketing manual: support.sas.com/techsup/technote/ts722/pdf.
48. Beforehand we did not have strong expectations about possible significant two-way interactions 
between attributes. However, by creating a design with the possibility of testing for interaction terms, 
our main effects model estimates will be unbiased even if several interactions would exist. By using a 
main effects design only, results may be biased if interaction effects exist but cannot be estimated. We 
did test for the presence of several interaction effects for which hypotheses may exist but we have not 
found any significant effects. We therefore left this out of the analysis.
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attributes were placed in a random order that differed across respondents, to neutralize 
any ordering effects on consumer preferences (Kjaer, et al. 2006). In addition, the alter-
natives were placed in a random order that differed across respondents to neutralize 
any left/right bias.
We did not include an opt-out option because consumers are required to register with 
a single GP. Also in the pharmacy version we did not include an opt-out to make both 
questionnaires as similar as possible. To estimate the effect of a possible status quo bias, 
we confronted respondents with two additional choices including their current GP and 
pharmacy. We could also have chosen to, in addition to the purely hypothetical choice 
options, offer choices including the current GP and pharmacy as an opt-out option. We 
did not do so because we expect that the label ‘current’ dominates other attributes for 
the majority of the respondents. In addition, offering a similar number of non-forced 
choices next to the forced choice format is likely to lead to cognitive overload for the 
respondents. With the two additional choices we expect to capture the effect of a pos-
sible status quo bias. An example of a choice scenario is given in appendix 6.1.
Econometric specification
Economic Framework
We use Lancaster’s economic theory of value and random utility theory to examine 
consumers’ willingness to trade-off providers with different financial and qualitative 
attributes (Lancaster 1966; Lancaster 1971; McFadden 1974; Hanemann 1983; Ryan, 
Netten et al. 2006). This implies that we assume that utility is derived from the properties 
or characteristics of a good rather than from the good itself. Hence, we describe the 
decision making process about pharmacy and GP choice in terms of comparing indirect 
utility functions. Consumers are assumed to have perfect discrimination capability and 
to choose the pharmacy/GP that maximizes their utility. We assume that the utility that 
individual i derives from choosing alternative j on choice occasion t is then given by 
equation 1,
 Uijt = Vijt + εijt (1)
where Uijt denotes individual i’s utility from choice j on choice occasion t, Vijt is the deter-
ministic part which captures both pharmacy and GP characteristics which vary over ijt 
and individual characteristics (taste variations) which vary over i, and εijt is the error term 
which captures the characteristics that are unobservable to the researchers as well as 
measurement error (Manski 1977).
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Empirical Framework
In the empirical models, we first estimate consumers’ sensitivity to certain pharmacy 
or GP characteristics and their willingness to pay to visit a pharmacy or GP with these 
specific characteristics based on the forced choice questions. Second, we estimate a 
model that allows for status quo bias related to the choices between the current phar-
macy or GP and the preferred hypothetical scenario in which we use information on the 
characteristics of the current pharmacy and GP.
McFadden shows that if εijt are assumed to be type I extreme value (or Weibull) and 
independent, then a logit model can be derived from the random utility model (McFad-
den 1974). The parameter estimates of the logit model may be interpreted as parameter 
estimates of the indirect utility function. For the empirical estimation of the indirect 
utility model, we used a multinomial logit model.49
Each pharmacy and GP in the choice set is composed of a bundle of pharmacy or GP 
characteristics (X) faced by the ith individual. Since we observe the choice and not the 
actual difference in utility, the dependent variable is binary. The conditional probability 
Pr(yi = m) that individual i in choice occasion t is observed to choose alternative m is 
given by equation (2),
Pr(yit = m|Vijt) = P(Uimt > Uijt ∀j ≠ m) = 
exp(Vimt) for m = 1 to J (2)ΣJj exp(Vijt)
where Vijt = xijtβ and xijt is a vector with choice attributes.
As each respondent made 12 choices, the choices whether or not to choose a specific 
pharmacy or GP might not be independent within an individual. To obtain standard 
errors that are valid in the presence of such intra-individual correlation, we used the 
“cluster” option in Stata version 9.0. The resulting variance-covariance matrix generalizes 
the Huber-White sandwich estimator to allow for possible within individual correlation 
(Huber 1967; White 1980,1982, Stata User Guide 1999)50.
In the forced choice decision the labels of the pharmacies and GPs have no mean-
ing, they only differ in the specified attributes and their location on the screen. During 
49. We also analyzed our data using a mixed logit model that allows for preference heterogeneity. Since 
both models lead to similar results we have opted for the multinomial logit model because this facilitates 
the computation of confidence intervals for our marginal rates of substitution and the simulated choice 
shares.
50. See also http://repec.org/usug2007/crse.pdf for a detailed explanation of the Eicker-Huber-White 
robust standard errors in Stata.
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data collection, the alternatives were randomly assigned to one of the three labels and 
corresponding locations. As a consequence, there will be no relationship between the 
attributes and the labels. Still, alternative specific constants can be used to test for mis-
specification. The constant term can then be interpreted as the difference in average 
utility between scenario A, B and C caused by a left/middle/right bias (Scott, et al 2003)
In the status quo bias model consumers can choose between the hypothetical 
pharmacy or GP and their current pharmacy or GP, i.e. they can opt-out and choose 
to stay with their current pharmacy or GP. This model can be seen as a labeled experi-
ment in which consumers may attach a certain value to the label ‘current pharmacy/GP’. 
Respondents are assumed to have an ex ante preference not to switch pharmacies/GPs. 
To capture this effect we included an alternative specific dummy, which we defined as 
being equal to 1 for the current pharmacy or GP and equal to -1 for the hypothetical 
alternative. To be able to capture the full ‘status-quo bias’ we used effects coding (-1 for 
the base level and 1 for the other levels, see table 6.1) to estimate our attributes (Bech 
and Gyrd-Hansen 2005).
To investigate whether there is a predictable component in the preference heteroge-
neity, we included interactions between background characteristics (income, having a 
job, age, health status) and attributes. In addition, we included interactions of the at-
tributes with respondents’ past experiences; the description of and the relationship with 
their current pharmacy and GP. It might, for example, be expected that respondents 
who are used to a pharmacy or GP with an internet service are more likely to prefer a 
pharmacy or GP including an internet service (Scott, et al. 2003).
A model with main effects was estimated first and is used to compute marginal rates of 
substitution (based on equation (3)) between each attribute and the price attribute (the 
financial incentive). The marginal rates of substitution represent the willingness to pay 
for an attribute m, given a marginal change in that attribute (MRSP) (Hanemann 1983). 
Since we used effects coding for the attributes the formula for the MRSP is multiplied by 
2, with an exception for distance, which is a continuous variable.
MRSP = −
δv/δbm = −2
βm  (3)
δv/δbprice βprice
To study the effectiveness of the attributes in actually channeling patients to preferred 
providers, we study their importance in terms of choice shares. The computation of the 
choice shares will be described in detail in the result section.
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Results
Descriptive statistics
In total 1906 respondents filled in the GP questionnaire, 968 the discount version and 
939 the co-payment version and 1875 respondents filled in the pharmacy questionnaire, 
952 the discount version and 923 the co-payment version (response rate of about 80%). 
The study population is representative of the adult Dutch population with an average 
age of 49 years, 48% female, 56% with a job and an average net monthly income of about 
1700 euro. Furthermore, over 80% indicates to be in good or even excellent health.
Table 6.2 presents the characteristics of respondents’ past experiences with and their 
description of their current GP and pharmacy. The majority of the respondents has a 
regular GP or pharmacy with a long-term relationship of over 5 years. Moreover, respon-
dents’ description of the current GP and pharmacy showed that the majority visits a GP 
Table 6.2 Past experiences and description of the current pharmacy and GP
Past experiences/ Description of 
current pharmacy/GP
Response Frequency 
GP
Frequency 
pharmacy
Past experiences
Number of visits to the pharmacy/GP 
in the last year
0 visits 28% 23%
1 or 2 visits 43% 30%
3 or 4 visits 18% 21%
More than 4 visits 11% 26%
Do you have a regular pharmacy/GP? No 3% 3%
Yes 97% 97%
How long do you have this regular 
pharmacy/GP?
Less than one year 4% 3%
Between one and five years 19% 15%
More than five years 78% 85%
Did you ever switch between 
pharmacies/GPs?
No 35% 56%
Yes 65% 44%
What was the most important reason 
to switch?
I moved to another city 60% 80%
The pharmacy/GP quitted with its 
practice
23% 3%
A new pharmacy/GP opened its 
practice closer to my home address
1% 8%
Bad experiences with the former 
pharmacy/GP
9% 3%
Other 7% 6%
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or pharmacy that has no extra features such as extended opening hours or a quality 
certificate.
The answers to the first part of the questionnaire show that consumers are much more 
aware of quality differences between GPs than between pharmacies. Whereas the major-
ity of the respondents (65%) recognizes quality differences between GPs, only 26% ob-
serves quality differences between pharmacies. Preferences for qualitative aspects may 
therefore play a larger role in choosing a GP than in choosing a pharmacy. In addition, 
the answers to the general questions show that respondents are more loyal to GPs than 
to pharmacies. A larger proportion of the respondents is willing to pay a co-payment 
to stick with their current GP (35%) than with their current pharmacy (14%) and less 
Table 6.2 Past experiences and description of the current pharmacy and GP (continued)
Past experiences/ Description of 
current pharmacy/GP
Response Frequency 
GP
Frequency 
pharmacy
Description of the current pharmacy/ GP
Distance to the current pharmacy/GP 5 minutes 28% 38%
15 minutes 34% 37%
25 minutes 17% 11%
35 minutes 21% 14%
Opening hours Basic opening hours 94% 66%
Extended opening hours 6% 34%
Internet Service No 77% 73%
Yes 23% 27%
Quality certificate No 77% 57%
Yes 23% 43%
Meetings on medication management No // 76%
Yes // 24%
Consumer satisfaction Bad // 1%
Mediocre // 7%
Good // 70%
Very Good // 22%
Telephone access No 75% //
Yes 25% //
Availability of Practice assistants No 94% //
Yes 6% //
Type of practice Only pharmacy or GP 66% 69%
GP and pharmacy 13% 14%
Primary care centre 20% 17%
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respondents are willing to switch to another GP (30%) than to another pharmacy (40%) 
in return for a financial gain.
Estimation results
Choice between (purely) hypothetical providers
Table 6.3 reports the willingness to pay for contractible aspects of GPs and pharmacies. 
We focus on the MRSP and the choice simulations and included the estimation results of 
the main effects model for both the pharmacy and GP in appendix 6.2. The estimation 
results show that the constant term is only significant for alternative B over alternative C. 
This could indicate that there might be a left/right bias but since we randomly assigned 
Table 6.3 Willingness to pay values for the hypothetical scenarios
Discount version Copayment version
Pharmacy GP Pharmacy GP
MRSP
(95% CI)
MRSP
(95% CI)
 Qualitative incentives and practice characteristics
Distance -.398
(-.446; -.347)
-.563
(-.685;-.478)
-.211
(.187;.231)
-.244 (.22;.27)
Extra opening hours 4.31
(3.63;5.01)
7.16
(6.06;8.92)
2.07
(1.77;2.39)
2.50
(2.13;2.90)
Meetings on medication management .252
(-.178;.71)
// .230
(-.004;.513)
//
Internet Service 2.01
(1.51;2.56)
3.46
(2.69;4.53)
.829
(.572;1.12)
1.47
(1.13;1.81)
Quality Certificate 5.61
(4.90;6.49)
11.25
(9.52;13.79)
2.41
(2.13;2.82)
4.29
(3.81;4.85)
Telephone access // 12.56
(10.80;15.30)
// 5.20
(4.67;5.85)
Availability of practice assistants // 6.14
(5.06;7.82)
// 1.91
(1.56;2.31)
Consumer satisfaction
Reasonable -4.56
(-5.66;-3.75)
// -3.05
(2.53;3.66)
//
Good 10.25
(9.00;11.49)
// 5.35
(4.82;5.99)
//
Very Good 12.62
(11.11;14.23)
// 6.80
(6.08;7.40)
//
Type of practice
Group practice with GP 2.04
(1.35;2.79)
2.61
(1.59;3.97)
.805
(.405;1.17)
.206
(.286;.629)
Primary Care Centre -2.09
(-2.77;-1.35)
-3.07
(-4.58;-1.86)
-.079
(-.408;.298)
-.925
(-1.39;-.420)
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the alternatives to position A, B or C, this will not affect our estimates51. The signs of the 
coefficients are as expected.
We find that respondents are more sensitive to co-payments than to discounts. Their 
willingness to pay for similar attribute level changes in the co-payment version is lower 
than that in the discount version. Furthermore, respondents are more willing to pay 
for qualitative attributes with GPs than with pharmacies. For example, respondents are 
willing to pay about twice as much for a quality certificate of a GP than for a quality cer-
tificate of a pharmacy. The difference in WTP for quality certificates is significant in the 
co-payment version. In the discount version, the WTP for distance, opening hours, Inter-
net and a quality certificate are significantly different between GPs and pharmacies.52 
Where a quality certificate is valued high in GP choice, respondents value consumer 
satisfaction rates with pharmacy choice.
Table 6.4 reports how the various channeling incentives and practice characteristics 
influence the choice probabilities for GPs and pharmacies. The willingness to switch in 
return for positive and negative financial incentives indicates that respondents are more 
sensitive to negative than to positive financial incentives. In addition, respondents are 
more sensitive to financial incentives in case of pharmacies than in case of GPs. While 
5% of the respondents would switch to another GP once the discount decreases with 3 
euro, 9% of the respondents is willing to switch to another pharmacy. This also holds in 
case of negative financial incentives.
Table 6.4 also shows that for qualitative incentives such as a quality certificate and 
an Internet service, the propensity to switch is higher in case of GPs than in case of 
pharmacies. These findings are in line with the reported results on the propositions 
and perceptions in which respondents were more willing to switch in case of negative 
financial incentives and were more aware of quality differences between pharmacies 
than between GPs. Again, consumer satisfaction ratings have a substantial impact on 
pharmacy choice. Bad consumer satisfaction ratings result in a substantial loss in market 
share (- 20% in the discount version versus -11% in the co-payment version).
51. We also estimated a model without the constant term and found no large differences in the results. 
Furthermore, we only present the results of the main effects. The models including the interaction effects 
between the attributes and background characteristics and between the attributes and consumers’ past 
experiences with GP and pharmacy care showed only few significant effects. Having a job for example 
was associated with stronger preferences for extended opening hours and age was associated with a 
lower preference for internet services. In addition, interactions with past experiences showed that 
respondents have stronger preferences for GPs and pharmacies that have similar attribute levels as their 
current GP and pharmacy. We do not present detailed results here because these results do not add to 
the understanding of the problem. The results are available upon request from the authors.
52. The significance of these differences is tested using bootstrapped confidence intervals on the mean 
WTP values obtained from the MNL model (Hole 2007).
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Choice between the hypothetical and the current provider
Table 6.5 presents the WTP values for contractible aspects of GPs and pharmacies 
once respondents are confronted with choices between their current provider and a 
hypothetical (better) alternative (the estimation results are presented in appendix 6.2, 
Table 6.4 Predicted probabilities in response to variation in attributes for hypothetical scenarios
Discount version Co-payment version
Δ % Preferred 
Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred 
Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Base share Alternative .50 .50 .50 .50
Practice characteristics
Distance = −10 minutes +.11
(.106; .128)
+.097
(.086;.107)
+.11
(.101; .123)
+.101
(.090;.111)
Extended opening hours +.13
(.112; .140)
+.122
(.108;.135)
+.11
(.096; .0124)
+.103
(.089;.117)
Meetings on medication 
management
+.01
(-.005; .020)
// +.01
(-.001; .025)
//
Internet service +.06
(.046; .073)
+.060
(.047;.072)
+.04
(.032; .058)
+.061
(.048;.074)
Quality certificate +.16
(.148; .176)
+.186
(.172;.200)
+.13
(.114; .142)
+.172
(.157;.187)
Telephone Access // +.206
(.192;.219)
// +.201
(.190;.219)
Availability of practice 
assistants
// +.105
(.092;.118)
// +.079
(.066;.091)
Consumer satisfaction
Consumer satisfaction 
= bad
-.35
(-.356; -.338)
// -.33
(-.337; -.317)
//
Consumer satisfaction = 
mediocre
-.21
(-.221; -.196)
// -.21
(-.227; -.199)
//
Consumer satisfaction = 
very good
+.04
(.020; .050)
// +.04
(.023; .054)
//
Type of practice
Type of practice = GP 
and pharmacy
+.03
(.014; .045)
+.019
(.004;.033)
+.04
(.026; .056)
-.011
(-.025;.003)
Type of practice = group 
practice
-.03
(-.047; -.018)
-.031
(-.046;-.016)
+.02
(.003; .032)
-.034
(-.049;-.020)
Financial incentive
Financial incentive = 
−3 euro
-.09
(-.100; -.080)
-.052
(-.061;-.043)
-.16
(-.166; -.148)
-.123
(-.132;-.114)
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Table 6.5 Willingness to pay values for the scenarios including the current pharmacy/GP
Discount version Copayment version
Pharmacy GP Pharmacy GP
MRSP
(95% CI)
MRSP
(95% CI)
Status quo bias
Alternative specific constant 8.07
(3.81;18.99)
37.03
(11.45;157.97)
5.929
(3.58;10.66)
9.21
(6.08;15.87)
Qualitative incentives and practice characteristics
Distance -.321
(-.643;-.177)
-.369
(-2.08;-.107)
-.141
(-.25;-.08)
-.059
(-.135;-.008)
Extra opening hours -.031
(-2.48;2.48)
11.79
(2.64;49.26)
1.19
(.045;2.64)
3.05 (1.32;5.83)
Meetings on medication 
management
2.59
(.246;6.80)
// 1.22
(.01;2.96)
//
Internet Service 2.25
(.012;6.57)
5.44
(2.43;24.63)
.006
(-1.18;1.34)
1.16
(-2.89;.22)
Quality Certificate 3.21
(.879;7.187)
8.47
(1.23;40.22)
.445
(-.595;1.69)
2.28 (1.03;4.16)
Telephone access // 8.03
(7.22;36.33)
// .196
(.63;3.97)
Availability of practice assistants // 4.22
(3.18;19.88)
// 2.17
(.87;4.15)
Consumer satisfaction
Reasonable -3.689
(-11.16;1.838)
// -4.00
(-7.83;-1.149)
//
Good 7.896
(3.49;16.67)
// 1.829
(-.319;4.52)
//
Very Good 14.46
(8.27;29.26)
// 8.60
(5.523;14.39)
//
Type of practice
Group practice with GP -2.16
(-8.023;1.55)
-2.30
(-9.98;18.32)
-.632
(-2.98;1.151)
-.774
(-1.24;3.46)
Primary Care Centre 1.375
(-1.631;6.377)
-.75
(-32.40;2.27)
2.39
(.78;5.196)
1.29
(-4.0;.58)
Consumer willingness to switch to preferred providers: GPs versus pharmacies 135
6
table 2)53. The estimation results show similar patterns as the estimation results of the 
choices between hypothetical scenarios. Furthermore, the results show that respondents 
have a preference for their current provider. Similar to the ‘purely’ hypothetical choice 
scenarios, we find higher WTP values in the discount version than in the co-payment 
version. Also the WTP for qualitative attribute level changes is higher with GPs than 
with pharmacies. Comparing these results to those in the ‘purely’ hypothetical choice 
situations makes clear that the preference for the current pharmacy and GP reduces the 
sensitivity to the channeling incentives. The WTP values for similar qualitative attributes 
and practice characteristics are lower than those found in the purely hypothetical sce-
narios (see table 6.3).
Respondents have a higher preference to stick with their current GP than to stick with 
their current pharmacy. The WTP for the status quo is higher in case of GPs than in case 
of pharmacies. The differences in WTP between GPs and pharmacies are not statistically 
significant.54 However, though the differences between the WTPs are not statistically sig-
nificant we do expect them to be economically relevant, especially because the results 
are comparable to those found in the purely hypothetical scenarios and to the reported 
preferences in the first part of the questionnaire.
Table 6.6 indicates the probabilities that respondents switch to another alternative 
once one of the attributes for the non-current alternative changes. These probabilities 
are computed using a base scenario in which both the current and non-current providers 
have identical attribute levels, except for the status-quo dummy. In the base scenario, 
about 90% of the respondents choose the current GP in both the discount and the co-
payment version while 80% choose the current pharmacy in the co-payment version 
and 70% in the discount version55. This difference is related to consumers’ sensitivity to 
53. We also estimated a model including interactions between background characteristics and the de-
scription of the respondents’ relationship with their current pharmacy and GP (number of visits, number 
of years with the same pharmacy/GP etc) and the alternative specific constant. This resulted in only one 
significant effect: older respondents showed a stronger preference for their current pharmacy/GP than 
younger respondents. Other characteristics or descriptions of the pharmacy/GP showed no significant 
results. Due to the few significant effects, we did not present the results for the model with the interac-
tion variables. The results are available upon request from the authors.
54. Significance is based on the bootstrapped percentile based confidence intervals on the mean WTP 
values. (Hole 2007).
55. The difference in the starting points between the discount and the co-payment version is a result 
from the simulation used to compute the choice shares. In the base scenario we constructed two 
identical pharmacies with identical attribute levels. In the scenarios including the current pharmacy, 
these pharmacies only differed with respect to the alternative specific constant. The alternative specific 
constant determines the preference for the current pharmacy. The estimation results (appendix B) show 
that the preference for the current pharmacy is stronger in the co-payment version than in the discount 
version, resulting in different starting points.
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the status quo, the alternative specific constant. Since the alternative specific constant 
influences the utility respondents derive from choosing a specific alternative also the 
probability with which they are willing to choose for a specific alternative is influenced.
The choice probabilities are lower than those found in the hypothetical scenarios (see 
table 6.4). Respondents are less willing to switch to a preferred alternative when facing 
a choice between a preferred and current provider than a choice between two hypo-
thetical providers. The choice probabilities do show a similar pattern as in the purely 
Table 6.6 Predicted probabilities in response to variation in attributes for scenarios including current 
pharmacy/GP
Discount version Co-payment version
Δ % Preferred Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred 
Pharmacy
(95% CI)
Δ % Preferred GP
(95% CI)
Base share Alternative .29 .12 .19 .13
Practice characteristics
Distance = −10 minutes +.08
(.015; .142)
+.022
(-.003;.048)
+.06
(.007; .111)
+.016
(-.015;.044)
Extended opening hours +.00
(-.057; .056)
+.084
(.049;.120)
+.05
(-.004; .102)
+.089
(.051;.127)
Meetings on medication 
management
+.06
(-.003; .128)
// +.05
(-.003; .104)
//
Internet service +.05
(-.009; .116)
+.034
(.004;.064)
+.00
(-.043; 0.43)
+.030
(-.007;.066)
Quality certificate +.08
(.009; .148)
+.057
(.023;.091)
+.02
(-.035; .069)
+.063
(.0186;.108)
Telephone Access // +.053
(.020;.086)
// +.053
(.013;.093)
Availability of practice 
assistants
// +.025
(-.001;.056)
// +.079
(.066;.091)
Consumer satisfaction
Consumer satisfaction 
= bad
-.20
(-.231; -.178)
// -.11
(-.137; -.086)
//
Consumer satisfaction = 
mediocre
-.11
(-.154; -.072)
// -.09
(-.114; -.060)
//
Consumer satisfaction = 
very good
+.08
(.013; .147)
// +.16
(.390; .534)
//
Type of practice
Type of practice = GP 
and pharmacy
+.03
(-.087; .022)
+.006
(-.019;.032)
+.02
(-.032; .076)
-.003
(-.034;.028)
Type of practice = group 
practice
+.01
(-.049; .063)
+.036
(.003;.068)
+.09
(.035; .146)
+.022
(-.011;.056)
Financial incentive
Financial incentive = 
−3 euro
-.06
(-.097; -.029)
-.016
(-.030;-.001)
-.09
(-.106; -.072)
-.056
(-.068;-.044)
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hypothetical scenarios where respondents are more sensitive to financial incentives in 
pharmacy choice and more sensitive to qualitative incentives in GP choice.
Simulation with different financial incentives
To examine the impact of negative and positive financial incentives on GP and phar-
macy choice, we simulated different levels of financial incentives. The simulation is 
based on a choice between the current GP or pharmacy and an identical non-current 
alternative. Both alternatives have identical attribute levels but differ with respect to the 
status quo dummy. In the simulation, we confront respondents with different levels of 
out-of-pocket payments for the current provider. In the starting point, the current and 
the non-current provider both face no out-of-pocket payments (no co-payment or nine 
euro discount). In the simulation, the introduction of a co-payment of three euro for the 
current provider is equal to a reduction of the discount to six euro. In both cases the 
out-of-pocket payment for the current provider equals three euro. The simulation results 
are illustrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
The most important findings are the differences in sensitivity to financial incentives 
between GP choice and pharmacy choice. For pharmacies the impact of financial in-
centives is much larger than for GPs. Moreover, respondents react, both in case of GPs 
and in case of pharmacies, stronger to negative than to positive financial incentives. 
Figure 6.1 The probability that respondents choose their current GP or pharmacy in the discount version 
given different levels of out-of-pocket payments.*
Discount version
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* The x-axis of the graph shows the net payment respondents have to make to visit the current GP/pharmacy. 
For the discount version a co-payment of 3 euro is similar to a discount of 6 euro. We thus translated the 
discount into the corresponding co-payment to generate the results in the graph.
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This effect is, however, more prominent in GP choice than in pharmacy choice. Figure 
6.1 shows that positive financial incentives have only a limited impact on GP choice (a 
decrease in the probability to choose the current GP from 88% to 82%), while figure 6.2 
shows that similar negative financial incentives have a substantial impact on GP choice 
(a decrease in the probability to choose the current GP from 88% to 51%). For pharma-
cies the positive financial incentives have a smaller impact than the negative financial 
incentives, but both incentives substantially decrease the attractiveness of the current 
pharmacy (in the discount version a decrease from 70% to 48% and in the co-payment 
version a decrease from 80% to 31%).
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we examined whether consumers respond differently to similar incentives 
to visit specific pharmacies and GPs. Consumer channeling is becoming increasingly 
important in countries that are reinforcing the role of health insurers as prudent buyers 
of health services (e.g. The Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland). Once insurers are 
able to channel their enrollees toward preferred providers, they can effectively bargain 
about price and quality of health services. How consumers respond to channeling incen-
tives for different types of providers is therefore an important research question. With 
Discrete Choice Experiments, we elicited consumer preferences for various incentives in 
case of GP and pharmacy choice.
Figure 6.2 The probability that respondents choose their current GP or pharmacy in the co-payment 
version given different levels of out-of-pocket payments.*
Co-payment version
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 3 6 9
out-of-pocket payment
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 fo
r 
ch
oo
si
ng
 th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
GP PROB 
Pharmacy PROB 
* The x-axis of the graph shows the net payment respondents have to make to visit the current GP/pharmacy. 
For the discount version a co-payment of 3 euro is similar to a discount of 6 euro. We thus translated the 
discount into the corresponding co-payment to generate the results in the graph.
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The most important findings can be summarized as follows. First, negative financial 
incentives have a larger impact on provider choice than positive financial incentives. 
This difference is particularly large in case of GPs. Second, respondents are more aware 
of quality differences between GPs than between pharmacies. Respondents are more 
willing to pay for qualitative differences between GP practices than between pharma-
cies. Third, we find that many respondents prefer to stick with their current provider 
even if they have the option to switch to a better alternative (i.e. a provider with higher 
valued attributes). This status quo bias, however, is much stronger in case of GPs than in 
case of pharmacies. The strong preference for the current provider substantially reduces 
consumer sensitivity to channeling incentives for both types of providers. In the case of 
GPs the status quo bias almost completely cancels out the effect of the positive financial 
incentives included in our experiment
Our findings imply that channeling patients to preferred providers is much more dif-
ficult in the case of GPs than in case of pharmacies. In addition, for both types of providers 
different channeling incentives appear to be effective. For instance, positive financial in-
centives may well work to motivate consumers to switch to preferred pharmacies, but are 
likely to be insufficient to persuade consumers to give up their current GP. On the other 
hand, qualitative incentives are likely to be more effective in encouraging the use of pre-
ferred GPs than preferred pharmacies. Although influencing GP choice is likely to be more 
difficult than influencing pharmacy choice, successful channeling toward preferred GPs 
may have a longer lasting impact on provider choice. Once consumers are persuaded to 
switch to a preferred GP, they are likely to stay precisely because of the strong status quo 
bias. Although this effect is also expected in case of pharmacies, the effect is expected to 
be more pronounced in case of GPs. Therefore the higher effort of channeling to preferred 
GPs may be compensated by a more long-term benefit. Moreover, the benefit of chan-
neling toward preferred GPs may not be only confined to GPs but also to other providers. 
In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, GPs function as gatekeepers because for 
most health services a referral of a GP is required. Since consumers are inclined to listen to 
advice from their GP about which hospital or specialist to consult (RVZ 2003, Vries 2006), 
this implies that successful channeling toward a preferred GP enables health insurers to 
also indirectly influence the choice of other health care providers.
The difference in status quo bias between the two provider types also has implica-
tions for the timing and scope of channeling incentives. In the case of GPs, channeling 
incentives are likely to be most effective if they are targeted at people who did not yet 
register with a GP, for instance because they recently moved to another area. In addition, 
temporary incentives may be sufficient to encourage those people to switch. By con-
trast, in case of pharmacies channeling incentives are likely to be more effective if they 
a permanent. Permanent incentives may be required to prevent people from returning 
to their previous pharmacy. However, they can be targeted to all potential consumers.
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Appendix 6.1
In the questionnaire we presented respondents with the following choice scenarios 
between pharmacies:
“In the next part of the questionnaire we have put together a number of different choices 
between 3 pharmacies and ask you to choose between them. The pharmacies are described 
based on the characteristics we explained before. You can assume that the pharmacies only 
differ on the basis of these characteristics; all other things can be assumed equal.
When you have to visit one of these pharmacies, which one would you visit?”
Pharmacy A Pharmacy B Pharmacy C
Distance from your home address to the 
pharmacy
5 minutes 15 minutes 25 minutes
Opening hours Extended opening 
hours
Limited opening 
hours
Extended opening 
hours
Internet Service Yes, Internet service Yes, Internet Service No, no internet 
service
Certificate of Quality No quality 
certificate
Yes, a quality 
certificate
No quality 
certificate
Meetings on medication management Yes, regular 
meetings
No meetings No meetings
Consumer satisfaction Good Excellent Reasonable
Practice type Stand alone 
pharmacy
Pharmacy and GP Primary care center
Co-payment 6 euro 3 euro 0 euro
I choose A B C
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In the questionnaire we presented respondents with the following choice scenarios 
between GPs:
“In the next part of the questionnaire we have put together a number of different choices 
between 3 GPs and ask you to choose between them. The GPs are described based on the 
characteristics we explained before. You can assume that the GPs only differ on the basis of 
these characteristics; all other things can be assumed equal.
When you have to visit one of these GPs, which one would you visit?”
GPA GP B GP C
Distance from your home address to the 
pharmacy
5 minutes 15 minutes 25 minutes
Opening hours Extended opening 
hours
Limited opening 
hours
Extended opening 
hours
Internet Service Yes, Internet service Yes, Internet Service No, no internet 
service
Certificate of Quality No quality 
certificate
Yes, a quality 
certificate
No quality 
certificate
Practice assistants available No Yes No
Extended telephone access Yes No Yes
Practice type Solo practice Pharmacy and GP Primary care center
Co-payment 6 euro 3 euro 0 euro
I choose A B C
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Appendix 6.2
Table A1 Regression results for the hypothetical scenarios
Discount version Co-payment version
Pharmacy GP Pharmacy GP
β (SE) β(SE)
Qualitative incentives and practice characteristics
Distance -.048(.002)* -.039 (.002)* -.046(.002)* -.041 (.002)*
Extra opening hours .258(.017)* .249 (.016)* .224(.016)* .210 (.016)*
Meetings on medication management .015(.013) // .025(.014) //
Internet Service .120(.015)* .120 (.013)* .090(.015)* .123 (.014)*
Quality Certificate .336(.017)* .391 (.018)* .261(.017)* .359 (.018)*
Telephone Access // .437 (.018)* // .435 (.019)*
Availability of practice assistants // .213 (.014)* // .160 (.014)*
Consumer satisfaction
Reasonable -.273(.026)* // -.330(.029)* //
Good .615(.026)* // .579(.026)* //
Very Good .757(.031)* // .736(.031)* //
Type of practice
Group practice with GP/pharmacy .122(.021)* .091 (.019)* .087(.021)* .017 (.019)
Primary Care Centre -.126(.020)* -.107 (.021)* -.008(.019) -.077 (.021)*
Financial incentive
Discount/ co-payment .120(.006)* .070 (.006)* -.216(.008)* -.167 (.007)*
Constant
Constant A -.018(.017) .023 (.015) .003(.018) .022 (.015)
Constant C -.058(.016)* -.114 (.015)* -.062(.017)* -.077 (.015)*
LL
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Number of individuals
-9242
.253
33762
940
-10145
.187
34092
954
-8712
.271
32634
911
-9651
.2015
33003
924
* p<0.001
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Table A2 Regression results scenarios including the current pharmacy/GP
Discount version Co-payment version
Pharmacy GP Pharmacy GP
β (SE) β(SE)
‘Status quo bias’
Alternative specific constant .446(.08)* 1.018 (.099) * .727(.096)* .937 (.103) *
Qualitative incentives and practice characteristics
Distance -.036(.005)* -.020 (.004)* -.035(.006) * -.012 (.005) **
Extra opening hours -.0017(.058) .324 (.081)* .146(.065)** .311 (.088)*
Meetings on medication 
management
.143(.063)** // .150(.073)**
Internet Service .124(.065) .149 (.06) ** .001(.07) .119 (.066)***
Quality Certificate .177(.06) * .233 (.060)* .055(.065) .233 (.066)*
Telephone Access // .221 (.058)* // .199 (.063)*
Availability of practice assistants // .116 (.056)*** // .221 (.0598)*
Consumer satisfaction
Reasonable -.203(.155) // -.491(.178)**
Good .436(.116)* // .224(.131)
Very Good .799(.199)* // 1.055(.133)*
Type of practice
Group practice with GP/pharmacy -.119(.098) -.063 (.086) -.078(.107) -.079 (.098)
Primary Care Centre .076(.088) .186 (.079) ** .294(.101)** .131 (.056)
Financial incentive
Discount/ co-payment .111(.028)* .055 (.026) ** -.245(.037) * -.204 (.032)*
LL
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Number of individuals
-712.666
.251
1384
692
-719.255
.263
1407
704
-640.263
.359
1440
770
-773.194
.196
1388
694
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Conclusion and Discussion
With the introduction of the new Health Insurance Act (HIA), health insurers are in-
creasingly encouraged to manage care. Price competition between insurers strongly 
increased as the introduction of the new health insurance act induced many people to 
reconsider their choice of health insurer. This increased the incentive for insurers to act as 
prudent buyers of care and to control costs. Moreover, insurer’s financial risk for out- and 
inpatient medical expenses increased over the past decade, which also strengthened 
the incentives to manage care. In addition, the new insurance scheme increased the 
possibilities for health insurers to act as prudent buyer of care. A major instrument is the 
option to selectively contract with all health care providers. Moreover, supply and price 
regulation is gradually being relaxed, creating more room for insurers to negotiate with 
health care providers about price, quality and the organization of health services. Health 
insurers can use various incentives to stimulate enrollees to visit preferred suppliers with 
whom they have concluded favorable contracts.
Insurers’ ability to influence provider choice is an important precondition for effective 
negotiations with providers. Prior to the reform, the experience of Dutch health insurers 
with influencing provider choice has been limited. Moreover, in general little is known 
about effective channeling strategies by health insurers. Therefore, it is not clear whether 
this important precondition for the success of managed competition can be fulfilled.
The goal of this thesis was to investigate consumers’ responsiveness to channeling 
incentives. We first developed a theoretical framework using insights from two-sided 
market, option demand and principal-agent theories to explain the importance of con-
sumer channeling. Second, we investigated how insurers have taken up their new role 
as prudent buyers of care in the recently reformed Dutch health care market. In addition, 
we investigated consumers’ attitudes towards selective contracting and channeling by 
health insurers using survey data over the period 2005-2009. Third, we analyzed the im-
pact of insurers’ experiments with positive channeling incentives in the pharmaceutical 
market. Finally, we used discrete choice experiments to estimate consumers’ preferences 
for different channeling incentives for different preferred providers to assess insurers’ 
possibilities to channel enrollees.
In this final chapter, we will summarize the most important findings for each research 
question formulated in chapter 1 and reflect on the most important results.
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Are insurers acting as prudent buyers of care?
Q1: How are insurers taking up their role as prudent buyers of care since the introduction of 
the new HIA in the Dutch health care market?
Since the introduction of the HIA, insurers have been reluctant to selectively contract 
with health care providers and to offer health plans with restricted provider networks. 
Only one health insurer offers a health plan with a preferred provider network in which 
enrollees are strongly encouraged by financial incentives to use within network care. In 
contrast, most other health insurers contract with the majority (>95%) of all providers 
and use soft positive (financial) incentives to encourage enrollees to use the designated 
preferred providers, even though restrictive networks and negative financial incentives 
may sort a larger effect on provider choice. Anticipating the use of selective contracting, 
most insurers started to differentiate reimbursement limits between contracted and 
non-contracted care. However, since most insurers contract with the vast majority of the 
health care providers, the financial consequences of the differentiated reimbursement 
limits for both providers and enrollees are negligible.
Furthermore, insurers introduced preferred provider contracts in which they grant a 
preferred provider ‘status’ to a provider that offers better than average quality of care as 
measured by a variety of performance indicators. Insurers stimulated enrollees to visit 
these preferred providers, mainly with ‘soft’ positive incentives. Insurers e.g. encouraged 
preferred provider use by lower waiting lists and quality guarantees. Insurers did not 
differentiate reimbursement limits between preferred and non-preferred providers. 
Only since 2009, health insurers are legally permitted to directly stimulate enrollees with 
positive financial incentives to visit these preferred providers by exempting enrollees 
from paying the mandatory and voluntary deductible once they visit preferred provid-
ers. About half of all insurers (with a total market share of 58%) use this positive financial 
incentive to encourage preferred hospital utilization.
What are consumers’ attitudes towards channeling?
Q2: How did consumer attitudes towards channeling incentives and restrictions on provider 
choice developed since the introduction of the new HIA in the Dutch health care market?
The most important reason why health insurers seem reluctant to use selective contract-
ing is that they face a credible-commitment problem. Most consumers do not seem to 
trust that insurers with restrictive networks are committed to provide good quality care. 
Survey analysis over the period 2005-2009 showed that the insurer-credibility problem 
substantially increased during the first two years of the reform. The proportion of respon-
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dents willing to follow the advice of their insurer regarding provider choice reduced by 
about 50% across all types of providers (including GPs, pharmacies, hospitals, dentists 
and physical therapists). Consumers’ reluctance to follow their insurers’ advice was high-
est in the case of GPs and dentists and lowest in case of pharmacies and hospitals.
One of the reasons for the emergence of this credible-commitment problem is the 
considerable negative publicity in the media about health insurers that introduced 
initiatives to manage care since the introduction of the HIA. Consequently, consumers 
were afraid that insurers would increasingly ‘sit on the chair of the doctor’. In other 
words, in the Netherlands a ‘managed care backlash’ occurred even before insurers actu-
ally started to manage care.
The increasing credibility problem may also explain why several insurers still refrain 
from using positive (financial) channeling incentives to influence provider choice and 
why insurers are reluctant to engage in vertical integration with health care providers. 
It may also explain insurers’ adherence to a not-for-profit status. In 2009, all remaining 
Dutch health insurers are not-for-profit, which they often stress in marketing and com-
munication to (potential) enrollees.
Due to the two-sided character of the market, the credible-commitment problem 
also limits insurers’ possibilities to act as prudent buyers of care. Providing adequate 
and objective quality information about providers may play a key role in solving the 
credible commitment problem as quality of contracted providers is likely to play an 
important role in health plan choice. With adequate quality information insurers can 
select providers that offer good quality and can communicate the ex ante value of their 
provider network to their (potential) enrollees. As long as insurers cannot communicate 
the rationale behind their contracting policy, they will not be able to convince their 
enrollees that they can act as good agents. Solving the credible commitment problem 
should be a priority of both health insurers and the government as the credible commit-
ment problem limits insurers’ ability to effectively manage care.
Are consumers sensitive to positive channeling incentives?
Q3: What is the impact of insurers’ experiments with channeling on provider choice?
The empirical results in chapter 3 showed that experiments with positive channeling 
incentives in the pharmaceutical market were effective in influencing pharmacy choice. 
Three health insurers concluded preferred provider arrangements with pharmacies 
and encouraged their enrollees through various incentives, including gift certificates, 
discounts on over-the-counter drugs and a free body check, to visit the preferred 
pharmacy. The pharmacies were mainly selected on financial criteria as they offered 
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discounts on drug prices to these health insurers. Two of these insurers concluded a 
contract with a drugstore while the third insurer concluded a preferred contract with a 
traditional pharmacy via a public tender.
The results showed that enrollees were sensitive to the introduced incentives but that 
their responsiveness varied between the types of incentives used and the setting in which 
the experiments took place. Both financial incentives (gift certificates and discounts on 
over-the-counter drugs) had a positive effect on pharmacy choice although the tem-
porary gift certificates (only offered at the first and second visit) induced a ‘switch and 
return’ decision whereas the ‘permanent’ discounts induced a ‘switch and stay’ decision. 
Consumers facing temporary financial incentives were thus more likely to switch back 
to their original pharmacy after having collected the gift certificates. Despite the posi-
tive response to channeling incentives preferred provider contracts with the drugstore 
terminated in 2008. The drugstore was simply not able to attract enough patients to 
sustain a financially stable pharmacy, suggesting that many enrollees returned to their 
previous pharmacy after having collected the gift certificates.
The ‘switch and stay’ decision observed in the experiment in which enrollees were 
given a ‘permanent’ financial incentive was also influenced by the setting in which this 
experiment took place. In this experiment, the preferred traditional pharmacy was 
located in a new residential area in which no other pharmacies were located. In addi-
tion, the pharmacy was located in a primary care center. The proximity of other health 
care providers, especially the GP, also contributed to the attractiveness of the preferred 
pharmacy. Therefore, as location and the proximity of the GP also play an important role 
in pharmacy choice, insurers should not only focus on financial incentives to encourage 
preferred pharmacy use.
What are effective channeling incentives?
Q4: Are consumers sensitive to different channeling incentives to encourage the use of 
preferred providers?
Q4a: Does sensitivity to channeling incentives differ between different providers?
Q4b: How does status quo bias affect sensitivity to channeling incentives?
Q4c: Does status quo bias differ between different providers?
The empirical results from the discrete choice experiments in chapter 4, 5 and 6 showed 
that consumers are sensitive to different channeling incentives. Provider choice can 
be influenced by the introduction of financial as well as qualitative incentives such as 
higher quality and better access. The experiments showed that consumer sensitivity to 
channeling incentives is dependent on the type of provider as well as the status-quo 
bias for particular providers. First, in pharmacy choice financial incentives play a strong 
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role, whereas, in GP choice, qualitative incentives are more important. Moreover, nega-
tive financial incentives have a stronger impact than positive financial incentives. This 
effect is even more pronounced in case of GPs than in case of pharmacies as positive 
financial incentives have a negligible effect on GP choice.
Second, consumers are reluctant to give up their current provider even when better 
alternatives are readily available. This status quo bias limits the effectiveness of chan-
neling incentives for both pharmacies and GPs although the status quo bias is more 
prominent in case of GPs. In addition, contrary to what we expected, our research did 
not show significant differences in sensitivity to channeling incentives between differ-
ent enrollees. Hence, insurers may not have to differentiate their channeling strategies 
between enrollees that differ by age, gender or health status.
Because of the higher status quo bias, channeling enrollees to preferred GPs will be 
more difficult than channeling enrollees towards preferred pharmacies. Nevertheless, 
we expect that successful channeling toward preferred GPs has a longer lasting impact 
on GP choice. Once consumers are persuaded to switch to a preferred GP, they are likely 
to stay precisely because of this strong status quo bias. The higher effort of channeling 
to preferred GPs may therefore be compensated by a more long-term benefit. Moreover, 
the benefits of channeling consumers toward preferred GPs may not be confined only 
to GPs. In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, GPs function as gatekeepers. For 
most health services a referral of a GP is required. As consumers are inclined to listen to 
advice from their GP about which hospital or specialist to consult, successful channeling 
toward a preferred GP enables health insurers to indirectly influence the choice for other 
health care providers as well.
The difference in status quo bias between the two provider types also has implica-
tions for the timing and scope of channeling incentives. In the case of GPs, channeling 
incentives are likely to be most effective if they are targeted at people who did not yet 
register with a GP, for instance because they recently moved to another area. In addition, 
temporary incentives may be sufficient to encourage those people to switch and stay. 
By contrast, in case of pharmacies channeling incentives are likely to be most effective 
if they are permanent. Permanent incentives are likely to be required to prevent people 
from returning to their previous pharmacy. They can, however, be effectively targeted to 
all potential consumers.
Consumer channeling in health care: (im)possible?
Q: Are insurers able to channel enrollees to preferred providers in order to effectively act as 
prudent buyers of care?
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In this research we have investigated the sensitivity of consumers to channeling incen-
tives towards preferred providers in the context of the Dutch health system reform. 
We found that channeling is not a ‘mission impossible’. Consumers are sensitive to 
channeling incentives, although the extent to which consumers are sensitive strongly 
depends on both the type of incentive and the type of provider for whom the chan-
neling incentive was introduced. We find that negative incentives are more effective in 
influencing provider choice than positive ones. However, negative financial incentives 
may not be useful in practice as long as insurers cannot solve the credible commitment 
problem. The credible commitment problem may, therefore, limit insurers’ channeling 
possibilities. This explains why Dutch health insurers so far mainly used positive chan-
neling incentives.
Final remarks
To conclude this last chapter, we will outline two possible topics for future research:
(1) Natural experiments with channeling incentives
This thesis mainly used stated preference data to estimate consumer sensitivity to 
channeling incentives. Because after the introduction of the HIA, and particularly since 
2009, health insurers started to introduce various channeling incentives to encourage 
preferred provider use (e.g. positive financial incentives in the hospital market), revealed 
preference data is becoming more and more available. Moreover, we expect that over 
time more insurers start using channeling incentives to influence provider choice in 
different market segments including pharmaceutical care, GP care and hospital care. It 
would be interesting to evaluate these initiatives to investigate how consumers actually 
respond to channeling incentives in these market segments.
(2) The credible commitment problem
The credible commitment problem limits insurers’ ability to effectively manage care. 
Objective quality information about providers may help insurers to reduce the credible 
commitment problem. Current research already focuses on the development of quality 
indicators, the presentation and communication of quality information to enrollees and 
the role of quality information in provider choice (see e.g. Damman, et al. 2007, Reitsma-
van Rooijen, et al. 2008). In future research, it may be interesting to further analyze the 
link between the role of quality information and the credible commitment problem.
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Since the 1990s the Dutch health care system has been in transition from supply-side 
government regulation toward managed competition. A major step in this transition 
process has been the introduction of the Health Insurance Act (HIA) in 2006. The HIA is 
based on the principles of managed competition within the context of a national health 
insurance system under which all persons who legally live or work in the Netherlands are 
obliged to buy, on an annual basis, a basic benefit package from a private health insurer. 
With the introduction of the HIA the government shifted part of its responsibilities to 
market parties. Health insurers have to become prudent buyers of care on behalf of their 
enrollees and are therefore given incentives and possibilities to selectively contract or 
integrate with (all) health care providers.
A crucial condition for insurers to act as prudent buyers of care is their ability to chan-
nel enrollees towards selected providers. Once insurers are able to successfully channel 
enrollees toward selected providers, their bargaining power vis-à-vis health care provid-
ers increases. Providers will have an incentive to offer high quality services at a reason-
able price in order to be included in the insurer’s network of providers. Insurers can then 
be seen as the intermediary between health care providers and enrollees. Providers of 
care may, however, only be willing to bargain with health insurers if insurers can offer an 
attractive network of enrollees. For providers not only the size of the insurer in terms of 
enrollees matters but also the insurers’ ability to steer its patients to the selected provid-
ers. Enrollees, on the other hand, may only be willing to buy a health insurance policy 
if insurers can offer an attractive network of providers. Once enrollees are reluctant to 
choose health plans with selected or preferred provider networks, health insurers will 
be unable to effectively bargain with health care providers over the price and quality 
of care.
Insurers are able to channel enrollees toward preferred providers via various chan-
neling strategies. In the US, insurers typically encourage preferred provider utilization 
through negative financial incentives (higher co-payments for non-contracted provid-
ers). The most restrictive forms are the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) that 
only offer reimbursement for within network care (except in case of emergency). More 
popular, however, are the less restrictive Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) that 
offer partial reimbursement for non-contracted providers. Instead of negative financial 
incentives, insurers can also use positive financial and qualitative incentives including 
better service, lower waiting lists, discounts and bonus payments to encourage pre-
ferred provider use.
In this thesis we investigate consumer preferences with respect to preferred providers 
and evaluate how health insurers have taken up their new role as prudent buyers of 
care in the Dutch health care system over the past few years. In chapter 2 we analyze 
whether health insurers have taken up their new role of prudent buyers of care after the 
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introduction of the new HIA. In addition, we investigate consumers’ attitudes with re-
spect to selective contracting and consumer channeling. In chapter 3, we evaluated the 
impact of the first experiments by health insurers with positive channeling incentives 
in the Dutch pharmaceutical market. Because of the limited experience with managed 
care in the Dutch health care market, we used discrete choice experiments in chapter 4 
and 5 to estimate consumers’ preferences to various channeling incentives to encour-
age the use of preferred pharmacies and preferred general practitioners (GPs). We have 
chosen to look at pharmacies and GPs because we expect preferences for channeling 
incentives between these two provider types to differ most. In chapter 6 we compare 
the two discrete choice experiments and discuss the implications for the effectiveness 
of channeling for both provider types.
In chapter 2, the evaluation of insurers’ contracting policies over the past few years 
showed that insurers have been quite reluctant to selectively contract with health care 
providers. Health insurers have hardly used stringent restrictions on provider choice or 
negative channeling incentives. Although health insurers have introduced differenti-
ated reimbursement limits for non-contracted and contracted care, the financial conse-
quences of these differentiated limits have been negligible since most insurers contract 
with more than 95% of all health care providers. Only one insurer introduced a health 
plan with a selected network of providers. Enrollees are stimulated, through a negative 
financial incentive, to visit the selected providers. Over time insurers introduced pre-
ferred provider contracts in which they grant a preferred provider ‘status’ to a provider 
that offers better than average quality of care as measured by a variety of performance 
indicators. Enrollees are stimulated with positive ‘soft’ incentives such as quality infor-
mation and financial bonuses to visit the preferred supplier. Provider choice is, however, 
not restricted since preferred and non-preferred providers are fully reimbursed.
The reluctance of health insurers to selectively contract care can be explained by the 
presence of a credible-commitment problem. Insurers that use negative financial incen-
tives or restrictions on provider choice have difficulty to credibly commit ex-ante to act 
as a good agent. This may explain the reluctance of insurers to use negative channeling 
incentives in the Dutch health care market. Survey analysis over the period 2005-2009 
showed that the insurer-credibility problem substantially increased during the first two 
years of the reform. The proportion of respondents willing to listen to insurers’ advice 
about provider choice reduced by about 50% across all provider types (including GPs, 
pharmacies, hospitals, dentists and physical therapists). Consumers’ reluctance to listen 
to insurers’ advice was highest in case of GPs and dentists and lowest in case of pharma-
cies and hospitals.
The lack of objective quality indicators is likely to be a major reason for this credible 
commitment problem. If consumers are not able to verify health insurers’ efforts to 
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provide good quality care ex ante, they are less likely to believe that health plans with 
restricted networks offer the best treatment because they do not trust the selected pro-
viders to have an incentive to offer good quality care. To solve the credible-commitment 
problem adequate quality information is needed that health insurers can use in their 
contracting policy. Insurers are then able to communicate the value of their selected 
provider network ex ante and can also more effectively manage care since they can use 
the objective quality information in their contracting policy.
In chapter 3, we examined consumer preferences for preferred pharmacies using natural 
experiments in the Dutch pharmaceutical market. In 2003 three health insurers (CZ, VGZ, 
De Friesland) started small scale experiments with preferred pharmacy contracts. These 
health insurers did not actually exclude other pharmacies from their provider network, 
but tried to stimulate their enrollees with positive financial (gift certificates and discounts 
on over-the-counter drugs) and qualitative (free body check-up, extended opening 
hours, one-stop shopping) incentives to visit preferred pharmacies. These pharmacies 
were labelled “preferred” since they offered discounts on the price of prescription drugs 
to insurers. Two of the three health insurers concluded preferred provider contracts with 
a new entrant. This entrant was an incumbent drug store that decided to provide phar-
maceutical care in its existing locations to facilitate convenience (one-stop) shopping for 
its customers. The third (regional) health insurer completed a public tender procedure 
for a new pharmacy located in a new residential area in which no other pharmacies were 
located and in which the health insurer had a large market share. Although our results 
showed that enrollees responded positively to both the financial and the qualitative 
incentives, the preferred provider contracts with the drugstore were terminated in 2008. 
The drugstore was simply not able to attract enough patients to sustain a financially 
stable pharmacy suggesting that many enrollees returned to their previous pharmacy 
once insurers stopped rewarding them for visiting the preferred pharmacy. Hence, the 
effect of the incentives on enrollees’ pharmacy choice had been only temporary. The 
third initiative did show a permanent effect on pharmacy choice but this effect was also 
caused by the setting in which the experiment has taken place. Because there is no other 
pharmacy located in the new residential area, distance also plays an important role in 
the decision making process. Furthermore, the pharmacy was located in a primary care 
center. The proximity of other health care providers, especially the general practitioner, 
has been also important in pharmacy choice. Therefore, as distance and the proximity of 
the GP also play an important role in pharmacy choice, insurers should not only focus on 
financial incentives to encourage preferred pharmacy use.
In chapter 4, 5 and 6, we designed two discrete choice experiments to estimate consum-
ers’ preferences for specific channeling incentives in the pharmaceutical market and the 
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market for general practitioners. The experiments showed that consumer sensitivity to 
channeling incentives is dependent on the type of provider and the status-quo bias for 
particular providers. While financial incentives play a stronger role in pharmacy choice, 
qualitative incentives are more important in GP choice. Moreover, negative financial 
incentives have a stronger impact than positive financial incentives. This effect is even 
more pronounced in case of GPs than in case of pharmacies. With GPs, positive financial 
incentives have a negligible effect on GP choice. Furthermore, status quo bias limits the 
effectiveness of channeling incentives in case of pharmacies as well as GPs. Status quo 
bias, however, plays a more important role in case of GPs than in case of pharmacies. 
The relative high reluctance to switch in case of GPs therefore decreases the impact of 
channeling incentives on GP choice.
Although influencing GP choice is likely to be more difficult than influencing phar-
macy choice because of the strong status-quo bias, successful channeling toward 
preferred GPs may have a longer lasting impact on provider choice. Once consumers 
are persuaded to switch to a preferred GP, they are likely to stay precisely because of the 
strong status quo bias. The higher effort of channeling to preferred GPs may, therefore, 
be compensated by a more long-term benefit. Moreover, the benefit of channeling 
toward preferred GPs may not be only confined to GPs but also to other providers. In 
the Netherlands, GPs function as gatekeepers because for most health services a referral 
of a GP is required. Since consumers are inclined to listen to advice from their GP about 
which hospital or specialist to consult, health insurers might be able to indirectly influ-
ence the choice of other health care providers as well, once they are able to successfully 
channel enrollees toward preferred GPs.
The difference in status quo bias between the two provider types also has implica-
tions for the timing and scope of channeling incentives. In the case of GPs, channeling 
incentives are likely to be most effective if they are targeted at people who did not yet 
register with a GP, for instance because they recently moved to another area. In addi-
tion, temporary incentives may be sufficient to encourage those people who switched 
to stay with the new provider. By contrast, in case of pharmacies channeling incentives 
are likely to be most effective if they a permanent. Permanent incentives are likely to be 
required to prevent people from returning to their previous pharmacy. However, they 
can be effectively targeted to all potential consumers.
Chapter 7 provides the most important conclusions and directions for further research. 
We found that channeling is not a ‘mission impossible’. We have shown that consumers 
are sensitive for both qualitative and financial incentives in provider choice. Negative 
financial incentives have the largest impact on provider choice. However, even though 
negative financial incentives have a large impact on provider choice, they may not be 
feasible in practice because they may increase the credible commitment problem for 
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health insurers. The credible commitment problem limits insurers’ possibilities to ef-
fectively manage care. Increasing the availability of adequate and reliable consumer 
information about the quality of health care providers is likely to be crucial to effectively 
reduce the insurer-credibility problem. If insurers can use adequate quality indicators to 
select preferred providers they are also able to communicate the value of their preferred 
provider network ex ante to their enrollees.
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Na de invoering van het nieuwe zorgstelsel in 2006 hebben verzekeraars een belang-
rijke rol als zorginkoper gekregen. Het systeem is in ontwikkeling van een aanbodge-
reguleerd systeem waarin prijs en aanbod sterk gereguleerd werden door de overheid, 
naar een vraaggestuurd systeem waarin marktpartijen een belangrijke(re) rol krijgen. 
Verzekeraars worden geacht te onderhandelen met aanbieders van zorg over de prijs 
en kwaliteit van zorg. Verzekerden moeten verzekeraars prikkelen om op te treden als 
goede inkopers door een kritische keuze te maken uit het polisaanbod op een concur-
rerende zorgmarkt. Zij kunnen jaarlijks van verzekeraar wisselen waarbij verzekeraars 
verplicht zijn om iedereen te accepteren voor het, door de overheid vastgestelde, 
basispakket tegen een niet naar persoonskenmerken gedifferentieerde premie. De over-
heid compenseert verzekeraars voor verzekerden met een hoog risico op ziekte via het 
risicovereveningssysteem om zo risicoselectie tegen te gaan.
Een belangrijke voorwaarde om als goede inkoper op te treden is dat verzekeraars 
de mogelijkheid hebben om verzekerden te sturen naar geselecteerde voorkeursaan-
bieders. Hierdoor neemt de onderhandelingsmacht van verzekeraars toe. Aanbieders 
zullen zorg met een goede prijs-kwaliteit verhouding moeten bieden om geselecteerd 
te worden door de verzekeraar. Hierbij treedt de verzekeraar op als intermediair tussen 
verzekerden en aanbieders. Aanbieders zullen echter pas bereid zijn om te onderhan-
delen met een verzekeraar als dat extra patiënten oplevert, terwijl verzekerden pas 
een polis zullen kopen als de verzekeraar een aantrekkelijk netwerk van aanbieders 
aanbiedt. Zodra verzekerden terughoudend zijn te kiezen voor voorkeursaanbieders, 
zullen verzekeraars niet in staat zijn om actief als zorginkoper te acteren.
Verzekeraars hebben verschillende mogelijkheden om verzekerden te sturen naar 
geselecteerde voorkeursaanbieders. Allereerst, kunnen verzekeraars met negatieve 
financiële prikkels het gebruik van voorkeursaanbieders bevorderen. Hierbij kunnen 
verzekeraars verschillende vergoedingslimieten hanteren voor niet-gecontracteerde 
aanbieders. De meest restrictieve vorm is om geen vergoeding te geven voor niet-gecon-
tracteerde aanbieders. Alleen zorg bij gecontracteerde aanbieders wordt dan vergoed 
door de verzekeraar. De consument wordt hierdoor sterk beperkt in zijn keuzevrijheid. 
Een minder restrictieve vorm is om niet-gecontracteerde zorg gedeeltelijk (bijvoorbeeld 
voor 80% tot 90%) te vergoeden. Verzekerden hebben dan nog steeds de mogelijkheid 
om, tegen een bijbetaling, niet-gecontracteerde aanbieders te bezoeken. Daarnaast 
kunnen verzekeraars ook op basis van positieve financiële en kwalitatieve prikkels 
het gebruik van voorkeursaanbieders bevorderen. Positieve prikkels kunnen worden 
gebruikt door verzekeraars die onderhandelen met voorkeursaanbieders over de prijs 
en kwaliteit van de zorg maar die de keuze van hun verzekerden niet willen beperken tot 
een selectief netwerk van aanbieders. Hiervoor kan de verzekeraar positieve financiële 
prikkels introduceren, zoals het kwijtschelden van het eigen risico, of positieve kwali-
tatieve prikkels zoals lagere wachttijden en betere service bij de voorkeursaanbieders.
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In deze dissertatie onderzoeken we de preferenties van consumenten ten aanzien van 
voorkeursaanbieders en evalueren we hoe zorgverzekeraars hun rol in het Nederlandse 
stelsel als zorginkoper in de laatste jaren hebben opgepakt. In hoofdstuk 2 analyseren 
we de ontwikkeling van verzekeraars tot actieve zorginkopers tijdens de transitie van 
een aanbodgestuurd systeem naar een vraaggestuurd systeem in de Nederlandse ge-
zondheidszorg. Hierbij onderzoeken we ook de houding van consumenten ten opzichte 
van inmenging van verzekeraars in de keuze voor een aanbieder. In hoofdstuk 3 analy-
seren we het effect van de eerste experimenten met voorkeursapotheken. Hierbij kijken 
we naar het effect van positieve financiële prikkels op de keuze voor een apotheek. 
Doordat er maar weinig natuurlijke experimenten met betrekking tot sturing zijn in de 
Nederlandse zorgmarkt hebben we in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 discrete keuze experimenten 
gebruikt om consumentenvoorkeuren voor verschillende prikkels in de apothekers en 
huisartsenmarkt te onderzoeken. We hebben gekozen voor huisartsen en apotheken 
omdat we, op basis van eerder onderzoek, verwachtten dat de mate van stuurbaarheid 
tussen deze twee aanbieders het meest zou verschillen. In hoofdstuk 6 vergelijken 
we de twee discrete keuze experimenten en trekken we conclusies over de mate van 
stuurbaarheid van verzekerden in beide markten.
Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat verzekeraars terughoudend zijn geweest om selectief te con-
tracteren. Verzekeraars hebben nauwelijks negatieve financiële prikkels gehanteerd om 
de keuze voor niet-gecontracteerde aanbieders te ontmoedigen. Hoewel verzekeraars 
wel verschillende vergoedingslimieten voor gecontracteerde en niet-gecontracteerde 
zorg hanteren, zijn de financiële consequenties hiervan voor verzekerden en aanbieders 
nog beperkt omdat verzekeraars meer dan 95% van alle aanbieders contracteren. Er is 
slechts één verzekeraar geweest die een voorkeurspolis in de markt heeft gezet waarbij 
hij een beperkt netwerk van voorkeursaanbieders heeft geselecteerd. Verzekerden 
worden via financiële prikkels (20% eigen bijdrage met een maximum van 500 euro 
per jaar) gestimuleerd om van deze aanbieders gebruik te maken. Andere verzekeraars 
richten zich ook op het contracteren van voorkeursaanbieders maar gebruiken geen 
harde restricties om het gebruik hiervan te stimuleren. Verzekerden ervaren namelijk 
geen beperkingen bij gebruik van niet-preferente aanbieders maar worden via positieve 
(financiële) prikkels gestimuleerd om voorkeursaanbieders te bezoeken.
De terughoudendheid van verzekeraars om restricties in keuze te introduceren wordt 
mede veroorzaakt door de negatieve houding van veel consumenten ten opzichte van 
keuzebeperkingen. Verzekeraars vrezen reputatieverlies en het verlies van verzekerden 
als zij polissen met een restrictief netwerk van aanbieders aanbieden. Een veelvoorko-
mend probleem is dat verzekerden geen vertrouwen hebben in verzekeraars die een 
restrictief netwerk van aanbieders contracteren. Dit vormt een belangrijke reden voor 
de focus op het gebruik van positieve prikkels om consumenten te sturen in plaats van 
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negatieve prikkels. Vragenlijsten laten zien dat consumenten terughoudend zijn om 
advies van hun verzekeraar op te volgen als het gaat om de keuze voor een zorgaanbie-
der. Deze terughoudendheid is in de jaren na de invoering van de Zorgverzekeringswet 
toegenomen. De bereidheid om advies op te volgen van de verzekeraar daalde met 
ongeveer 50%. Deze daling kwam naar voren bij alle onderzochte aanbieders (huisart-
sen, apotheken, fysiotherapeuten, tandartsen, en ziekenhuizen). De terughoudendheid 
om advies op te volgen blijkt minder groot bij ziekenhuizen en apotheken dan bij de 
overige aanbieders. Consumenten zijn het meest terughoudend om advies op te volgen 
als het gaat om de keuze voor een huisarts of tandarts.
Om het vertrouwensprobleem op te lossen is objectieve kwaliteitsinformatie over 
zorgaanbieders nodig die verzekeraars kunnen gebruiken in hun contracteerbeleid. 
Verzekerden zijn namelijk wel gevoelig voor kwaliteit en meer bereid om advies van 
de zorgverzekeraar op te volgen als dit gebaseerd is op objectieve kwaliteitsinformatie. 
Het beschikbaar komen van objectieve kwaliteitsinformatie voor zowel verzekeraars als 
verzekerden kan de relatief negatieve houding van consumenten positief beïnvloeden. 
Met objectieve kwaliteitsinformatie kan de verzekeraar komen tot een betere selectie 
van voorkeursaanbieders en tevens tot een effectievere sturing naar deze voorkeurs-
aanbieders.
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we verschillende experimenten van verzekeraars met voor-
keursapotheken geanalyseerd. De bevindingen laten zien dat consumenten positief 
reageren op (financiële) prikkels. In 2003 zijn er verschillende verzekeraars geweest 
die voorkeursapotheken hebben gecontracteerd. Eén initiatief had betrekking op het 
openen van een voorkeursapotheek in een bestaande drogisterijketen. Een ander 
initiatief is opgezet door een kleine regionale verzekeraar die een voorkeursapotheek 
heeft opgericht in een nieuwbouwwijk waar nog geen andere apotheken gevestigd 
waren. De voorkeursapotheken zijn geselecteerd op basis van prijs. Beide verzekeraars 
hebben hun verzekerden actief geïnformeerd over de mogelijkheid om de preferente 
apotheek te bezoeken en stimuleren hun verzekerden via financiële (cadeaubonnen 
en korting op zelfzorggeneesmiddelen) en kwalitatieve (gratis bodycheck, ruimere 
openingstijden, one-stop shopping) prikkels om gebruik te maken van de voorkeurs-
apotheek. Hoewel de resultaten laten zien dat verzekerden positief hebben gereageerd 
op zowel de financiële als de kwalitatieve prikkels, zijn de initiatieven met betrekking tot 
de drogisterij-apotheek gestaakt in 2008. Consumenten bleken wel gevoelig te zijn voor 
financiële prikkels maar de eenmalige acties waren onvoldoende om de keuze blijvend 
te beïnvloeden. De voorkeursapotheek van de kleinere regionale verzekeraar liet wel 
een blijvend effect zien maar dit effect werd mede veroorzaakt door de setting waarin 
het experiment plaatsvond. Doordat er in de nieuwbouwwijk geen andere apotheek 
gevestigd is speelt, naast de financiële prikkels, afstand een grote rol in het keuzeproces. 
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Bovendien is deze apotheek gevestigd in een gezondheidscentrum waar zich ook een 
huisarts gevestigd heeft. Deze heeft ook een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij de keuze voor 
de voorkeursapotheek.
In hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6 bespreken we de resultaten van de discrete keuze experimenten 
waarmee de relatieve voorkeuren van consumenten voor prikkels in de apothekersmarkt 
en huisartsenmarkt zijn gemeten. Uit deze experimenten blijkt dat de gevoeligheid voor 
sturingsmechanismen afhankelijk is van het type aanbieder en de loyaliteit ten opzichte 
van de eigen aanbieder. Waar financiële prikkels een sterke rol spelen bij de keuze voor 
een apotheek, blijken kwalitatieve prikkels juist een belangrijke rol te spelen bij de 
keuze voor een huisarts. Verder zien we dat negatieve financiële prikkels een sterkere rol 
spelen dan positieve financiële prikkels. Dit effect is sterker bij huisartsen, waar positieve 
financiële prikkels een verwaarloosbaar effect hebben op de keuze voor een huisarts. 
Daarnaast is er zowel bij de apotheek als bij de huisarts sprake van een status quo bias. 
Bij een keuze tussen de ‘eigen’ apotheek of huisarts en een alternatief met objectief 
hoger gewaardeerde kenmerken kiest een substantieel aandeel van de respondenten 
voor de ‘eigen’ apotheek of huisarts. De status quo bias speelt een belangrijkere rol bij 
de keuze voor een huisarts dan bij de keuze voor een apotheek. Sturingsmechanismen 
zijn in de huisartsenmarkt dus minder effectief door de lage switchingsbereidheid van 
consumenten. Een verklaring hiervan kan liggen in de sterkere vertrouwensrelatie die 
verzekerden hebben met hun huisarts en in de verplichte registratie bij een huisarts in 
het Nederlandse stelsel.
Hoewel sturing naar preferente huisartsen moeilijker zal zijn dan sturing naar pre-
ferente apotheken, verwachten we dat succesvolle sturing naar preferente huisartsen 
uiteindelijk een grotere impact kan hebben. Doordat de huisarts een poortwachterfunc-
tie heeft en patiënten doorverwijst naar andere zorgaanbieders in de eerste en tweede 
lijn, is het mogelijk om via de huisarts de keuze voor andere aanbieders te beïnvloeden. 
Het merendeel van de verzekerden heeft vertrouwen in het oordeel van de huisarts en 
is bereid om advies van de huisarts op te volgen. Verzekeraars die de keuze voor de 
huisarts kunnen beïnvloeden kunnen daardoor eventueel ook de keuze voor andere 
aanbieders bepalen. Daarnaast verwachten wij dat een eenmalige succesvolle sturing 
een blijvend effect zal hebben op de keuze voor een huisarts. Doordat consumenten 
loyaal zijn aan een eenmaal gekozen huisarts, zal een eenmalige effectieve sturings-
prikkel een langdurig effect hebben. We verwachten dat consumenten minder snel 
terugswitchen naar hun oorspronkelijke huisarts wanneer ze eenmaal geswitcht zijn. 
Hierdoor zijn tijdelijke prikkels misschien voldoende om mensen blijvend over de streep 
te trekken. Verzekerden die voor het eerst een huisarts kiezen of die recent verhuisd zijn, 
zijn het best te beïnvloeden aangezien zij nog geen status quo bias ervaren. Zij hebben 
immers nog geen vaste huisarts. Een effectieve sturingsstrategie van een verzekeraar 
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zou dus zijn om deze verzekerden actief te stimuleren om voor een voorkeursaanbieder 
te kiezen. Bij apotheken zijn verzekerden gevoeliger voor financiële prikkels en zullen 
dus eerder wisselen van apotheek om een financieel voordeel te behalen. Daarnaast 
speelt de status quo bias een minder belangrijke rol dan bij de huisarts. Daardoor zullen 
verzekeraars niet alleen nieuwe maar ook bestaande verzekerden effectiever kunnen 
prikkelen om een voorkeursaanbieder te kiezen.
In hoofdstuk 7 bespreken we de belangrijkste conclusies en geven we de richting aan 
voor verder onderzoek. Ons onderzoek wijst uit dat consumentensturing in de zorg geen 
onmogelijke missie is. Verzekerden blijken gevoelig voor positieve en negatieve prikkels 
bij de keuze voor een aanbieder. Negatieve financiële prikkels hebben het grootste 
effect op de keuze voor een aanbieder. Negatieve financiële prikkels vergroten echter 
waarschijnlijk ook het vertrouwensprobleem tussen de verzekeraar en de verzekerde. 
Dit vertrouwensprobleem kan ertoe leiden dat verzekerden geen polissen kiezen met 
beperkingen in hun keuzevrijheid. Dit verhindert de mogelijkheid voor verzekeraars 
om effectief op te treden als zorginkoper. De verdere ontwikkeling van objectieve 
kwaliteitsindicatoren is essentieel voor een effectieve rol van zorgverzekeraars als 
zorginkoper. Zodra verzekeraars objectieve kwaliteitsindicatoren kunnen gebruiken 
om voorkeursaanbieders te selecteren, kunnen zij hun verzekerden geloofwaardiger 
adviseren om van deze voorkeursaanbieders gebruik te maken.
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Wat een ontzettend mooi gevoel om dit eindelijk te mogen schrijven. Na vijf jaar van 
ups en downs kan ik dan eindelijk zeggen dat mijn proefschrift ‘af’ is. Hoewel onderzoek 
natuurlijk nooit helemaal af is, is een proefschrift dat op een gegeven moment wel. Dat 
dit proefschrift afgerond voor u ligt is mede te danken aan een aantal mensen die mij in 
de afgelopen vijf jaar geholpen hebben. Deels inhoudelijk maar zeker ook emotioneel 
met het beklimmen van de berg die het schrijven van een proefschrift heet.
Allereerst wil ik Erik Schut en Wynand van de Ven bedanken voor de mogelijkheid om 
bij het iBMG, sectie ziektekostenverzekeringen een promotietraject te starten. Dat zij 
mij hebben uitgenodigd voor een gesprek en vervolgens ook daadwerkelijk de kans 
hebben geboden om te beginnen met een promotie in de zorgsector heb ik erg gewaar-
deerd. Het vertrouwen dat hieruit sprak en er ook altijd is geweest in de afgelopen vijf 
jaar heeft mij altijd gestimuleerd om door te zetten.
Erik Schut wil ik nog speciaal bedanken voor alle hulp en begeleiding in de afgelopen 
vijf jaar. Jij hebt mij vele malen geholpen om mijn promotietraject tot een goed einde te 
brengen. De reacties op de vele, vele versies van alle artikelen die jij doorgenomen hebt, 
zijn van zeer grote waarde geweest. Je hebt volgens mij veel geduld moeten opbrengen 
om mij iedere keer weer op het ‘rechte’ pad te houden. Ook heb je vaak mijn ongeduld 
moeten indammen. Naast alleen het inhoudelijke heb jij ook altijd tijd genomen om te 
luisteren naar de ‘beren’ die ik tijdens mijn promotietraject tegen kwam. Ik had me geen 
betere begeleider kunnen wensen. Ik heb veel van je geleerd.
Daarnaast wil ik Xander Koolman heel erg bedanken voor het luisterende oor in de 
eerste jaren van mijn promotietraject. Jouw deur stond altijd open als ik ergens over 
twijfelde of inhoudelijk ergens tegen aan liep. Dankzij jouw econometrische kennis heb 
ik mijn eerste artikelen kunnen schrijven. Dank hiervoor en ik weet zeker dat we ook in 
de toekomst nog vaker zullen samenwerken.
Ook Bas Donkers wil ik hartelijk bedanken voor zijn input. Bij het opzetten van de 
discrete choice experimenten heb ik herhaaldelijk een beroep kunnen doen op jouw 
ervaring en expertise. Daarnaast wil ik je bedanken voor de tijd die je genomen hebt om 
de artikelen door te lezen, te brainstormen over de methode en het leveren van kritisch 
commentaar op de artikelen.
Daarnaast wil ik de leden van de promotiecommisse bedanken voor het lezen en beoor-
delen van mijn proefschrift en voor het opponeren tijdens de verdediging.
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Verder was dit onderzoek niet mogelijk geweest zonder de bijdragen van zorgverzeke-
raars CZ en DFZ. Zij hebben mijn eerste onderzoeken gefaciliteerd door hun data ter 
beschikking te stellen en mijn vragenlijsten onder hun verzekerden uit te zetten. Ik wil 
hen hier hartelijk voor bedanken. Een speciaal bedankje gaat uit naar Nelly de Jong die 
het vetrouwen in mij heeft gehad om mij aan de slag te laten gaan bij DFZ. Jouw en-
thousiasme en betrokkenheid bij het onderzoek heb ik erg gewaardeerd. Daarnaast wil 
ik ook de verschillende partijen, waaronder de LHV, Menzis, VGZ, Achmea, CZ, DFZ, Etos, 
en de DA, waarmee ik gesprekken over mijn onderzoek heb gevoerd in de afgelopen 
jaren nog speciaal bedanken voor de tijd die zij hiervoor vrijgemaakt hebben.
Ook wil ik hier in het bijzonder Nynke de Vries en Annemieke Leunis bedanken voor het 
invoeren van mijn data. Annemieke, ontzettend leuk dat jij uiteindelijk je plekje bij het 
iMTA gevonden hebt.
Buiten de directe inhoudelijke bijdragen wil ik natuurlijk ook mijn collega’s bedanken 
voor de ontzettend leuke tijd die ik heb gehad bij iBMG. In het bijzonder de collega’s 
van ZKV (Wynand, Erik, René, Trea, Marco, Richard, Doeska, Femmeke, Piet, Francesco, 
Weiwei, Frank en Stéphanie). Trea super bedankt voor alle leuke en fijne gesprekken die 
niet altijd alleen maar over statistiek gingen! Marco, ook jou wil ik heel erg bedanken 
voor de fijne samenwerking en de leuke congressen (mijn voeten doen nog zeer maar 
dat ligt ook deels aan Richard!). Heel erg bedankt voor al het advies in de afgelopen 
jaren.
Dan nog in het bijzonder mijn kamergenootjes, Doeska en Maite. Doeska bedankt voor 
de leuke tijd die we gehad hebben als kamergenootjes in het L-gebouw. Beiden nog 
zoekende in het begin, naar zowel het invullen van het onderwijs als het invullen van 
het onderzoek. Ik heb ontzettend veel aan je gehad in die beginperiode en het was altijd 
fijn om mijn verhaal kwijt te kunnen. Daarnaast Maite, ik wil je bedanken voor de leuke 
tijd, de betrokkenheid bij mijn onderzoek en mijn ‘leven’ buiten de universiteit. Super 
bedankt voor het helpen met de laatste loodjes. Ik heb veel van je geleerd en ik wil je 
alle succes wensen bij het afronden van jouw proefschrift de komende tijd. We houden 
contact!
Buiten alle collega’s om wil ik natuurlijk ook nog in het speciaal mijn lieve vrienden 
en familie bedanken voor alle steun tijdens het proces. Jullie oren zullen ondertussen 
moe zijn van alle promotieperikelen, maar zie hier het resultaat! In het bijzonder een 
bedankje voor mijn paranimfen Cas en Renske. Cas, ondanks de drukke agenda’s ben 
jij er altijd op de achtergrond. Het is een fijn gevoel dat ik altijd kan aankloppen voor 
advies in Den Haag, super dat jij vandaag hier naast me staat! Ook Renske, mijn lieve 
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grote zus, wil ik bedanken voor het feit dat je hier naast me staat vandaag. Wie had dat 
gedacht?! Heerlijk dat ik altijd langs kan komen om even lekker met Imke en Timme te 
spelen en te kletsen. Emile jij ook bedankt voor de interesse en tips. Je bent met ‘stip’ 
mijn favoriete schoonbroer!
Pap en Mam, altijd was er tijd en ruimte om te bellen en langs te komen. Jullie hebben 
mij altijd gestimuleerd en vrij gelaten om de ‘wereld’ in mijn eentje te ontdekken. Of 
dat nu vakantiewerk in Frankrijk betrof, het studeren in een ander land, het verhuizen 
naar de grote stad Rotterdam of de backpack vakanties in al die enge verre landen, jullie 
waren en zijn er altijd. Ik kan niet uitdrukken hoeveel me dat geholpen heeft en nog 
helpt. Een hele dikke kus van mij.
Sander, het laatste woord is voor jou. Het is moeilijk om op papier uit te drukken hoe be-
langrijk het voor me is dat je er bent. Samen met jou is alles gewoon veel leuker (behalve 
de spelletjes boggle die ik maar niet kan winnen)! Het is heerlijk om te weten dat ik met 
alles bij jou terecht kan. Je stimuleert me altijd om net een stapje extra te zetten. Ik vind 
het ontzettend bijzonder om samen met jou de volgende stap te zetten.
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Lieke Boonen (1981) graduated in 1999 from secondary school (Athenaeum) at Sint 
Ursula in Horn. From 1999 to 2003 she studied International Economics and Finance at 
Tilburg University, where she graduated with a Master’s thesis on the pharmaceutical 
market. After graduation she continued her studies with a master Health Economics at 
the institute of Health Policy and Management at the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
from which she graduated in 2004.
In 2004, she started working as a PhD-student at the institute of Health Policy and Man-
agement. From 2004-2009 she worked on her dissertation and published her research 
articles in national and international journals. In addition, she presented her work at 
several national and international conferences between 2005 and 2009. She developed 
a particular interest in consumer behavior, health plan choice and health care provider 
choice. Next to her dissertation she also worked on other projects involving health plan 
choice. She obtained grants from ZONMW for research related to her PhD project in 
2006 and 2008.
As a teacher, Lieke has been involved in the Bachelor program Health Sciences at the 
Earsmus University where she was a lecturer in the courses Statistics and Economics for 
Bachelor students and the course Advanced Economic Evaluation for Master students. 
In addition, she also supervised bachelor and master theses.
Currently, Lieke is working at SIRM, Strategies in Regulated Markets. As a consultant she 
continues her research focusing on health care.
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PhD Portfolio
PhD Student:
Department:
PhD period:
Promotor:
Lieke H.H.M. Boonen
Institute of Health Policy and Management
2004-2009
Prof.dr. F.T. (Erik) Schut
PhD Training
Training
-  Presenting and discussion skills 2008
-  Discrete Choice Modeling – Erasmus University 2007
-  Techniques for writing and presenting a scientific paper- Wageningen University 2007
-  Individual Choice Behaviour- Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge (VS) 2006
-  Discrete Choice Modeling- Institute for Fiscal Studies in Londen (England) 2006
-  Academic writing for PhD students – Erasmus University 2005
-  Microeconomics II- Tinbergen institute 2005
-  Discrete choice Experiments – Erasmus University 2005
-  Mathematics II- Tinbergen institute 2004
Presentations
-  7th world congress of the international Health Economics Association (iHEA), Beijng (China) 2009
-  LOLA Studygroup, Maastricht 2009
-  2nd biennial conference of the American Society of Health Economics (ASHE), Durham (U.S.) 2008
-  Conference on “Health Economics and the Pharmaceuticals Industry” organised by the 
Institut D’Economie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (Frankrijk)
2007
-  6th World Congress of the international Health Economics Association (iHEA), Copenhagen 
(Denmark)
2007
-  Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) / Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) 2006
-  6th European Conference on Health Economics, Budapest (Hungary) 2006
-  5th World Congress of the international Health Economics Association (iHEA), Barcelona 
(Spain)
2005
Teaching qualifications and experience
Courses followed
-  Basic didactical skills 2004
Lecturing
-  Bachelor in Health Policy and Management: Statistics; lecturer 2004-2009
- Bachelor in Health Policy and Management: Economics of Health care; lecturer 2003-2009
- Master Health Economics: Advanced Economic Evaluation; lecturer 2008-2009
Supervising Master’s and Bachelor’s thesis
- Bachelor in Health Policy and Management; supervisor
- Master Health Economics; supervisor
